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Editors’ Introduction
In this general issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention, the editors are pleased
to present a diverse collection of articles. These include a critical examination of the
issue of intent in the punishment of genocide and an assessment of the effectiveness
of the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.
Two articles consider justice in Rwanda, one advocating the wider application of
restorative justice approaches and the other examining the construction of memory
within the context of transitional justice. The final two articles explore the use of
testimonials in teaching about genocide, and the manner in which the Armenian
genocide was perceived in Sweden.
In ‘‘The Issue of Intent in the Genocide Convention and its Effect on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Toward a Knowledge-Based
Approach,’’ Katherine Goldsmith challenges the prevailing and restrictive definition
of genocidal intent, defined as dolus specialis, or clear, specific, and explicit intent.
She argues that such an approach mitigates efforts to both prevent and punish geno-
cide. In addition, based on her examination of Raphael Lemkin’s writings and of
documents concerning the framing of the United Nations Genocide Convention, she
maintains that such a restrictive approach was never the aim of either Lemkin or
the drafters of the Convention. To restore the concept of intent to what she argues
was originally envisioned, Goldsmith advocates a knowledge-based approach that
is centered more on inference from actions than on specific statements from perpe-
trators. Under this approach, an individual who commits an illegal act with the
knowledge that it forms part of a larger plan to destroy a group would be guilty of
genocide. Such an approach, she contends, would facilitate convictions for genocide,
serve as a deterrent to those who would otherwise engage in such acts, and realign
the interpretation of intent with the original views of both Lemkin and the framers
of the Convention.
Aidan Hehir explores the efficacy of the United Nations office that is responsible
for detecting and preventing genocide in ‘‘An Analysis of Perspectives on the Office of
the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.’’ Hehir highlights the political
and diplomatic dynamics that shape and limit the utility of the office. Some of these
strained dynamics are within the United Nations itself, from which the Special
Adviser obtains most of his information. In practice, this has often been difficult, as
various offices are sometimes reluctant to provide information, often for reasons of
bureaucratic territoriality. In addition, the Special Adviser can only make public
statements with the support and approval of the Secretary-General. To the problematic
issues of bureaucracy and institutional politics is added the inherently difficult, and
somewhat paradoxical, nature of the Special Adviser’s work. Success is hard to
evaluate as the office is oriented toward preventing events from happening. In addi-
tion, the focus on a low-key diplomatic approach often results in recommendations
that are not recorded, or heeded. Hehir concludes that the Office would be more
effective with a more aggressive and public approach to preventing genocide, and he
calls for the Special Adviser to have the right to address the Security Council. Impor-
tant as these recommendations are, they would not solve the many problems facing
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the Special Adviser, such as bureaucratic intransigence, unwillingness of nations to
exercise political will, and the inherently advisory nature of the Office.
In ‘‘Reconciliation and Justice after Genocide: A Theoretical Exploration,’’
Genevie`ve Parent challenges the primacy and efficacy of retributive justice in post-
genocide contexts. Using Rwanda as an example, she argues that punitive justice,
and especially the gacaca courts, provide little more than the illusion of either justice
or a victim’s psychological healing. Instead, their adversarial nature not only rein-
forces and perpetuates historic divisions and animosities, but also further victimizes
those who have suffered loss. The situation is further complicated by ambiguities
concerning victim/perpetrator status, most pronounced among those of mixed ancestry.
In lieu of punitive justice, Parent advocates the application of restorative justice,
where, on the basis of an acknowledgment of suffering, all parties endeavor to
view events and conditions from the other’s perspective and generate momentum
toward mutual understanding and, ultimately, forgiveness and cooperation. These
goals reflect the social and psychological emphases of restorative justice, and its
ultimate aim of restoring the humanity of all those involved in genocidal conflicts.
Elisabeth King, in ‘‘Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Implica-
tions for Peacebuilding,’’ focuses on the context in which transitional justice takes
place, and specifically the construction of memory about the Rwandan genocide.
Based on her extensive field interviews, she contrasts the diversity of survivors’
accounts and experiences with the much more constricted presentation of memory
by the government in the Kigali Memorial Center and in school textbooks. Seeking
to bolster government legitimacy, Hutu accounts of victimhood, and of heroic actions
of Hutus saving Tutsis are almost entirely excluded from the official memory. Simi-
larly, Tutsi experiences of conscription into then-rebel forces and the predicament of
those of mixed ancestry are also denied recognition. While such selective perception
and construction of historical memory reinforces government legitimacy, at least in
the short term, King argues that it undermines the longer process of reconstructing
the social fabric of the nation by failing to acknowledge the diversity of experiences
and suffering during the genocide.
The efficacy of using first-hand accounts to teach about rape-as-genocide is
explored by Kimberley Ducey in ‘‘Dilemmas of Teaching the ‘Greatest Silence’:
Rape-as-Genocide in Rwanda, Darfur, and Congo.’’ The section of her class that
focuses on this topic is situated in the context of an upper-level undergraduate sociology
course on comparative genocide. The unit on rape-as-genocide is theoretically framed
in terms of the causes and effects of violence against women, and informed by an
examination of the international law aspects of rape-as-genocide. It is within this
context that Ducey introduces first-hand accounts, through testimonials, documen-
taries, and commentaries. The article offers testimonials by students that under-
scores the importance and impact of including the personal dimension of victims in
the study of genocide. By doing so, students relate to and emphasize the individual
dimension, thus adding a level of comprehension that goes well beyond statistics
and facts. Readers who include or are considering including a course component on
rape-as-genocide will find this article useful in terms of sources and structure.
Finally, in ‘‘The Armenian Genocide of 1915 from a Neutral Small State’s Perspec-
tive: Sweden,’’ Vahagn Avedian explores how the Swedish people and government
perceived the Armenian genocide. While newspaper and missionary accounts offered
differing and often competing perspectives and framed popular perceptions of events,
dispatches from military and diplomatic sources further informed government
officials. Unlike newspaper reports, which were generally second-hand information,
Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:3 December 2010
236
missionary, military, and diplomatic accounts came directly from the field and, as a
result, are important primary sources and cover a considerable time frame. Ironi-
cally, although Sweden’s neutrality enabled it to gather and disseminate important
information on the genocide, it also eliminated the possibility of government action
on behalf of the victims. The nature of official correspondence also evolved over
time. With the arrival in 1920 of a new Swedish envoy to Turkey, Gustaf Oskar
Wallenberg, the emphasis shifted from the humanitarian focus of his predecessor,
Per Gustaf August Cosswa Anckarsva¨rd, to one centered on future commercial
opportunities. With this, the sympathy for the victims of the genocide evidenced
by Ambassador Anckarsva¨rd was eclipsed by a current of Armenian denigration.
Not only does this study offer a new perspective on the Armenian genocide, it also
implicitly raises the question of the limits of the value of neutrality in the face of
genocide.
We hope that this diverse collection of articles will both foster a better under-
standing of, and stimulate further debate concerning, genocide.
Nicholas Robins
Co-editor
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The Issue of Intent in the Genocide
Convention and Its Effect on the
Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide: Toward a
Knowledge-Based Approach
Katherine Goldsmith
Since the Genocide Convention was created in 1948, its effectiveness has been
hindered by debates on what the definition actually means. It has been widely
accepted that the meaning of ‘‘ intent,’’ within the Genocide Convention, refers to
specific or special intent, dolus specialis. However, as more trials have taken place,
creating more understanding of the crime of genocide, the linking of dolus specialis
with the intent definition, that was so easily accepted at the first genocide trial
(Akayesu at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR]), has been
repeatedly put into question. The new approach being put forward as the most
appropriate interpretation of ‘‘intent’’ is the knowledge-based approach. The
Vienna Convention on Treaties states that interpretations of laws should follow
the treaty’s original purpose and objective, and should do this by looking at the
preparatory work and its circumstances. By looking at the Travaux Pre´paratoires
of the Genocide Convention and Raphael Lemkin’s original writings on the subject,
this article will discuss which approach fits the original intentions of both the
drafters of the Convention and Lemkin himself, to determine which interpretation
should be used in the future when considering the crime of genocide.
Key words: Genocide Convention, intent, Raphael Lemkin, Darfur, ICTR, ICTY
The Origins of the Term ‘‘Genocide’’
While studying at the University of Lvov, Raphael Lemkin, a twenty-one-year-old
Polish Jew, came across an article on Soghomon Tehlirian. Tehlirian was an
Armenian Genocide survivor on trial for the murder of Mehmet Talaat, one of the
orchestrators of the Armenian Genocide, who had at the time escaped prosecution.
‘‘Lemkin asked [his professor] why the Armenians did not have Talaat arrested for
the massacre. The professor said there was no law under which he could be arrested.
‘Consider the case of a farmer, who owns a flock of chickens,’ he said. ‘He kills them
and this is his business. If you interfere, you are trespassing.’ ’’1 Finding this gap in
international law intolerable, Lemkin began work on an international law proposal
for this sort of crime.
Raphael Lemkin originally created two new international laws: ‘‘barbarity’’ and
‘‘vandalism.’’ These laws were presented to the Fifth International Conference for
the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid in 1933,2 in Lemkin’s absence. Because of
travel visa problems and opposition from the Polish government, he could not attend.
His proposal also referenced the discrimination taking place in Germany against the
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Jews as a cause for concern. Although receiving little positive response from leaders,
he continued to press for action on this issue.
Lemkin then became caught up in World War II. He escaped to Sweden in 1940,
and then the United States in 1941. While documenting his findings on Nazi actions
and laws imposed in occupied Europe, he continued lobbying the US government
to take action to stop these atrocities. On hearing Winston Churchill’s 1941 speech
referring to the situation in occupied Europe as ‘‘a crime without a name,’’ Lemkin
realized that he needed to find the appropriate name for this crime.
In 1944, Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of
Government, Proposals for Redress was published containing the word ‘‘genocide’’ to
describe the ‘‘crime without a name.’’ Lemkin stated that genocide (from the Greek
term for race or tribe, genos, and the Latin word for killing, cide,) was ‘‘the destruc-
tion of a nation or of an ethnic group.’’3
Genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except
when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather
to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves. . . . Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the
actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but
as members of the national group.4
When World War II ended, the extent of the Nazis’ atrocities was revealed and the
Allies began discussing appropriate punishments for these crimes. The Nuremberg
Trials were established, in 1945, with jurisdiction over three categories of crimes:
‘‘crimes against peace,’’ ‘‘war crimes,’’ and ‘‘crimes against humanity.’’ Though geno-
cide was cited in the indictments, the convictions reflecting the actions of the Nazis
were regarded as crimes against humanity.
After the Nuremberg Trials, many were concerned with the gap in international
law that meant the actions taken by the Nazis before the war, being out of the con-
text of war, were not covered under the Nuremberg Charter. Lemkin consistently
lobbied at the UN for a resolution on the crime of genocide. Due largely to his efforts,
the United Nations General Assembly began discussions on whether genocide should
be a crime under international law.
On 11 December 1946, the General Assembly Resolution 96(I) declared ‘‘that
genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns,
and for the commission of which principals and accomplices—whether private indi-
viduals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious,
racial, political or any other grounds—are punishable.’’5 The General Assembly then
referred the issue to the Economic and Social Council asking them to create a draft
convention for the crime of genocide.
On 9 December 1948, less than two years after the General Assembly declared
genocide a crime under international law, General Assembly Resolution 260(III)A
unanimously adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Article II of which defines genocide as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
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(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.6
The UN Convention is highly important, as it is the key international law that
creates a legal obligation for action in cases of genocide. Once a situation of genocide
has been determined, under the rules of the Convention the ‘‘contracting parties’’
may refer the situation to the UN, which has the responsibility to act, in line with
the purpose of the Convention, to prevent further atrocities and punish any already
committed. Since the adoption of the Convention, the UN’s response has been
paralyzed by legal debates about what the definition actually means, and whether a
situation is or is not genocide, according to the definition in the Convention.
As stated above, the Convention was created to prevent and punish the crime of
genocide. Although punishment is self-explanatory, genocide prevention can mean
either preventing genocidal actions from ever taking place or preventing further
atrocities once genocide has arguably begun. For the purpose of this article, it means
the latter. It is worth pointing out that though action should also take place to stop
other mass atrocities and crimes against humanity, these actions are more in rela-
tion to the first meaning (prevent genocide ever taking place). Genocide prevention,
in the sense of prevention before it ever takes place, could in turn prevent many
other atrocities when effective steps are put in place. At the early stages of genocide,
for example, there are many acts that are crimes in their own right. Similarly,
preventing other international human rights abuses, such as hate crimes, could in
turn have a positive effect on preventing genocide. Because this article concerns
prevention meaning preventing further atrocities once genocide has begun, it will
not look at preventing other crimes. In addition, this article explores the Genocide
Convention, so arguments around intent will be looked at in relation to the crime of
genocide only.
In relation to Gregory Stanton’s ‘‘8 Stages of Genocide’’,7 once genocide reaches
the seventh stage (extermination, where the systematic killing begins), in most geno-
cide cases, the majority of killing happens early on. During the Rwandan genocide,
for example, ‘‘about 80 percent of the victims died in a ‘hurricane of death . . . between
the second week of April and the third week of May’.’’8 Although there are many
stages before the extermination stage, these earlier stages, as discussed, can show
signs of crimes other than genocide. As the legal obligation lies with genocide, many
have used this excuse (that these actions are not the beginning of the genocidal process
but are a different crime altogether) for non-involvement in stopping the atrocities.
Therefore, the possibility of preventive action is rarely, if ever, spoken of until mass
violence has commenced. Once it is spoken of, this is where the problematic general
conversations regarding genocide begin. It is crucial that preventative action take
precedence over general conversations about genocide. A decision could be reached
more quickly if the definition of genocide was clearer. One of the main difficulties
with the definition concerns the element of ‘‘intent.’’
The Genocide Convention, as stated above, simply reads, ‘‘genocide means any of
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a . . . group,
as such.’’ The type of intent required (e.g., dolus specialis, dolus eventualis, general,
or knowledge-based) is not stated. This absence of a clear definition has resulted in
much debate and arguably hindered the effectiveness of the Convention. Although
there may be other reasons hindering action, the question surrounding the meaning
Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:3 December 2010
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of ‘‘ intent’’ comes up frequently, and if this barrier was removed, it would be one less
obstacle preventing action, and one less excuse for states to use.
The people involved in international law come from different countries with
different legal systems, which can cause problems. The different levels of ‘‘intent’’
vary from one system to another, creating conflict when determining what degree of
intent is required for different international crimes, and whether a perpetrator is
guilty or not. The type of intent regularly associated with genocide is the Romano-
Germanic civil law term, dolus specialis. Recently, many scholars have argued that
dolus specialis is too strict and that a knowledge-based approach should be adopted,
which is more closely related to the intent required in a common-law legal system.
Specific intent (dolus specialis) will be discussed here first, along with the negative
effect it has on genocide prevention and punishment. A knowledge-based approach will
then be examined. Following this, in order to determine what the Convention means
by ‘‘intent,’’ there will be an exploration of the discussions that occurred during the
drafting of the Convention and of the reasons the Convention was originally created.
Dolus Specialis (Specific Intent)
Dolus specialis ‘‘demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act
charged.’’9 In relation to genocide, it means the perpetrator commits an act while
clearly seeking to destroy the particular group, in whole or in part.
Genocide has been dubbed the ‘‘crime of all crimes’’ and, for some, should require
the highest form of intent. The UN International Law Commission (ILC), in the
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind commentaries
(1996), states that a general intent would not be sufficient and that genocide
‘‘requires a particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall
consequence of the prohibited act.’’10 Guenael Mettraux continues this argument by
stating that ‘‘genocide was adopted to sanction a very specific sort of criminal action.
It would be regrettable to denature genocide for the sake of encompassing within its
terms as many categories and degrees of criminal involvement as possible.’’11
A prominent argument for the specific intent requirement is that dolus specialis
is what separates the crime of genocide from other international crimes, e.g., crimes
against humanity. This argument is put forward by many, including William Schabas,
who states that ‘‘[w]hat sets genocide apart from crimes against humanity and war
crimes is that the act . . . must be committed with the specific intent to destroy in
whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.’’12 Some argue
that this distinction is very important as it holds genocide above crimes against
humanity in relation to the seriousness of the crime.
Dolus specialis is seen by some as the only appropriate intent level for the crime
of genocide, as allowing any lower form of intent would risk situations that result in
the destruction of a group, with no intent of this destruction taking place, being
wrongly seen as genocide. Within the same legal system as dolus specialis, the intent
one level below is known as dolus eventualis. In relation to genocide, this means that
the perpetrator knows that his/her actions may bring about the destruction of a
group, but continues to commit these acts. Reducing the level of intent would mean
that those not specifically intending the destruction of the targeted group could be
open to convictions for genocide. Dolus eventualis is too low a level of intent for the
severity of the crime of genocide; therefore, the only option for those in that legal
system is to require dolus specialis. Another lower level of intent is general intent.
This requires that the perpetrator intends to commit the killing, but not necessarily
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to destroy the group. This term is also too low for the level at which the crime of
genocide is held.
Problems with the Dolus Specialis Interpretation of the Convention
Before discussing the movement for a knowledge-based approach, we need to con-
sider why this movement arose. The main difficulty with dolus specialis, which has
been argued for many years, is in obtaining actual proof, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the perpetrator’s intention was to destroy the group, in whole or in part. Intent
refers to a person’s state of mind, a private thought process that, unless explicitly
stated, is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Lawrence LeBlanc argues,
The most prominent argument on the notion of intent was advanced by Jean-Paul
Sartre. Pointing out, quite correctly, that the Genocide Convention ‘‘was tacitly
referring to memories which were still fresh,’’ namely, to Hitler’s ‘‘proclaimed . . .
intent to exterminate the Jews,’’ Sartre asserted that not all governments, including
that of the United States, would be as stupid as Hitler’s and proclaim such demonic
intentions. . . . The authors of such a genocidal plan would not necessarily be
‘‘thoroughly conscious of their intention.’’ This would be ‘‘impossible to decide. We
would have to plumb the depths of their consciences. . . .’’13
Cherif Bassiouni adds that
it is not difficult to think of a number of contemporary conflicts, such as those in
Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, where there is obviously no paper trail and
where the specific intent can only be shown by the cumulative effect of the objective
conduct to which one necessarily has to add the inference of specific intent deriving
from omission.14
In terms of preventing further atrocities and stopping genocide, proving a perpetra-
tor’s state of mind is a massive problem. Perpetrators are fully aware that admitting
what they are doing could interfere with achieving their objective. They are therefore
unlikely to admit what their intentions are and thus risking possible action against
them, especially if the objective of destroying the target group is still taking place.
Negative Effects on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide
One situation that highlights the controversy surrounding proving specific intent is
Darfur, which turned into genocide in 2003. ‘‘Since it erupted in 1983, the internal
conflict between the North and the South has had a significant impact on Sudan in
many ways. It is the longest conflict in Africa involving serious human rights abuses
and humanitarian disasters.’’15 While the North and South were negotiating a peace
agreement, Darfur, which is situated on the western edge of the country, was left
behind. Due to resentment of the government by the Darfuris, an insurgency began
against the government. Starting in late 2002, rebel military action began by target-
ing police offices and looting weaponry. After rebels briefly seized the Sudanese
government’s airbase in El Fasher in early 2003, the government responded fero-
ciously. The government retaliated, but due to lack of equipment themselves, they
recruited local tribes, mostly Arab, as proxy militias. The retaliation arguably went
beyond simple counterinsurgency, with entire villages being attacked. Sudanese
planes bombed villages, and then government troops and government armed militia
(Janjaweed) entered the targeted villages, raping the women, killing people that
were left, and polluting the water supply before burning the villages to the ground.
(All of this is evidence shown in the UN Report, 2005).
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The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was set up in 2004,
to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human
rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide
have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to
ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.16
For the purposes of this article, the focal part of this report is the section determin-
ing whether genocide was committed in Darfur:
The Commission found that Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate
attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of
villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement,
throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis,
and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity. The extensive destruction and
displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and means of survival for countless
women, men and children . . . The vast majority of the victims of all of these viola-
tions have been from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Jebel, Aranga and other so-called
‘‘African’’ tribes.17
The Commission’s report was highly important, as this was the document that
would determine the United Nations’ position on Darfur. There can be no dispute
that the evidence found by the Commission proved the actus reus of genocide.
However, the Commission concluded that ‘‘the crucial element of genocidal intent
appears to be missing; at least as far as the central Government authorities are
concerned.’’18 An examination of the evidence produced by the Commission shows
that there are numerous points that they failed to take into account. The Commis-
sion failed to provide details regarding what would be necessary for genocidal intent
to be proved. The Commission also failed to consider the decision taken at the
Akayesu Trial, regarding intent being proven from actions. Furthermore, the Com-
mission confused motive with intent, stating that ‘‘the intent was to drive the
victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counterinsurgency warfare.’’19
Intent refers to the person’s state of mind at the time of committing the crime.
Motive, on the other hand, refers to what drives the perpetrator to commit their
crime, why they did it, and proof of this is not required for conviction. The perpe-
trators intended to commit the prohibited acts (discussed in the Report) and kill a
substantial part of the group; the motive behind this was to move the victims off
their land. Regardless of motive, they still intended to destroy a substantial part of
the group, and are, therefore, committing genocide.
This case also shows how unlikely it is that the perpetrators will express their
true intentions. Although, the Commission said they found no genocidal policy, they
were not allowed access to all military documents, which could have proved a
genocidal policy and intent.
34 . . . In a meeting held on 9 November 2004 with Bakri Hassan Salih, Minister of
Defence and other senior Ministry of Defence officials, the Commission requested
access to records of the deployment of military aircraft and helicopter gunships in
Darfur since February 2003. Again, the Commission undertook to treat such records
confidentially. . . . However, a complete set of the records requests was never provided
to the Commission.20
The following day, the Commission asked to see records, which they ensured would
be kept confidential, of government instructions regarding actions taken by the
armed forces against rebels and the civilian population in Darfur’s three states.
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First, Vice-President Taha ensured this would happen. The Commission was told by
the governors of the three states that the minutes of these meetings did not exist,
though the Commission had been informed by reliable sources that they did exist.
The Commission received a general list of final decisions, but the Commission never
saw complete documents.
The specific intention requirement has prevented the Convention from working
effectively and five years after the Commission was first established, Darfur is still
in a disastrous situation. Genocide has taken place in Darfur, as the evidence in
the UN Report proves. Arguably, the decision came down to the issue of intent. A
knowledge-based approach would have found genocide occurred and left it open
for appropriate action to take place. As it stood, with Antonio Cassese heading the
Commission, it chose to adopt a specific (dolus specialis) intent approach.
The Commission proved that the Sudanese government was recruiting and arm-
ing the Janjaweed, that there was a coordinated plan to target and destroy specific
villages, and that the target group was identified as one protected by the Genocide
Convention. The dolus specialis requirement meant the Commission was unable
to establish that genocide occurred in Darfur, where at least 100,000 people had
died at the time of the Commission’s report. This seriously calls into question the
appropriateness of the dolus specialis interpretation of the intent requirement in
the Genocide Convention. The intent requirement again failed the purpose of the
Convention and failed to protect a group that is threatened with destruction.
Negative Effects on the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
It has been argued that the dolus specialis requirement has allowed many who have
committed genocide to escape conviction for that crime. A prime example of this can
be seen in the overall failure of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) regarding prosecutions of genocide. Genocide did take place in Srebrenica:
‘‘The [Krstic] Trial Chamber concluded that this campaign to kill all the military-
aged men was conducted to guarantee that the Bosnian Muslim Population would
be permanently eradicated from Srebrenica and therefore constituted genocide.’’21
The Appeals Chamber confirmed this. Prior to Krstic, convictions for genocide by
the Trial Chamber were either quashed or reduced to a lesser crime by the Appeals
Chamber. Though the ICTY has recently convicted Vujadin Popovic and Ljubisa
Beara (both ICTY-05-88-T) of genocide (as long as these are also not quashed or
reduced at appeal), the definition of specific intent has still caused much confusion
in decisions made at the ICTY. It has allowed people who have given direct orders
to commit genocide and keenly participated in the genocide of Bosnian Muslim men,
such as Krstic (ICTY-98-33-T) and most recently Drago Nikolic (ICTY-05-88-T), to be
convicted of the lesser offense of ‘‘aiding and abetting’’ genocide.
The most significant case from the ICTY is against Goran Jelesic:
The words and deeds of the accused demonstrate that he was not only perfectly aware
of the discriminatory nature of the operation but also that he fully supported it. It
appears from the evidence submitted to the Trial Chamber that a large majority of
the persons whom Goran Jelisic admitted having beaten and executed were Muslim.
Additionally, many of the elements showed how Goran Jelisic made scornful and
discriminatory remarks about the Muslim population. Often, Goran Jelisic insulted
the Muslims by calling them ‘‘balijas’’ or ‘‘Turks.’’ Of one detainee whom he had just
hit, Goran Jelisic allegedly said that he must be have been mad to dirty his hands
with a ‘‘balija’’ before then executing him.22
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Jelesic had openly admitted to prohibited acts, which constituted the actus reus
for genocide. He was openly using derogatory terms against Muslims, as well as
identifying himself as the ‘‘Serbian Adolf.’’ There was much more evidence presented
during the trial, which all offers very reliable indications as to Jelesic’s state of mind.
The Trial Chamber, however, came to the decision that Jelesic did not possess the
required specific intent, and he was found not guilty of genocide. Although this was
later found incorrect by an Appeals Chamber, it was decided that a retrial would not
take place, meaning he was not convicted of genocide. Although some would argue
that he was convicted of other crimes, and received a forty-year sentence, he was still
not convicted of the crime he committed, which is unacceptable.
Arguments for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation of the Convention
Many in the international community have moved to change the intent requirement
to a knowledge-based approach. This approach is more closely related to the mens
rea in common-law legal systems. The International Criminal Court (ICC) states
‘‘for the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. ‘Know’ and
‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.’’23 For genocide, if the knowledge-based
approach was used it would mean that a person is guilty of genocide if they willingly
commit a prohibited act with the knowledge that it would bring about the destruc-
tion of a group. Individuals are unlikely to achieve the destruction of a group by
themselves; they would have to work with others. Therefore, it is enough evidence if
the individual commits an act knowing that it would contribute to other acts being
committed against a particular group, which when put together, would bring about
the destruction of that group, in whole or in part.
In such countries as the UK, some distinguished commentators consider knowledge as
having the same value and intensity as intent, with the difference that intent ‘‘relates
to the consequences specified in the definition of the crime’’ (for instance, death as
a result of killing, in the case of voluntary murder), whereas knowledge ‘‘relates to
circumstances forming part of the definition of the crime’’ (for instance, the circum-
stance that property belongs to another person, in the case of criminal damage to
property).24
An example in English law would be the situation where a person obtains a gun,
willingly aims it at someone, and pulls the trigger. Due to the high chance that that
victim would die, the perpetrator is seen as having the intent and is therefore guilty
of murder, if the victim dies. In the case of genocide, where the collective actions
of many individuals is considered, one would have to show that there is a high possi-
bility that a collection of prohibited acts aimed at a particular group would bring
about its destruction. Therefore, committing a prohibited act with the knowledge
that it would further a genocidal plan should be sufficient to prove intent.
Other countries’ case law refers to foresight of consequence equalling intent.
As reiterated in Badar (2008), the Ontario Court of Appeal asserted in Regina v.
Buzzanga and Durocher that,
As a general rule, a person who foresees that a consequence is certain or substantially
certain to result from an act which he does in order to achieve some other purpose,
intends that consequence. The actor’s foresight of the certainty or moral certainty of
less, acted so as to produce it, then he decided to bring it about (albeit regretfully) in
order to achieve his ultimate purpose. His intention encompasses the means as well
as to his ultimate objective.25
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A prominent argument for the knowledge-based approach of intent is that the
dolus specialis requirement goes beyond what the Convention actually intended,
and what Lemkin foresaw. Otto Triffterer argues this point, adding that requiring
dolus specialis ‘‘would not only go beyond the wording, but would introduce a concept
not precisely defined . . . [or] . . . generally accepted in Common Law countries. And
even in Civil Law countries the concept of specific or special intent in the sense of
dolus specialis is highly disputed.’’26 The prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide is challenging enough. To include an intent requirement that is extremely
difficult to prove after the fact, and which is a contested term in many civil law
countries, renders the Genocide Convention both confusing and ineffective. Such con-
fusion makes the preventive purpose of the Convention nearly impossible to achieve.
The movement for a knowledge-based approach has been given increased weight
by international courts moving toward a more lenient form of intent requirement.
One of the most important decisions regarding proving intent came from the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The important judgement came in
the Akayesu case, in which the trial judges stated,
that intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to determine. This
is the reason why, in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be
inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact. The Chamber considers that
it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged from
the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed
against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or
by others.27
Allowing intent to be inferred from an individual’s actions does not in its strictest
form, as specific intent requires, prove that the individual’s actions were intended to
destroy a group. It does, however, permit the courts to consider ‘‘foresight of con-
sequences’’, which is in keeping with a knowledge-based approach.
The Kayishema and Ruzindana case also showed the ICTR’s more lenient
approach, which argued that for the mens rea to be complete, the prohibited acts
‘‘should be done in furtherance of the genocidal intent.’’28 Arguably, the tribunal
was working under the assumption that if the perpetrator knows of the intent of
others to kill a particular group, and knows his/her actions would contribute to this
intent, but continues to participate, then in a sense the perpetrator does want the
destruction of the group and is, therefore, guilty of genocide.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction
includes genocide, shows a more lenient form of intent being required for the crime
of genocide. Article 30 states:
Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.29
How will adopting the knowledge-based approach affect the purpose of the Con-
vention? In terms of prevention, the Convention is there to protect groups from
being destroyed. If there are reports of prohibited acts targeting a protected group
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being committed by people that have the ability to destroy the group, in whole or in
part, then that should be enough to warrant action. The focus would then return to
protecting the groups, rather than focusing on the specific state of mind of the perpe-
trator. If the knowledge-based approach was adopted, prosecution for the crime
of genocide would be possible for all active participants. Any of the prohibited acts
willingly committed, with the knowledge of the wider destruction being carried out
on the targeted group, would constitute genocide.
The Original Intentions of the Creator and Drafters of the Convention
In order to determine what the Convention means by its definition (‘‘genocide is any
of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
group’’), the reason for the Convention being proposed, and the discussions that
took place during the drafting of the Convention, including arguments for either
dolus specialis or a knowledge-based interpretation, all need to be reviewed. As
Lemkin personally coined the term ‘‘genocide,’’ his original intentions are also impor-
tant. Throughout Lemkin’s works, he focused on the idea of a group being destroyed
and not on the level of intention behind the perpetrators’ actions. When Lemkin first
coined the term genocide, there was little emphasis on intent. He saw genocide as a
‘‘coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential founda-
tions of the life of national groups.’’30 He argued that each individual group brings
unique qualities to the collective well-being of humankind and destroying one of
these groups is a serious crime against all humankind and should be prevented and
punished.
Lemkin reiterates this point in his later work, ‘‘Genocide: A Modern Crime,’’
including examples of what the world could be missing out on if it allowed the
destruction of a group. His focus remained on the vital diversity of the human race:
Our whole cultural heritage is a product of the contributions of all nations. We
can best understand when we realize how impoverished our culture would be if
the peoples doomed by Germany, such as the Jews, had not been permitted to create
the Bible or to give birth to an Einstein, a Spinoza; if the Poles had not had the
opportunity to give to the world a Copernicus, a Chopin, a Curie, the Czechs a
Hass, and a Dvorak; the Greeks a Plato and Socrates; the Russians, a Tolstoy and
a Shostakovich.31
Arguments for Dolus Specialis during the Drafting of the Convention
Dolus specialis is mentioned three times in the drafting of the Convention: twice
by the Brazilian delegate (see A/C.6/SR.72 and A/C.6/SR.76), and once by the French
(E/AC.25/SR.26). When Brazil mentioned it, it seemed to refer to premeditation
and motive, which were both deemed not necessary within the definition. Arguably,
France mentioned the term simply because that is the highest intent used within
their legal system. It is worth noting that ‘‘mentioned’’ is the correct word to attach
to these statements because, when either country used the term, no other country
affirmed the use of the term further, and none pushed for the dolus specialis intent
to be adopted by the drafters. The term seemed to be completely brushed over by the
other countries during the drafting, arguably showing that its inclusion was not at
all important to the drafters.
Although not specifically mentioning dolus specialis, the Venezuelan delegate
raised concerns over the use of more general forms of intent. Referring to a Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) proposal wanting to change ‘‘committed with
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intent to destroy’’ to ‘‘aiming at the destruction,’’ the Venezuelan delegate pointed
out that in some countries, military personnel had no choice but to obey orders and,
therefore, would risk punishment whatever decision was taken.
According to the definition of genocide given in Article II of the Convention, intent
formed the chief element of the crime. By excluding that element the USSR amend-
ment completely altered the nature of genocide, Mr. Perez Perozo [the Venezuelan
delegate] gave an example a group of soldiers, ordered by an officer to open fire on a
political group and who did so in the belief that they were suppressing disturbances,
whereas the officer had really intended the destruction of the group . . . if they obeyed
the order, they would have committed genocide and if they did not obey it, they would
be guilty of subordination.32
Arguments for a Knowledge-Based Approach during the Drafting
of the Convention
Although not explicitly stating the term knowledge-based approach during the draft-
ing of the Convention, the discussions seemed to be moving more in that direction.
The Secretariat Draft of the Genocide Convention, May 1947, Article I(I) states
that ‘‘the purpose of this Convention is to prevent the destruction of racial, national,
linguistic, religious or political groups of human beings.’’33 Though the list of groups
has narrowed through drafting, the main purpose remains the same. Whenever
trying to find the correct interpretation of the Genocide Convention, the protection
of the groups is paramount and every interpretation needs to be focused on achieving
this purpose. If not, the interpretation is incorrect. You cannot have an interpre-
tation of a Convention that does not allow for the purpose of the Convention to be
achieved. The Peruvian delegate also pointed out that the ‘‘characteristic feature
was the destruction of groups,’’34 highlighting again the focus being on groups, and
not on the perpetrators’ level of intent.
Genocide vs. Homicide: The Original Intent of the Intent Requirement
Throughout the creation and drafting of the Genocide Convention, the importance of
the word ‘‘intent’’ within the definition was to separate the crime of genocide from
that of general homicide. This is seen in the General Assembly Resolution 96(I),
which showed the connection between the two crimes: ‘‘Genocide is a denial of
the right of the existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the
right to live of individual human beings.’’35 In order to distinguish genocide from
homicide, intent was included to emphasize that the prohibited acts were committed
not to target an individual as an individual, but as a result of his/her association
with the targeted groups. The different acts prohibited within the Convention are
crimes in their own right. The use of ‘‘ intent’’ ensured that people committing
general homicide would not be charged with genocide. The crime of genocide is dif-
ferent because while the crime is committed against an individual, it is actually
intended to harm the group with which the individual is associated. Focus through-
out the years has centered on the latter part of the definition: ‘‘the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part,’’ a group.’’ This is incorrect. The focus should be on the whole
first part of the definition: ‘‘any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy . . . a group.’’ Genocide is the destruction of selected groups.
The Colour Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘‘group(s)’’ as ‘‘a number of people
or things placed or classed together.’’36 One way of destroying the group is by target-
ing its different parts, which for genocide would be the individuals that make up the
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group. The focus should not be on the need to prove that every perpetrator’s specific
intention is to wipe out the group, but on the prohibited acts that will result in the
destruction of the group. During the drafting of the Convention, the Panamanian
delegate stated that ‘‘the characteristic which distinguished genocide from the com-
mon crime of murder was the intention to destroy a group.’’37 The United States
delegate reiterated this point: ‘‘The intent to destroy a group[,] which differentiated
the crime of genocide from the crime of simple homicide.’’38 The Belgian delegate
concurred.
Throughout the drafting, many discussions focused on finding the correct word-
ing to create an instrument that could be used to protect against the destruction of
groups. The word ‘‘intent’’ was not meant to be the focus of the definition, nor of the
crime of genocide itself, in the way that it has become.
The Draft Convention (6 June 1947) for the prevention and punishment of
genocide stated that ‘‘In this Convention, the word ‘genocide’ is understood to mean
criminal acts against any one of the groups of human beings aforesaid, with the
purpose of destroying them in whole or in part, or of preventing their preservation
or development.’’39 The next relevant document was the Secretariat Draft on 26
June 1947 from the Economic and Social Council, which refers to genocide as ‘‘a
criminal act directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of human beings, with
the purpose of destroying it in whole or in part.’’40 Discussions that took place on 16
April 1948 showed that the Chinese delegation ‘‘proposed that genocide should be
defined as an act directed against. . . . [groups].’’41 The same day, the Committee
adopted a definition ‘‘pending further discussion of the word ‘national’: In this
Convention, the word ‘genocide’ means a criminal act aimed at the physical destruc-
tion, in whole or in part, of a group of human beings, for racial, national or religious
reasons.’’42
During discussions on 23 April 1948, the Chinese delegate’s proposal of genocide
as an ‘‘act directed against . . . [groups] . . . was adopted by the Committee by six votes
to none, with one abstention.’’43 Other important proposals during the drafting came on
29 April 1948 from the United States, defining genocide as the ‘‘killing of members
of the group with the intention of destroying its physical existence,’’ and ‘‘acts
causing the death of members of the group.’’44 Lebanon saw genocide as ‘‘acts which
are intended to . . . destroy groups, directly or indirectly.’’45 The wording moved back
to ‘‘directed against’’ but finally settled on ‘‘intent to destroy.’’ Taken in the context of
the words suggested by different delegates before the final text was adopted, and with
delegates pointing out the link between homicide and genocide, the word ‘‘intent’’
within the definition does not point toward requiring a high level of intention. The
significance is that the people who are targeted are seen not as individuals, but as
a part of a group. In order to destroy the group, the individuals need to be destroyed.
Delegates from the USSR and France were some who raised concerns about the
definition being interpreted too restrictively. USSR stated that
If the words ‘‘committed with the intent to. . .’’ were retained, there would be a risk of
ambiguity. The perpetrators of acts of genocide would in certain cases be able to claim
that they were not in fact guilty of genocide, having had no intent to destroy a given
group . . . Rather, therefore, than stipulate the intent to destroy, the article should
define acts of genocide as acts ‘‘resulting in ‘destruction.’ ’’46
The USSR also proposed including the wording ‘‘aiming at the destruction’’ rather
than ‘‘with the intent to destroy.’’ On this proposal the French Delegate commented:
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The idea of the USSR was apparently to guard against the possibility that the presence
in the definition of the word ‘‘intent’’ might be used as a pretext, in the future, for
pleading not guilty on the grounds of absence of intent. In the circumstances, the
objective concept seemed to be more effective than the subjective concept.47
Following this opinion, the Greek delegate expressed the idea that some wanted a
less restrictive intent requirement for genocide and ‘‘to leave the judge free to decide,
in each individual case, whether the element of intention was present or not.’’48
France agreed, stating:
It was perfectly normal that an international law such as the convention on genocide
should contain instructions to the judges charged with its application. It could not be
asserted that it would thereby restrict the power of judges to determine the responsi-
bility of the accused.49
The delegates wanted the definition broad enough for judges to decide on a case-by-
case basis and determine whether the person had ‘‘committed any of the . . . acts
with the intent to destroy a group.’’ This implies leniency, not the strictest form of
intent.
Evaluating Previous Arguments and Developments
The main argument for a stricter interpretation, made by those who advocate invoca-
tion of dolus specialis as the intent requirement for genocide, is that it separates the
crime as more serious than other international crimes, such as crimes against
humanity. This, however, is not true. Genocide is a crime against humanity and
was developed from crimes against humanity. Although genocide is a very serious
crime, there are incidents of crimes against humanity that are just as shocking.
Many of the crimes that were committed during Josef Stalin’s tyranny could not be
classified as genocide, yet the number of people who died was much higher than any
genocide that has taken place, and the crimes were equally atrocious. The focus
as stated throughout this article is the destruction of the group, not constructing a
‘‘hierarchy of horrible.’’50
During the drafting of the Convention, delegates considered genocide to be a
particular type of crime against humanity. An example of this is the French pro-
posal, including Article 1 that states ‘‘the crime against humanity known as genocide
is an attack on the life of a human group or of an individual as a member of such
group.’’51 The International Law Commission (ILC) also saw the connection: ‘‘The
General Assembly affirmed that the persecution type of crimes against humanity or
‘genocide’ constituted a crime under international law for which individuals were
subject to punishment.’’52 This was again pointed out at the ICTR in the Kayishema
and Ruzindana Judgement: ‘‘The definition of the crime of genocide was based upon
that of crimes against humanity, that is, a combination of ‘extermination and perse-
cutions on political, racial or religious grounds.’. . . The crime of genocide is a type of
crime against humanity.’’53
One of the arguments against all perpetrators being punished is that of superior
orders. Some raise concerns that if people were only following orders, then they
should not be punished. For those who do not have freedom over their actions, this
could be an acceptable defence. But, for those willing participants, it is absurd that
they should be able to escape prosecution for the crimes they commit just because
they were told to do the acts. Superior orders have never been acceptable as a
defence in relation to the crime of genocide and should not be allowed as something
for people to hide behind to escape conviction. From the first time Lemkin introduced
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the term ‘‘genocide,’’ he argued that all parties involved should be punished, regard-
less of their position within the genocide. In his 1944 book, Lemkin stated, ‘‘In order
to prevent the invocation of the plea of superior orders, the liability of persons who
order the genocide practices, as well as of persons who execute such orders, should
be provided expressly by the criminal codes of the respective countries.’’54 Within
the final text of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the idea that all should be punished was retained, showing consistency
about superior orders not being an excuse. Under Article 4, ‘‘Persons committing
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether
they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.’’55
The Development of the Interpretation of ‘‘Intent’’ within
the Convention
The ILC’s Draft Codes of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind was one
of the first detailed documents concerning what was meant by the word ‘‘intent’’
within the definition of genocide. Article 17 of this document focuses on the crime of
genocide. Article 17(5) states that ‘‘an individual incurs responsibility for the crime
of genocide only when one of the prohibited acts is committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a group, as such.’’56 Although this document states that intent is
required, Article 17(10) argues that such intent can be inferred from knowledge of
the discriminatory effects of his acts in destruction of a targeted group:
(10) . . . Indeed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide explicitly recognizes in article IV that the crime of genocide may be com-
mitted by constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
The definition of the crime of genocide would be equally applicable to any individual
who committed one of the prohibited acts with the necessary intent. The extent of
knowledge of the details of a plan or a policy to carry out the crime of genocide would
vary depending on the position of the perpetrator in the governmental hierarchy or
the military command structure. This does not mean that a subordinate who actually
carries out the plan or policy cannot be held responsible for the crime of genocide
simply because he did not possess the same degree of information concerning the
overall plan or policy as his superiors. The definition of the crime of genocide requires
a degree of knowledge of the ultimate objective of the criminal conduct rather than
knowledge of every detail of a comprehensive plan or policy of genocide. A subordinate
is presumed to know the intentions of his superiors when he receives orders to
commit the prohibited acts against individuals who belong to a particular group. He
cannot escape responsibility if he carries out the orders to commit the destructive
acts against victims who are selected because of their membership in a particular
group by claiming that he was not privy to all aspects of the comprehensive genocidal
plan or policy. The law does not permit an individual to shield himself from criminal
responsibility by ignoring the obvious. For example, a soldier who is ordered to go
from house to house and kill only persons who are members of a particular group
cannot be unaware of the irrelevance of the identity of the victims and the signifi-
cance of their membership in a particular group. He cannot be unaware of the
destructive effect of this criminal conduct on the group itself. Thus, the necessary
degree of knowledge and intent may be inferred from the nature of the order to
commit the prohibited acts of destruction against individuals who belong to a parti-
cular group and are therefore singled out as the immediate victims of the massive
criminal conduct.57
This section may mention the individual needing the ‘‘necessary’’ intent, but it
also states that intent and knowledge would be enough to be convicted of genocide.
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The ILC, as shown above, indicates that if a person commits one of the acts with the
knowledge that it is part of an orchestrated effort targeted at a particular group, this
would be sufficient for the individual to be convicted of genocide. This again argues
for a knowledge-based approach to the requirement of intent in the Convention.
Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in
relation to crimes committed by a collective for a common purpose, gives examples
of the level of responsibility for individuals involved:
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(d) In any other way continues to the commission or attempted commission of such
crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contributions shall
be intentional and shall either
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.58
One reason the Genocide Convention was created was to ensure that those guilty
of genocide were punished. Although not required for conviction, genocide does
usually involve a plan. Genocide is not one act; it is a collection of acts committed
by a number of people that when put together, if successful, would bring about the
destruction of a group, in whole or in part.
It is correct that genocide would not happen if people did not organize and
orchestrate the process and/or plan. However, it is also true that genocide could not
go beyond the stages of planning if people did not willingly act. The people who
commit the actus reus of genocide are not just aiding and abetting, or being complicit
in the crime of genocide. These people are in fact at the center of the prohibited acts
that constitute genocide, therefore, at the center of the crime. For this reason, they
should not be allowed to escape punishment for that crime. All free persons are
responsible for their own actions and should be held responsible for them. If someone
willingly commits a prohibited act knowing of a coordinated effort by others against
a targeted group, then they should know that this will threaten the survival of the
group. If they continue to act, they do have the intent for the group to be destroyed,
whether they choose to admit it or not. If they are of sound mind, then they are fully
aware of their actions and what their actions could lead to. To plead ignorance is
inappropriate. People need to consider carefully the actions they take before taking
them. The dolus specialis requirement is therefore unsuitable because, regardless of
an individual’s expressed intentions, he/she is still actively involved in genocide and
plays a crucial part. Without these actions, the lives of many victims could be
spared. The individuals are as much to blame as the people who orchestrated the
‘‘plan.’’ A lower form of intent should, therefore, be used as this will not restrict
punishment to just a selection of leaders. Aiding and abetting charges should be
used for people who did not commit a prohibited act, but still helped enable genocide
to occur. The people who committed the prohibited acts are far too involved to be
seen only as accomplices. They are at the center of the crime and their acts are the
ones that bring about the destruction of the group. Their willingness to commit these
acts, with knowledge that they would bring about the destruction of the group,
should suffice. The focus should be on preventing group destruction, not only on
punishing people with ‘‘specific’’ intent.
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If the knowledge-based approach was adopted, while the number of people
prosecuted for genocide would increase, it could also have an additional effect on
prevention. Genocide is a systematic crime that, to take place, needs the actions of
many people. If people knew that by participating in prohibited acts there was a
high chance that they would be prosecuted for their part, and if they were convicted
of genocide they could spend the rest of their lives in prison (as opposed to a
few years if convicted of a lesser crime), this would undoubtedly act as a deterrent.
During the drafting of the Convention, the French delegate made this exact point:
Mr. CHAUMONT (France) maintained that the punishment of a soldier, which did
not of course exclude the punishment of an officer, was intended to produce the
profound psychological effect, the deterrent value of which had been stressed by
the representative of Czechoslovakia.59
Intent, as discussed above, is a personal state of mind and very difficult to prove
if not openly expressed. Stanton determined that denial is the eighth and final stage
of genocide, and that it operates throughout the genocidal process. This is because
genocide is a crime that aims at completely removing the memory of a group’s
existence. Perpetrators ‘‘deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame
what happened on the victims. They block investigations of the crime, and continue
to govern until driven from power by force, when they flee into exile.’’60 The perpe-
trators always state that they are not committing genocide. Their denial is in fact
part of the crime. By requiring strict specific intent proven beyond a reasonable
doubt as in a court of law, we are actually accommodating their criminality. The
possibility that perpetrators will not only deny that the crime is taking place, but
also destroy all evidence of the crime, is highly likely. Requiring dolus specialis is
assisting this stage of genocide and works against the purpose of the Convention:
Genocide being based on the denial of the victims’ very existence, it is therefore
unsurprising that denial of a given genocide is nothing but the universal strategy
of perpetrators who thus typically deny either that the events took place, or that
they bear any responsibility for the destruction, or still that the term ‘‘genocide’’ is
applicable to what occurred.61
Conclusion
As stressed throughout this article, the focus has always been, and should remain,
on preventing the destruction of particular groups. Lemkin saw the destruction of
the group as a crime, because it would mean humanity had lost the unique contribu-
tion that the group would bring to the world. For Lemkin, the key purpose of
the Convention was to ensure that the group would continue to exist, and that any
planned acts systematically orchestrated to threaten its existence would be stopped
and punished. The crime of genocide is special because it focuses on groups, as such,
as opposed to individuals. The drafting of the Convention developed this idea and
left the notion of ‘‘intent’’ open to interpretation. The Travaux Pre´paratoires of the
drafters does not support the dolus specialis interpretation.
The ILC’s statements began with a specific intent approach, but also allowed for
the knowledge-based approach. The courts seem to be split: The ICTY has taken the
restrictive approach, which has left it with questionable results. The ICTR, on the
other hand, has convicted many defendants, both because Rwanda was clearly a
case of genocide, but also because the ICTR has adopted a broader, knowledge-based
interpretation and has convicted defendants on evidence of the person’s involvement
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and foresight. Although there are currently no case study examples of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court’s interpretation of intent within the genocide definition, Article
30 of the statute shows an obvious move toward a knowledge-based approach. Some
have argued that ‘‘unless otherwise provided’’ means that because genocide is known
as a specific intent crime, intent is already provided. However, the challenged section
of the Convention’s definition simply states ‘‘committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part,’’ and does not detail what type of intent is required. It is therefore
argued that the ‘‘unless otherwise provided’’ stipulation should refer to the section in
the Convention containing the prohibited acts. For example, the word ‘‘deliberately’’
in the following quotation points to the act requiring premeditation and positive
action rather than recklessness or knowledge: ‘‘ (c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part.’’62
The use of dolus specialis as the intent required by the Genocide Conven-
tion completely goes beyond the original intent of the Convention’s drafters, and
especially beyond the intent of Raphael Lemkin. Before dolus specialis was held to
be the required intent in the Akayesu trial, no legal document or UN paper had
associated it with the crime. Although an argument was put forward in the Travaux
Pre´paratoires to allow judges the freedom to interpret, this was because all cases
would involve different circumstances and levels of involvement, requiring a case-
by-case interpretation. It was not meant to allow a judge’s decision to restrict future
decisions.
Once violence has begun, however, if it becomes obvious that a group is being
systematically targeted with acts, such as that prohibited by the Genocide Conven-
tion, then prevention efforts should commence. Hopefully prevention, beginning
with early warning systems, will one day be effectively used by governments to
alleviate tensions before violence begins. The key to genocide prevention is early
action. We cannot let another situation like Darfur take place. When the existence
of a group is threatened, the intentions of perpetrators are seldom openly expressed.
It is unacceptable that more than sixty years after the Holocaust was uncovered, a
genocide hidden from the world by the Nazis, genocides are still occurring and that
the international ‘‘community’’ continues to ignore them.
Genocide is a very serious crime and should remain as such. Although it is
uncommon, when it does take place, it is not just because a few people wanted it to
happen. People need to take responsibility for their actions. A general intent would
be too low a standard for the crime of genocide, but committing an act with the
knowledge that it will help an ongoing plan to destroy a group is sufficient evidence
to prove intent to commit genocide. If perpetrators are only attacking a section of the
group, such as men, then it is still obvious that this would have a devastating effect
on the existence of that group. For someone to escape punishment because they
either did not possess a plan to eliminate an entire group, or simply did not concern
themselves with the consequences of their actions, is unacceptable. Adopting the
dolus specialis requirement renders the Genocide Convention’s preventive purpose
incredibly difficult. By adopting the knowledge-based approach, anyone willingly
committing a prohibited act knowing that it would contribute to an ongoing offensive
against a group would be liable for conviction for that crime.
The move away from the creator’s and drafters’ original meaning of intent in the
Genocide Convention urgently needs to be corrected. The focus needs to return to
protecting groups. The knowledge-based interpretation is the most suitable means
for achieving this end. As demonstrated by the evidence above, this approach would
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not only restore the original intent of the Genocide Convention, but would also give
it a new power that is now vitiated by debates over whether atrocities possess the
‘‘specific intent’’ to qualify as genocide. This knowledge-based meaning of intent is
what was always intended by Lemkin and the drafters when they decided to adopt
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in
1948, and it is what should be required now.
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In April 2004, on the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide, the UN secretary-
general established the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide
(OSAPG). While the OSAPG has been hailed in some quarters as major institu-
tional reform of significant importance, there has been no focused academic
analysis of its mandate and work to date. This article addresses this gap and
is based on a series interviews conducted with prominent members of the OSAPG
itself and experts in the field of human rights. The article analyzes the differing
perspectives on the OSAPG and identifies the major institutional weaknesses,
methodological failings, and ongoing challenges facing the OSAPG as cited by
the interviewees. While there is clearly broad—though not universal—support for
the establishment of the OSAPG, there are a number of factors, both endogenous
and exogenous, which appear to have limited the influence of the OSAPG, and it
is not clear whether the office, as presently conceived, can realize the task it has
been mandated.
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Introduction
The Holocaust states have often committed themselves to preventing genocide, most
clearly through the 1948 Genocide Convention. Active support for the implementa-
tion of substantive reforms and initiatives aimed at achieving this goal, however,
has been less forthcoming. The refrain ‘‘Never Again!,’’ so often solemnly articulated
since the Holocaust, has often appeared as little more than an empty slogan when
contrasted with the glacial pace of reform and the international community’s erratic
response to instances of alleged and clear genocide in the modern era. There has
been, as Thomas Weiss noted, ‘‘a dramatic disconnect between political reality and
pious rhetoric.’’1
The establishment of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide (OSAPG) in 2004, however, constitutes a definite structural innovation
within the UN architecture specifically focused on helping to realize the ‘‘Never
Again!’’ promise. The OSAPG has been described as ‘‘pioneering new approaches to
genocide prevention that represent an important part of the intellectual history of
preventative diplomacy at the UN’’ and ‘‘an authentic basis for hope that the UN
may move gradually toward fulfillment of its potential.’’2 The OSAPG is, therefore,
of great importance not only for scholars working on genocide, but for all those
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concerned with the evolution of the UN and specifically its mechanisms for address-
ing intrastate humanitarian crises.
Despite this importance, to date there has been a dearth of academic inquiry into
the creation and role of the OSAPG, reflected in the paucity of references to the office
in academic literature. This article aims to help fill this gap in the literature by pro-
viding an analysis of perceptions of the OSAPG’s role to date and the barriers to its
efficacy, based on a series of face-to-face interviews conducted during the summer of
2009. The intention is twofold: first, to provide the first academic analysis of perspec-
tives on the OSAPG from practitioners and experts in the field of human rights, and
second, to analyze the OSPAG’s own perspective on its role and its response to the
criticisms leveled against it.
This article initially provides an overview of the establishment of the OSAPG
and the nature of the interviews conducted. There follows a conceptual analysis of
the OSAPG, assessing perceptions on both whether it normatively constitutes a
significant innovation and how it can best add value to the existing UN system. The
subsequent section focuses on empirical issues, namely, the profile of the OSAPG, its
relationship with the UN and specifically the Security Council, and the nature of
its work. The final section assesses the issues identified as constituting barriers to
the future success of the OSAPG.
Background to the OSAPG
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was the catalyst for a process of self-reflection
within the UN, which was derived from a general consensus that the UN system
had failed to respond in a timely and effective manner to this tragedy.3 The UN’s
inquiry into the genocide identified gaps in the early warning capacity of the organi-
zation and called for ‘‘an action plan to prevent genocide’’ aimed at ‘‘improving early
warning.’’4 This was re-emphasized by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a 2001
report when he advocated establishing a new office devoted to prevention.5 In April
2004, on the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, Kofi Annan launched his
‘‘Action Plan to Prevent Genocide,’’ which included the establishment of the OSAPG.
While this was certainly not the first time the UN had addressed the issue of
preventing genocide, the establishment of this office was unprecedented. David
Hamburg notes: ‘‘It was the first time any prevention professional had been
appointed at such a high level . . . [and] the first time that a unit focusing specifically
on genocide prevention had ever been created at the UN.’’6
The mandate of the OSAPG, contained in a letter from the secretary-general to
the Security Council on 12 July 2004, noted,
The Special Adviser will (a) collect existing information, in particular from within the
United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted,
might lead to genocide; (b) act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-
General, and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention
potential situations that could result in genocide; (c) make recommendations to the
Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt
genocide; (d) liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of
genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage
information relating to genocide or related crimes.7
Initially, Juan Mendez, an Argentinean human rights lawyer, was appointed Special
Adviser and the role was part-time. In May 2006, Kofi Annan established an
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Advisory Committee to support the work of the OSAPG. On 27 May 2007, Francis
Deng, former Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally
Displaced Persons, was appointed Special Adviser and, in August 2007, the OSAPG
was made a full-time position and the status of the Special Adviser was upgraded to
Under-Secretary-General.
Rather than rely on the few second-hand sources that deal only tangentially with
the OSAPG,8 or the OSAPG’s own reports, I conducted a series of interviews in
August 2009 to evaluate opinion as to the utility of the office.9 The aim of these
interviews was to gather information on the OSAPG both from those working within
the OSAPG and those outside the OSAPG who work on issues directly related to its
mandate. In the first category I interviewed Dr. Francis Deng, the Special Adviser;
Professor David Hamburg, Chairman of the OSAPG Advisory Committee; and Maria
Stavropoulou and Castro Wesamba, both Political Affairs Officers within the OSAPG.
In the second category I interviewed Steve Crawshaw, Human Rights Watch’s United
Nations Advocacy Director; Heather Sonner from the International Secretariat of
the Institute for Global Policy; Sapna Chhatpar Considine, Project Manager with
the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect; Nicola Reindorp, Direc-
tor of Advocacy at the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect; and Professor
Thomas Weiss, Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Science,
which is affiliated with the Central University of New York. The following analysis
reflects the perspectives of these interviewees and draws out generic themes related
to the OSAPG’s normative raison d’eˆtre, role to date, and future prospects.
Perspectives on the Concept of a Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide
There are very few people who, in principle, oppose preventing genocide. Broad
support for genocide prevention, of course, need not readily translate into support
for the creation of a particular UN office or indeed the OSAPG itself. There are
those, however, who argue that while genocide prevention is a nice idea, it is simply
not possible to predict the occurrence of genocide with any kind of accuracy.10 Others
argue that even the best genocide early warning system will be of little to no use as
the international community’s reaction to suspected or actual genocide is typically
too little, too late. While the horror of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 compelled
many to call for improved early warning systems and greater international engage-
ment in states evidencing signs of instability, many drew significantly different
conclusions. Given that the international community had brokered the Arusha
Accords—deemed by many to have been a catalyst in the eventual carnage11—and
also that there were many international observers, including the UN force UNAMIR,
in Rwanda prior to the outbreak of the violence, some have argued that the genocide
cannot be cited as evidence in support of the idea that early intervention and inter-
national engagement is necessarily a good thing.12
It is not the intention of this article to engage with this argument.13 Clearly,
those who are skeptical about early intervention and preventative diplomacy generally
will be unlikely to view the establishment of the OSAPG as a useful development. A
more illustrative means of gauging perceptions of the OSAPG’s utility is derived
from garnering the views of those who believe that preventative diplomacy and
international engagement generally are, in principle, good ideas, hence the choice of
interviewees outside the OSAPG itself.
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Heather Sonner, from the International Secretariat of the Institute for Global
Policy, noted that her organization wishes to have ‘‘a very collaborative relationship
with the Special Advisor’s office . . . we very much want to support the mandate and
what they do.’’ Sonner argued that the secretary-general was tasked with maintain-
ing a generally cordial relationship with all member states. The Special Adviser,
however, would have the freedom to ‘‘speak out on such a sensitive issue as genocide
and . . . sound the alarm.’’14 This view was echoed by Steve Crawshaw from Human
Rights Watch, who identified ‘‘the wakeup call potential’’ of the OSAPG as being
‘‘very important.’’15 Similarly Nicola Reindorp, Director of Advocacy at the Global
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, stated, ‘‘Has [the OSAPG] got an impor-
tant and valuable role and has the original concept behind it still got value?
Absolutely.’’16 A key aspect of the ‘‘valuable role’’ of the OSAPG, according to
Reindorp, was that it would, ‘‘make it more politically costly for any policy maker to
fail . . . to take action in a particular way,’’ and that the existence of the office meant
‘‘[there are] people responsible to ensure that parts of the [UN] bureaucracy are
watching for warning signs and driving discussion around policy options.’’17
The OSAPG does not have a significant presence on the ground in trouble spots
around the world, nor has it established a new means of gathering information.
Rather, it aims to ‘‘filter information.’’18 Yet analyses of the genocide in Rwanda
in 1994 have noted that the most outrageous aspect of the UN response was the
fact that information was readily available and alarm bells were sounded, most
infamously Romeo Dallaire’s cable on 11 January 1994 warning that he had
uncovered plans for mass murder and had information about the location of weapons
caches.19 Establishing an office to manage information about impending genocide
may thus be seen as a solution to a problem that has not really been of major import,
certainly when compared to the problem of mobilizing political will among the five
permanent members of the Security Council (the P5) to take timely and effective
action. Crawshaw argued, however, that ‘‘[in 1994] there wasn’t a lack of information
but there was a lack of those who had information, who were able to cut like a knife
through the system.’’20 The OSAPG, he suggested, had the potential to serve as this
fast track. On this issue Sonner noted that while there were certain offices within
the UN that were already charged with dealing with gathering information related
to the prevention of genocide—in particular the High Commissioner for Human
Rights—there was no single spokesperson mandated specifically to focus on genocide
prevention and thus the OSAPG brought a sharper focus to the issue. Sonner argued
that the OSAPG would be able to ‘‘prevent the hyper politicisation of that informa-
tion as it moves up the chain within the Secretariat, which we did see in the case of
Rwanda.’’21 Reindorp claimed that it would be a ‘‘real exaggeration to suggest that
the appointment of one person and a couple of people is going to revolutionize the
response to genocide.’’ Nonetheless, this attempt ‘‘to plug one little piece of the gap
in the capacity of the UN secretariat, which itself is one tiny, tiny piece in the whole
prevention of genocide architecture’’ was, she claimed, ‘‘significant,’’ though the
OSAPG should not be seen as ‘‘a kind of a panacea.’’22
Within the OSAPG, the question of the office’s added value was accepted as
being ‘‘a valid concern.’’23 Francis Deng acknowledged that there was a plethora of
sources of information and that the OSAPG was not going to add significantly to
the detection of warning signs and did not constitute ‘‘anything dramatically
new.’’24 Nonetheless, he argued that the significance of the OSAPG derived from
the fact that, unlike NGOs, ‘‘[the OSAPG is a] UN entity, which was agreed upon
as a result of collective thinking about what the UN should be doing to respond to
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this issue. [It is] a spotlight within the system which is well equipped and capaci-
tated, it can mobilise these resources.’’25 Deng recalled that prior to the Rwandan
genocide, Bacre Ndiaye, then UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or
Arbitrary Executions, wrote a report that he submitted to the UN warning about the
likelihood of massive violence in Rwanda. This report, Deng noted, was lost in
the UN bureaucracy.26 Deng claimed, ‘‘If Ndiaye’s report had come to a focal point
within the UN system that was charged to make use of such information, to rally
forces, to alert the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council, that perhaps
would have been more effective.’’27 The OSAPG was evidently now acting as this
‘‘ focal point with the UN system’’ and thus ostensibly constituted a significant
reform of the existing system. Likewise Maria Stavropoulou, Political Affairs Officer
within the OSAPG, argued that the very existence of the OSPAG meant that if
action was not taken and genocide occurred, the OSAPG would be able to apportion
blame.28
This broad support for the establishment of the OSAPG and endorsement of its
utility was not shared by all. Professor Thomas Weiss asserted, ‘‘ [I]it’s not a real job,
it’s not something you can really do anything about from the inside at this point in
time . . . I think it would make much more sense to keep this as a focus or a part
of the High Commission for Human Rights and keep it live, but not expect it to
go anywhere because I don’t think it will.’’29 Weiss noted that this was a view
shared by Gareth Evans, who expressed similar concerns at a meeting of the OSAPG
Advisory Committee.30 In response to Evans’s criticism of the OSAPG, Weiss
claimed, ‘‘[David] Hamburg went through the ceiling, Francis [Deng] went through
the ceiling but I actually think that they just don’t want to hear how few clothes
the emperor has.’’31 Additionally, while the representatives of the NGOs interviewed
were broadly supportive of the office’s raison d’eˆtre, they all expressed significant
concerns about the methods of the Special Adviser. These concerns, explored in the
next section, suggested that the OSAPG’s potential utility had not been achieved,
rendering the office largely impotent.
Assessing the Role of the OSAPG to Date
The OSAPG has yet to achieve a high profile; according to Sonner, ‘‘there is still
a significant challenge in making people aware that the office exists.’’32 It has
attracted very little attention within academia, and even within the UN system, it
has been overlooked at times. Stavropoulou noted that the OSAPG was not invited
to a meeting of a UN inter-agency framework team for conflict prevention. She
recalled, ‘‘The office had to take the initiative to say, ‘We would like to be part of
this.’ This happened not just with this framework but within a couple of other fora
as well. There was no objection, nobody said, ‘We don’t think you should be part of
that meeting,’ there was never any objection but also there was no automaticity.’’33
It is significant that an office charged with such an important mandate established
over five years ago would be overlooked in this way and it is indicative of the
OSAPG’s low profile.
To some extent, the OSAPG’s low profile derives from the initial status of the
office. David Hamburg noted that prior to his appointment as Special Adviser, Juan
Mendez had accepted a full-time position as a president of the International Centre
for Transitional Justice. According to Hamburg, while Kofi Annan appointed Mendez
in the belief that he would work full-time, Mendez believed the position was part-
time, involving ‘‘at the most, a day a week.’’ Hamburg recalled, ‘‘Well then, we
had to make the best of it. We didn’t want to embarrass Kofi, we didn’t want to
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embarrass Mendez, and so we decided, ‘Well, let’s say we’re going to start very small
and experimentally.’ ’’34 This confusion, and the initial part-time nature of the
role during Mendez’s tenure, understandably influenced the OSAPG’s productivity.
When Mendez stepped down and was replaced by Deng, the position was quickly
made full-time, although, according to Hamburg, ‘‘[The UN] budget committee gave
[Deng] nothing,’’ with the result that Deng had to make do with a skeletal staff for
the first year of his tenure.35 Deng acknowledged that he spent most of his initial
twelve months trying to generate funding and recruit staff rather than actively work-
ing to fulfill his mandate.36
In addition to this issue of capacity, a number of other explanations were cited as
reasons for the OSAPG’s low profile. Stavropoulou noted that ‘‘because of its type of
mandate and the type of work it does, [the OSAPG] cannot be a very ‘productive’
office. We do not put notes and reports on our website like others; we simply can’t.
Politically it’s impossible.’’ Additionally, she suggested that within the UN, ‘‘there is
a bit of a proliferation of separate offices, entities, units, and so forth, and not all are
well known.’’37 This is certainly true; nevertheless, it is curious that an office that
is tasked with addressing such an emotive issue, which resonates so widely and
attracts so much attention, should be so anonymous.38
All those interviewed not directly connected to the OSAPG identified Deng’s style
as a key factor in the failure of the OSAPG to achieve prominence. Weiss noted that
the few press statements realized by the OSAPG had been largely devoid of signifi-
cant content and asserted, ‘‘I think Juan Mendez did more in 5% of his time than
Francis does in 100% of his.’’ Weiss claimed that Deng had ‘‘moved very quickly
into becoming a UN bureaucrat,’’ suggesting he had decided to maintain cordial rela-
tions with key actors in the UN and the major states. Deng’s previous trail-blazing
work on internally displaced, Weiss argued, was a function of his position at the
time as a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, which gave him more freedom.
Regarding Deng’s new role, Weiss stated, ‘‘He’s in a real comfort zone; the secretary-
general’s not pushing him to do more, his [Advisory] Committee isn’t pushing him to
do more, states would just as soon [prefer] he’d keep quiet.’’ Weiss claimed that the
current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon ‘‘doesn’t want any noise or any waves,’’
while ‘‘Francis [Deng] doesn’t want anybody to be angry at him any of the time.’’ The
combination of these approaches meant ‘‘[the OSAPG] is so behind the scenes that
it’s invisible.’’39
Sonner agreed that there were many within the NGO community who called for
Deng to have a much more public profile. She argued that more should have been
done to date in terms of public diplomacy and claimed that the OSAPG needed to
engage in a ‘‘substantial amount of outreach.’’40 Reindorp acknowledged that the
OSAPG had suffered from a lack of resources, and while she accepted that Deng’s
preference was for quiet diplomacy, she argued that ‘‘there hasn’t been as much
dynamism in the office, even in doing that.’’41
Deng acknowledged that he is committed to a ‘‘quiet approach’’ and observed
that, ‘‘obviously, you don’t see the results of the quiet approach as much.’’42 Accept-
ing that there were many within the NGO community who disagreed with his
approach, Deng defended his style by claiming it had proved its effectiveness during
his time as representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally
Displaced Persons. He claimed that, ‘‘if I were to be seen as crying out loud, naming
and shaming, talking about such a sensitive issue . . . I would not be invited by coun-
tries, doors would be closed, and I don’t see how I can help people if I cannot even go
and see the country and engage the governments in a constructive dialogue.’’43 Deng
An Analysis of Perspectives on the Office of the Special Adviser
263
further argued that the results of his efforts were effectively doomed to invisibility
for two reasons: First, successful preventative action necessarily stops something
becoming a major issue and thus is less likely to attract attention. Second, behind-
the-scenes diplomacy is by definition conducted in private and cannot be publicized
if it is effective. Continuing, Deng noted, ‘‘The British ambassador was telling me
just the other day, ‘You have really made an impact by approaching your mandate
in a non-threatening way,’ but that is not visible to people. Nobody’s going to speak
about it unless you go round and perhaps question member states about what they
think about the work we’re doing.’’44 There is clearly a degree of logic to Deng’s
defense of his methods. Nonetheless, when I asked Deng and his staff to identify
where the OSAPG had had the greatest positive impact, which may not have been
apparent to outsiders, their responses were evasive.45
The manner in which Deng has chosen to pursue his mandate is clearly of some
concern. This is made all the more significant by virtue of the fact that there was
general consensus that the potential utility of this office was, almost uniquely, a
function of the Special Adviser’s capacity to speak out. Crawshaw argued that the
OSAPG had to be outspoken to have any real effect and stated, ‘‘Once you’ve got
that job title on your business card, you have to accept that is the job title on your
business card and not everybody’s going to like you. So you can stop thinking that
you can be everybody’s best friend. You won’t be and that’s impossible. . . . Yes, it’s a
post which requires diplomacy in many contexts, but it also requires very robust
speaking.’’46 Sonner noted that her organization initially supported the OSAPG
because they believed the office would be ‘‘making the tough calls and really putting
the pressure on member states to take action in situations that look like they’re
moving towards genocide,’’ and thus they were disenchanted with Deng’s approach.47
Reindorp asserted that the OSAPG had to do more than exclusively engage in
behind-the-scenes work; she noted, ‘‘Have you got the person in the position that
is best able to juggle the challenges between being the whistle-blower and being
the advocate with governments? I don’t think so.’’48 Staff at the OSAPG, perhaps
unsurprisingly, rejected this assertion; Stavropoulou argued, ‘‘a public statement
can shut that many more doors in the short term, and in the long term make the
mandate less effective, and I think NGOs don’t always realize that.’’49 NGOs, she
claimed, tend to evaluate activity on the basis of the number of statements an office
had made, and in the case of the OSAPG, this approach overlooked much of its work.
Deng and his staff were also keen to highlight the fact that their capacity to
make public statements was dependent on the assent of the secretary-general.
Stavropoulou recalled that there were times when the Special Adviser had wanted
to speak out, but ‘‘it wasn’t always possible’’ because of opposition from the secretary-
general.50 Deng similarly stated,
Another very important thing that people miss is I am an arm of the secretary-
general and everything I do, even when I want to make a statement or a press release
or an op-ed, has to be cleared with the office of the secretary-general and very often,
in fact on two or three occasions, they advised me against saying anything . . . on the
Sudan, on Sri Lanka, on Myanmar. I think people miss this when they think I have
my own autonomous standing . . . I’m not an independent voice of humanity; I am a
tool of the secretary-general.51
While this subservience to the secretary-general, himself widely considered overly
cautious, appears to support Weiss’s view on the impact of Deng’s personality, Castro
Wesamba, Political Affairs Officer within the OSAPG, argued that the OSAPG did
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not acquiesce with the secretary-general’s caution in every instance, and noted that
there were occasions when ‘‘we have really come out very strongly within the UN
system and said, ‘There’s no way the Special Adviser’s going to keep quiet about
this.’ ’’52 Despite this apparent unwillingness to tow the line in every case, it is
difficult to identify anything controversial or even strongly-worded in any of the
statements released by the OSAPG. It seems clear that the combination of a very
cautious secretary-general and a Special Adviser, who by nature seeks to maintain
cordial relations with everyone, has had an impact on the public profile of the
OSAPG.
While the relatively low profile of the OSAPG was overwhelmingly attributed to
the approach taken by Deng, Sonner did highlight another possible explanation. She
speculated that Deng’s caution had much to do with the fact that his predecessor
had once been embarrassingly barred from addressing the Security Council.53 This
incident occurred on 10 October 2005 when, according to Hamburg, the then US
Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, literally marshaled Mendez out of the room
before a meeting of the Council.54 Clearly this public denigration of the OSAPG did
little to enhance its status and, as Sonner suggests, there appears to be evidence
that Deng was influenced by this incident. He stated that ‘‘my approach, which
some NGOs were uneasy with, is not to press [the Security Council]. When I came
on board I said, ‘Look, if I come out loudly knocking at the door and the door is
closed, what good is it? I’m just going to create tension between my office and the
Security Council.’ ’’55 Deng has certainly not formally engaged with the Security
Council as much as many would like, with Weiss and Sonner particularly critical of
his reluctance to do so. Crawshaw observed that Mendez had been highly critical
of the Security Council’s ability, and evident willingness, to block the Special Adviser
from addressing meetings of the Council.56 In his final report as Special Adviser,
Mendez advised that the mandate of the OSAPG be strengthened to ensure that the
right to address the Council be clarified. This amendment to the mandate has not
occurred.57
This capacity to address the Council has been cited as one of the OSAPG’s most
significant powers.58 The reluctance on the part of members of the Security Council,
both permanent and non-permanent, to allow the Special Adviser access clearly under-
mines the potential of this aspect of the OSAPG’s mandate, and thus, in practice,
the mandate of the OSAPG is not a mechanism that ensures warnings are always
conveyed to the Security Council.59 Nonetheless the potential for the Special Adviser
to address the Security Council is cited by OSAPG staff as ‘‘a major achievement
in itself,’’ which differentiates the OSAPG from NGOs and other UN bodies.60
Stavropoulou argued that while Deng had not pushed to exercise this privilege,
‘‘there are different ways of engaging the Security Council. It doesn’t have to be
through the submission of a report in a formal way or through a formal hearing.
It can be through informal contacts with the members, informal contact with the
President. There are many different ways of communicating in a fashion that won’t
be threatening and therefore will result in rejection.’’61 Deng, indeed, suggested that
formally addressing the Council was of limited utility. He stated, ‘‘Every time an
issue is brought to the Security Council, you can predict . . . how Russia, China, and
the others will vote. This is another consideration when it comes to my relationship
with the Security Council; if you go there and say, ‘I am here concerned about what’s
happening in this or that country,’ not only are you raising the stakes but you’re
also generating controversy because you are going to get one member or another
of the P5 to defend that country.’’62 In addition to this question about the utility of
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addressing the Council, there is the issue of the novelty of this provision. It is indeed
true that there are few offices within the UN, and fewer outside it, that can address
the Council directly. Yet, it is not the case that without this privilege the perspec-
tives of certain groups can never be heard at Council meetings. Under Article 99 of
the Charter, the secretary-general can automatically address the Council; while this
provision is rarely used, it is conceivable that the secretary-general may bring details
of a report by a particular UN office or even an NGO to the Council’s attention.
In this sense, the capacity of the OSAPG to present to the Council may not be as
significant as it first appears. I put this to the staff at the OSAPG; Wesamba replied,
‘‘Okay, yes, [a report by an NGO] can be raised. The secretary-general can brief the
Security Council directly about Situation X, of which the information has come from
the Red Cross or some other NGO.’’ He added, however, that a report from the
OSAPG would be different because ‘‘it creates responsibilities . . . I think it creates
expectations and that’s the difference.’’ Given that the Council had agreed to the
establishment of the OSAPG, he argued, a briefing by the Special Adviser ‘‘creates
obligations.’’63
The fact that the Security Council has been less than enthusiastic about hearing
reports from the OSAPG is not altogether surprising. What was perhaps more sur-
prising was that OSAPG staff, including the Special Adviser himself, claimed that
there was opposition to the OSAPG from within the UN bureaucracy itself. Deng
asserted that there were a number of times when he sought to have an input into
the UN’s response to a certain intrastate situation and ‘‘the first line of resistance
was from our own people.’’ Deng stated that as his office did not have independent
information-gathering capacity, the OSAPG was reliant on other offices within the
UN to provide them with information. He noted, however, that ‘‘there are entities,
even within the UN, that consider this type of information confidential and they are
guarding their own interests . . . We are supposed to get the information from within
the UN, primarily from within the UN. Yet we get more information from outside
the UN because NGOs are willing, and scholars are willing to give us what they
know. The system itself is not that collaborative.’’64 Deng specifically cited the cases
of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008 and Sri Lanka in 2009 as instances
when his involvement was greeted with hostility from within the UN system. Deng
recalled that he became particularly frustrated when his involvement in Sri Lanka
was questioned and he told a meeting of the secretary-general and his senior staff,
‘‘You say that the office has no say? When will it ever be in a position to say
anything about any country?’’65 Both Deng and his staff stated that their presence
at UN meetings on a particular country situation invariably led to raised eyebrows
as other offices assumed that the OSAPG would concern itself only with instances of
genocide.66 In fact, the opposite is the case; the OSAPG, as one might indeed guess
from the title, is concerned with preventing genocide rather than identifying it. In
fact, the Special Adviser is not mandated to decree that genocide is taking place.
While it may at first seem curious that the UN system itself has proved to be
reluctant to engage with the OSAPG, and has at times evidently been hostile toward
it, this may be more comprehensible when one assesses the nature of bureaucracies
in general. Michael Barnett’s highly critical analysis of the UN’s response to the
Rwandan genocide is notable for his claim that, while the UN’s response was
unquestionably deeply flawed, it was, ‘‘grounded in ethical considerations.’’67 Clearly
these considerations did not privilege the suffering Tutsis, and thus the basis for
the ethical considerations that informed the decision to react to the genocide in
such a manner must be found elsewhere. Barnett argues that the UN, like all
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bureaucracies, has developed ‘‘a discourse and formal and informal rules that shape
what individuals care about and the practices they view as appropriate, desirable,
and ethical in their own right.’’68 Thus, in 1994 the priority, perversely, within the
UN was not the plight of the Tutsis, but rather ‘‘the health of the UN.’’69 The growth
and suffocating pervasiveness of the bureaucratic ethical code creates a situation
where those charged with serving certain individuals and groups outside the organi-
zation actually de-prioritize this formal role in favor of a determination to preserve
the integrity of the system. Hence, the establishment of the OSAPG can be seen
as constituting a challenge to the status quo within the UN bureaucracy, and it
is, therefore, entirely predictable that those people long socialized into the UN
bureaucratic mindset and its insular priorities would seek to protect the status quo
and undermine and isolate the OSAPG. Of course, this hostility to the OSAPG, and
indeed any ostensible challenge to the status quo and prevailing bureaucratic
culture, will dissipate if the OSAPG itself internalizes the dominant cultural norms
and ethical priorities. As explored later in this article, there is evidence to suggest
that the OSAPG has already sought to integrate with the existing system rather
than act as a challenge to it. Indeed, according to Thomas Weiss, ‘‘[Deng has] moved
very quickly into becoming a UN bureaucrat, ‘recognizing all the constraints that
exist,’ blah, blah, blah, and he is no longer on the outside.’’70
The misperception about the OSAPG’s mandate has had an impact on its rela-
tions with states as well as other UN offices. It is perhaps understandable that
states will be somewhat resistant to engaging with ‘‘The Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide’’ given the negative implications that will invariably arise.
Indeed, Weiss remarked, ‘‘If you were coming to my country and you said, ‘I’m the
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide,’ the idea that I would welcome you with
open arms is clearly not a solid place to start.’’71 Stavropoulou also admitted, ‘‘The
closer we get to a country, the more difficult it becomes for apparent reasons.’’72
Paragraph 140 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document commits all states to
‘‘fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the
Prevention of Genocide,’’ although whether this is honored in practice is open to
debate. This lack of cooperation appeared to have been evident in late 2008 when a
visit to Burundi was canceled when the government claimed to be unable to provide
an official to meet the Special Adviser.73 Wesamba, however, claimed that ‘‘there’s
not any substantive evidence that states don’t like to engage with the Special
Adviser’’ and argued that the case of Burundi was an exception.74 Since the estab-
lishment of the OSAPG, the situation in Darfur has arguably been the most serious
intrastate crises of a potentially genocidal nature. On 19 September 2005, the then
Special Adviser Juan Mendez visited Sudan and noted in his report, ‘‘The govern-
ment of Sudan extended its cooperation to me during the course of the visit.’’75 This
suggests that even certain states widely denounced as engaging in genocide appear
willing to engage with the OSAPG, or perhaps, it suggests only that the OSAPG
has acquired a status that precludes states from being seen to actively ignore it.
Deng noted that his work was also hampered by a reluctance among certain
powerful states to engage with the OSAPG, claiming, ‘‘those who would be called
upon to intervene to stop [genocide], tend to be resistant to discussing this issue.’’76
Many such states are keen to play down the scale of crises and feel that the
OSAPG’s presence would attract attention and create a momentum in favor of
action. Deng recalled that it had been suggested that his title be changed to ‘‘Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities’’77 and also that he be
made a ‘‘Representative’’ rather than a ‘‘Special Adviser.’’ This was rejected, Deng
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maintained, by Russia, which led a campaign and mobilized many other countries to
oppose any expansion of the OSAPG’s mandate or further upgrade in its status. This,
he argued, was because Russia feared that this would lead to rebel groups achieving
disproportionate publicity for their cause and the creation of more pressure for some
response from the Security Council. Nonetheless, while his mandate has not formally
been expanded and there remains significant support among states for him to
concern himself only with genocide, Deng stated, ‘‘I see my mandate in a broader
sense . . . I am not focusing on the legalistic definition of genocide and nor am I
guided only by that narrow definition.’’78
‘‘A Waste of Time, and Energy, and Money’’?
Those directly connected with the OSAPG argued that it was too early to form an
accurate appraisal of the office. They argued that it had really only been active since
early 2008, as previously the part-time nature of the job, the lack of resources, and
the minimal staff had hampered its effectiveness. Nonetheless, it was clear from the
interviews with those outside the OSAPG that strong opinions as to the utility of the
OSAPG had already been formed.
In his summation, Weiss asserted, ‘‘Frankly, I think this office is a waste of time,
and energy and money.’’ Evidence that the OSPAG has achieved any results is,
according to Weiss, ‘‘totally lacking.’’79 As noted previously, much of the blame for
this has been attributed to the personality and style of Deng. While everyone inter-
viewed spoke highly of Deng’s intellect, character, and experience, all those not
working directly with the OSAPG were critical of his appointment on the basis that
his ‘‘behind-the-scenes’’ approach was ill-suited to this role.80 In assessing this ques-
tion it is necessary to reiterate the fact that preventative diplomacy by definition
does not produce spectacular results. As Payam Akhavan notes ‘‘The Special Adviser
has a thankless job. His success in early warning and prevention is necessarily
measured in terms of what does not happen.’’81 Additionally, the OSAPG’s mandate
commits it to act ‘‘without excessive publicity’’ and, therefore, while NGO’s and
others may believe that the OSAPG should act as an alarm bell, this is not actually
its official remit.82
It seems, however, that the utility of this ‘‘early warning’’ mechanism should be
to act as the ‘‘alarm call’’ that many interviewees suggested. Behind-the-scenes
diplomacy is not in itself inherently ineffective and clearly there is a place for just
such a style. Yet, arguably, the UN secretary-general and the Red Cross already
fulfill this role, and it does not seem logical to adopt this approach for this particular
office. The office has not improved the information-gathering capacity of the UN and
hence its utility lies in its capacity, as Crawshaw argued, to fast track information
from other sources through the UN system.83 This would be most effectively done
in a public way, meaning the Special Adviser would formally submit reports, give
presentations, produce statements, etc., to maximize the impact of any particularly
worrying information. If the information handled by the OSAPG is quietly and
unofficially disseminated, this then has an impact on its capacity to create a momen-
tum in favor of action. Deng acknowledged that states involved in activities deemed
to be potentially genocidal, or likely to lead to genocide, are uncomfortable with dis-
cussing their situation in public for fear of external intervention. He additionally
noted that states with either the capacity to intervene or the mandate to take
action—or both in the case of the P5—are also happy to bury bad news for fear
that they will be called upon to take action. How then, will Deng’s ‘‘quiet approach’’
convince either the state involved in the deteriorating situation, or those states most
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likely to be called upon to respond, to take action to prevent an explosion of violence?
None of the reports about the Rwandan genocide concluded that effective action
would have occurred if the dire warnings issued before the genocide, by Ndiaye and
Dallaire, for example, had been relayed through the UN system in a ‘‘quiet’’ manner.
Indeed, by late April 1994, some three weeks after the Rwandan genocide began,
representatives of the Czech Republic, Spain, New Zealand, and Argentina pressed
the Secretariat to make public the information it had. The failure of the Secretariat
to do so convinced these countries to look beyond the Secretariat for information and
the information they eventually received convinced them that genocide was occurring
and they publically called for more robust action, thereby significantly increasing the
pressure on the P5 to act. As Nicolas Wheeler notes, the eventual public clamor to
do something, particularly in France, eventually led to action being taken, albeit
disastrously late and possibly in a counter-productive manner.84 To discuss deterio-
rating situations—so grave that they bear the hallmarks of potential genocide—
informally with a view to maintaining cordiality cannot by definition generate a
momentum in favor of action. Behind-the-scenes informal briefings leave no paper
trail and thus facilitate the excuse, often offered after a crisis, that ‘‘we didn’t know
how bad things were.’’85
Of course, generating momentum does not guarantee effective or timely action;
the campaign to take robust action in Darfur was a huge success in terms of mobiliz-
ing international opinion and forcing the issue onto the agenda of the Security Council
and yet it is now routinely argued that action taken in response to this campaign
was manifestly inadequate.86 This has obvious implications for the approach adopted
by Deng; if a massive campaign in favor of international action can fail to convince
states to act then it seems fair to conclude that a ‘‘quiet approach’’ will be less likely
to succeed. As Weiss remarked, ‘‘Logically speaking, if you can’t even get people
mobilized to do something in the midst of a crisis, the idea that somehow even before
you have a crisis, they’re all going to align and put money on it seems to me to be
against the nature of human beings and certainly against the nature of the inter-
state system.’’87 Of course, there are notable examples of effective international pre-
ventative action such as the UN Preventative Deployment Force stationed on the
Macedonian/Serbian border from 1992 to 1999. Yet the history of the international
response to intra-state crises undoubtedly suggests a reactive disposition despite
the fact that proactive preventative action is not only likely to save lives, but is also
significantly cheaper than action taken once violence has erupted.88
Deng, however, argued that while his methods were decried by NGOs, they had
proven their effectiveness during his time as Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons. Yet Weiss claimed that much
of Deng’s undoubted success in his previous role was a function of his semi-
independence from the UN bureaucracy, as he was also an academic at the time.89
Deng himself acknowledged that while working on internally displaced persons,
there were times when he exploited the freedom of his academic position to take
certain actions that would have been impossible for a UN bureaucrat.90 Given that
Deng no longer has the second hat as an academic, he cannot rely on the counter-
tactic to the quiet approach he feels being a UN official requires him to adopt.
In any event, Deng and his staff argued that the OSAPG had exercised significant
influence at certain times, though this was necessarily largely impossible to see
given that the work was done behind-the-scenes, and by definition it produces results
you do not see. Nonetheless, none of those working with the OSAPG identified a
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particular case as an example of the OSAPG’s effectiveness, and it is difficult not to
conclude that this is indicative of the OSAPG’s modest influence.
Yet, there is arguably a bigger concern regarding the efficacy of the OSAPG; the
utility of the office is premised not on a belief in the benevolence of statesmen, but
rather on an assumption that they fear shame. Stavropoulou claimed that a formal
report by the OSAPG becomes part of the public record and serves as a deterrent to
inaction as there will be a permanent record of the Special Adviser’s warnings. She
noted, ‘‘If, God forbid, another Rwanda happens and if this office has done its
job properly, then it must have been able to identify what was going on, what was
coming . . . It will have brought this to the attention of the secretary-general and the
Security Council and if no action is taken, then the responsibility and the account-
ability is very precisely located.’’91 Similarly, Wesamba argued that a report from
the OSAPG created ‘‘obligations.’’ When pressed to identify what these ‘‘obligations’’
were, given that there is no mention of any obligation incumbent upon the Security
Council to even listen to the Special Adviser let alone act on his recommendations,
Wesamba argued that these were obligations in the sense that they created norma-
tive pressure rather than legal compulsions to act.92 Deng himself argued, ‘‘ [By
establishing the OSAPG] we are sharpening our sensitivity to these issues and the
resolve of the international community to act. Every time we say ‘Never again!’ and
it happens again, the level of guilt rises and as the level of guilt rises, the level
of resolve to do something about it before the next time increases.’’93 Given recent
history, this would appear to be a perspective born more from hope than experience.
After the genocide in Rwanda, statesmen around the world lamented their response
and ‘‘Never Again!’’ was once again widely and loudly proclaimed. Yet, in his assess-
ment of the response to the crisis in Darfur, Kofi Annan noted, ‘‘We were slow,
hesitant, uncaring and we had learnt nothing from Rwanda.’’94 This clearly doesn’t
correlate with Deng’s claim. States appear to have little compunction about ignoring
or equivocating about a looming or actual genocide unless they have significant
national interests involved. National interests are not immutable, of course, and
there is some evidence that pressure to act, either from NGOs, domestic publics or
UN organs, can influence states to alter their stance on a particular issue. None-
theless, it seems unlikely that an office that the Security Council is empowered to
ignore, led by a Special Adviser who has chosen to adopt a ‘‘quiet approach’’ and
restrained from speaking out by a cautious secretary-general, will be able to generate
the requisite pressure to convince those states with the power and authority to
mandate preventative action to fundamentally alter their foreign policies.
Conclusion
The UN internal inquiry into the organization’s response in 1994 presented fourteen
recommendations for UN reform, the fourth of which stated, ‘‘The early warning
capacity of the United Nations needs to be improved though better cooperation with
outside actors including NGOs and academics as well as within the Secretariat.’’95
The OSAPG appears to be a tangible manifestation of this recommendation and on
that basis its establishment is to be welcomed. It has been championed by both the
current and former secretary-general as a highly significant innovation and the
importance of its mandate is obvious. To date, however, it has not been subjected
to focused academic analysis and information about the working of the office and
perceptions as to its effectiveness are largely absent from academic literature. This
article has sought to address this gap and is based on a unique series of interviews
with leading figures within the OSAPG and informed observers outside it. The
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findings of this research are illustrative of the views of NGOs and the OSAPG itself.
It would be additionally instructive to undertake research into the perspectives of
various nations on the OSAPG and, though this is beyond the scope of the current
article, it is a future aim.
Deng recalled that when he was asked to take up the position of Special Adviser
he felt it was ‘‘a call of duty and a service to humanity that I could not take lightly,’’
though he admitted, ‘‘I quickly went from being flattered and honored, to worrying
‘what have I got myself into in taking on this huge responsibility?’ ’’96 Deng and his
staff ’s commitment to the OSAPG appears to be beyond question and their genuine
enthusiasm for the OSAPG can only be beneficial. This enthusiasm, however, is not
widely shared.
The ‘‘quiet approach’’ adopted by Deng does have some support and should not
be disregarded as fundamentally flawed.97 Nonetheless, while behind-the-scenes
diplomacy can be effective, it is criticized as an inappropriate method for this office.
All those interviewed working outside the OSAPG argued that the Special Adviser
should become a much more public figure and act as a vocal warning mechanism.
Yet, given the nature of the mandate, a compromise between Deng’s approach and
that advocated by the interviewees would arguably be best advised. Without becom-
ing a media-friendly mouthpiece, the Special Adviser could maintain a demeanor of
calm analysis, rather than adopting a combative, accusatory approach based on a
worse-case-scenario reading of information. He could increase the profile of the
OSAPG by seeking to exploit its capacity to address the Security Council. Failure to
avail himself of this aspect of the mandate constitutes a lost opportunity to raise
the profile of the OSAPG, but more importantly, engaging more formally with the
Council creates a formal record of warnings issued to the P5, which could undermine
any subsequent claims that information about a particular situation was lacking.
This is not to support the claims made by Stavropoulou that the OSAPG could
somehow ‘‘shame’’ the P5 into acting, but it does constitute the basis for generating
some degree of leverage; action of this type by the OSAPG will be highly unlikely
in and of itself to convince the Security Council to take preventative action, but in
conjunction with other factors, it could contribute to building momentum. Acting
more in the public sphere would additionally raise the profile of the OSAPG within
the UN itself, where it is clear there is a lack of information about the office. Many of
those who do know of its existence, evidently harbor a degree of hostility toward it.
The central issue in the quest to prevent genocide is the mobilization of political
will. The UN’s inquiry into the Rwandan genocide claimed that the ‘‘fundamental
failure’’ was ‘‘a persistent lack of political will.’’98 Overcoming this barrier consti-
tutes an enormous task that should not be deemed the responsibility of the OSPAG
alone. The interviews conducted with staff at the OSAPG highlighted that states are
reluctant to discuss genocide—actual or apprehended—for fear that they may be
called upon to act. Clearly this disposition among states creates a far from propitious
context in which the OSAPG is tasked with executing its mandate. The fact that
the Special Adviser cannot automatically address the Security Council is perhaps
indicative of the P5’s desire to manage the flow of information it is formally exposed
to. The former Special Adviser—Juan Mendez—suggested reforming the mandate of
the OSAPG so that the right to address the Council could not be vetoed and this
would be a potentially highly significant strengthening of the OSAPG’s powers. Yet,
even with this reform of the OSAPG’s mandate, there is no guarantee that the
spectacle of inertia in the face of mass tragedy, which has so degraded the status of
the UN in the past, will not happen again. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon noted
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in his 2009 report, ‘‘[T]he crucial element in the prevention of genocide remains
responding to concerns, once these have been communicated.’’99 The current secretary-
general has expressed his commitment to the office and there appears to be no danger
that it will be dissolved in the near future. Whether the OSAPG can ever be effective
given its restrictive mandate, the style of the current incumbent, and the perennial
problem posed by the lack of political will, especially amongst the P5, will become
more evident in the next five years as crises inevitably arise and the OSAPG’s
influence—or lack thereof—becomes more evident.
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Reconciliation and Justice after
Genocide: A Theoretical Exploration
Genevie`ve Parent
Laurentian University
This article argues that the post-conflict reconciliation process is undermined by
the importance given to the retributive form of justice dominating peacebuild-
ing and transitional justice measures. Retributive justice reinforces the division
between perpetrator and victim, thus undermining the reconciliation process between
antagonistic parties. The so-called objective categories of perpetrator and victim, so
crucial for the administration and management of most peacebuilding measures,
underestimate the individual and collective psychological dimension and intersub-
jective effects that these categories have upon the healing and reconciliation pro-
cesses. The significance of the psychological dimension of reconciliation suggests
a restorative justice approach that emphasizes the subjective and intersubjective
meanings of justice and reconciliation. The case of post-genocide Rwanda will be
used to show how the retributive justice approach can undermine the reconcilia-
tion process.
Key words: reconciliation, genocide, restorative justice, retributive justice,
psychological healing
Transitional justice refers to a number of peacebuilding measures that are inter-
nationally, nationally, and/or locally rooted, such as international tribunals, amnesties,
truth commissions, criminal trials, reparation programs, and memorials. Despite these
various efforts and despite the growing body of literature on transitional justice, it
remains unclear if and how these activities contribute to post-conflict reconcilia-
tion processes. This article seeks to contribute to the discussion through an interdis-
ciplinary reading of the relationship between the form of justice being administered
and post-conflict reconciliation, notably through an exploration of the significance of
the psychological dimension in post-conflict societies.
The article begins by discussing reconciliation, and how the concept relates
crucially to the concept of justice. In view of the former’s function in post-conflict
peacebuilding settings, there is a critical need to refine the vague and confusing
reconciliation concept and to discuss its relationship to the concept of justice. The
increasingly prevailing ‘‘retributive’’ form of justice of contemporary peacebuilding
efforts, it is argued, produces an unnecessary paradox or misleading choice between
dispensing justice and promoting peace and reconciliation (the famous justice versus
peace ‘‘dilemma’’). A ‘‘restorative’’ form of justice, on the other hand, can promote
both justice and reconciliation. It is argued that the rigid and static victim and
perpetrator labels not only poorly reflect fluid and changing sets of identities (e.g.,
victim, defender, caretaker, perpetrator, hero, mother, father) but also lead to
increasing animosity between antagonistic groups. The argument presented here
thus emphasizes the psychological and intersubjective dimensions of civil war and
genocide survivors’ experiences that have to be taken into account to guarantee the
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success and durability of the reconciliation process. It will also examine the conflic-
tual nature and dynamics of reconciliation so as to underline how reconciliation can
be influenced by the form of justice privileged in transitional periods. To ignore these
aspects is to seriously jeopardize the medium and long-term prospects of reconcilia-
tion processes.
Post-conflict Reconciliation
How can reconciliation be possible? It is very difficult. I cannot reconcile with the
person who killed members of my family. He cannot bring them back, he cannot erase
the pain . . . Nothing of them (family members) is left. It is as if they never existed.1
In spite of extensive interest in post-conflict reconciliation, the concept remains un-
clear and loosely used by both scholars and political actors. While this ambiguity
can serve many social and political purposes, it also leads to a number of assump-
tions about the links between reconciliation and other crucial concepts, such as
justice, forgiveness, truth, healing, peace, and so on. Some argue or simply assume
that these concepts are part of reconciliation,2 while others question these taken-
for-granted relationships.3
Despite the need to challenge the assumed relationship between reconciliation
and numerous other concepts, a recurrent theme is that reconciliation, somehow,
helps people to heal. In fact, healing is a pervasive term in the literature on recon-
ciliation4 and the latter is even often confused with healing.5 What and who needs
to be healed or what kind of healing is necessary for reconciliation to take place is
unclear. Some explicitly indicate that post-conflict individual wounds need healing.
Nevertheless, a broad understanding includes the healing of social relations.6 Some
authors also point to the importance of healing individual post-conflict wounds—
notably psychological ones—for reconciliation to occur.7 Healing seemingly has an
influence on reconciliation. The antagonistic parties go through some sort of healing
for reconciliation to occur.
There is little agreement beyond (an essentially implicit) healing on what recon-
ciliation really means. Daly and Sarkin highlight the irony that a term that evokes
cohesion has so many divergent meanings, sometimes even competing ones, ranging
from not killing each other to the equivalent of ‘‘a national hug.’’8 For example, Ross
refers to reconciliation as a continuum where we find different degrees of reconcilia-
tion.9 Congruent with this continuum, recent literature tends to see reconciliation
as a goal and a process. Several authors emphasize the transformative, dynamic,
and conflictual aspects of the reconciliation process.10 Indeed, reconciliation is not a
progressive linear process.
Accordingly, reconciliation is better understood as a societal process where
each party is supposed to acknowledge the other and the other’s sufferings, where
antagonistic parties are to move onto constructive attitudes and behaviors, and/or
where individual and collective relationships of trust are (re)built.11 This social
process, however, entails a significant psychological dimension: ‘‘a changed psycho-
logical orientation toward the other.’’12 More often than not, the members of antago-
nistic groups must overcome perceptions and feelings of enmity that are often based
upon horrific personal experiences and/or upon demonizing and dehumanizing repre-
sentations of the ‘‘other.’’ The psychological challenge, both individual and collective,
is double: (1) to overcome the psychological effects of terrible war experiences; and (2)
to see the (old) enemy as a fellow human being with whom it is possible to coexist.
Hence, in the end, post-conflict reconciliation involves not only trust and constructive
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attitudes or imposed peacebuilding measures, but recognizing the humanity of the
‘‘other’’; that is, the ‘‘other’s’’ needs, interests, understandings, and perceptions of
war, peace, and even reconciliation. Reconciliation might be a very complex social
process, but it requires more than material reparations and the administration of
(retributive) justice. To be effective, it must also include a significant psychological
healing dimension that requires transforming the psychological orientation of antago-
nistic groups and individuals toward each other. As it is argued below, this emphasis
on the psychological dimension entails redefining the relationship between recon-
ciliation and (restorative) justice. But first, I must elaborate on the importance of
the psychological dimension, notably in the context of a divided society.
Considering the Psychological Dimension in a Divided Society
Reconciliation is always difficult to achieve in post-conflict societies, and even more
so in the context of deeply divided societies fractured by cycles of extreme violence
and/or genocide. The one-size-fits-all characteristic of many peacebuilding and tran-
sitional justice measures do not make the task of reconciliation easier. Daly and
Sarkin suggest that reconciliation measures should be shaped to include three criteria:
(1) the general context before the transitional period (the nature of human rights
violations, for instance); (2) the nature of the transition (if it took place by force, by
negotiation, or otherwise); and (3) the social and political conditions going into the
reconciliation process (the victim–perpetrator ratio, socio-economic conditions, and
so on).13 It seems that, the more extreme the violence and the war crimes, the more
emphasis should be put on the psychological dimension for a ‘‘successful’’ reconcilia-
tion process.14 Also, coerced participation in reconciliation will not lay the ground for
one’s empowerment. It does not encourage one to assume a sense of responsibility
for his/her actions, or to adopt a sense of engagement either. Any imposed reconcili-
ation measure will bring little to no relief on one’s post-conflict wounds, or change
one’s psychological orientation toward the other. Despite the unique experiences of
each country, there is growing evidence that a deeply divided society necessitates
the prioritization of the psychological dimension.15
Some scholars contend that liberal institutions are necessary for durable peace
and/or that socio-economic changes are as important for reconciliation as psychologi-
cal healing. Lipschutz16 and Hutchison and Bleiker,17 among others, argue that the
exclusive restoration of state institutions and of the economy is insufficient to repair
the damaged or broken down relationships after years of violence and war. Without
the healing of individual wounds and (re)building of relationships between individuals
and groups, the capacity and ability of the citizens to participate in development
work are hampered, thus, weakening the communities’ capacity to fight poverty.
This sort of argument and debate reflects the complexity in implementing reconcilia-
tion processes.
Reconciliation is made more complex by the question of the level at which recon-
ciliation should take place: local, national, or international. At the level of individuals,
the focus is on the experience of the individuals who are or were affected by the armed
conflict. The emphasis is, for instance, upon the relationship between individual
victims and perpetrators. At the level of the community, peacebuilding reconciliation
implies engaging the former enemy groups/communities, involving both internal and
intergroup social dynamics. It is, however, at the national level that one finds the
bulk of the literature on liberal peacebuilding, state-building, and transitional justice.
It is also and mostly at this level that the international community directs its
demands for reconciliation. Hence, reconciliation considers the meaning of ‘‘peace’’
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between government and the rebel group(s), implies adopting and implementing
better policies, building ‘‘liberal’’ institutions, and changing the attitudes and
behaviors of those in power.18 Within this framework, internally displaced persons
are often marginalized, although many have warned that they must be considered
because they can greatly exacerbate problems and obstruct reconciliation.19 Since
transitional countries have little resources, the need is to target problems efficiently
in order to determine at which level reconciliation programs should be aimed and
work best.20
The question of the relevant level of reconciliation largely depends on ‘‘who is
looking at it.’’ In academia for instance, political scientists tend to put more emphasis
on the state,21 whereas social psychologists tend to focus on individuals and increas-
ingly on social groups.22 Although some put forward a multilevel approach,23 it is
far from a predominant approach to the problem of reconciliation. In practice, the
importance of the psychological dimension of reconciliation is much more explicit at
the local and social/community levels (e.g., local initiatives, NGOs, etc.), while it
tends to be ignored, dismissed, and/or minimized by national and international
peacebuilders (e.g., international courts, state/nation-building efforts, etc.). Attention
should be paid to this issue because reconciliation is almost always working at
all levels simultaneously, but not necessarily harmoniously. Hence, differences in
purposes or objectives are reflected in the respective levels, contradicting or working
against each other. It is important to have a global perspective on reconciliation
where all levels are considered. The variety of different understandings of reconcilia-
tion must bring scholars and stakeholders from different fields and perspectives
together—examining the affinities and tensions—in order to bridge the division and
have a holistic and inclusive approach to reconciliation. This diversity should be an
opportunity to engage into dialogue with others—all parts of a whole—to challenge
one’s own understanding or to explore new understandings rather than to divide
each into camps of like-minded individuals in order to strengthen one’s own view-
points. Otherwise, efforts at one or more level(s) could work against other level(s).
Processes of reconciliation will or will not foster sustainable peace, but they will
transform individuals, communities, groups, and their interrelationships.
To be effective, the reconciliation process must proceed bottom-up and top-down
simultaneously. Indeed, individuals are the fundamental elements of society and
widespread trauma throughout the population negatively affects all possible levels
of reconciliation.24 Most importantly, while the physical and mental health of
individuals is crucial for national reconciliation, national reconciliation has no imme-
diate, automatic, or necessary effect upon individual well-being.25 A government can
promote individual reconciliation through ‘‘genuine commitment’’ and ‘‘conciliatory
acts’’ done in public, which are accompanied by other initiatives such as funding
direct assistance to survivors or supporting public education. In short, citizens have
to believe that the government is genuinely seeking reconciliation. In the context of a
divided society, the importance of the psychological dimension—extreme traumatiza-
tion of the citizens—is substantiated by a number of defining features. For instance,
a divided society is characterized by the geographic proximity of the antagonistic
parties (often living as neighbors); by the perpetuation of conflicts across genera-
tions; by the lines of conflicts that are drawn from regional, religious, and/or ethnic
affiliations where one group oppressed the other; and by direct violence infliction.26
The experience of civil war is thus very different from the experience of interstate
war because it often questions and challenges the very nature and/or raison d’eˆtre of
the society at (civil) war.
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In short, without overlooking socio-economic realities and other ‘‘objective’’
factors, defining reconciliation in terms of (re)building individual relationships
and taking into consideration the importance of the psychological dimension of
reconciliation—conceived as more subjective in the literature—facilitates the estab-
lishment of a basis from which broader social relationships can be (re)built.
Especially in the context of a divided society, it is imperative that national recon-
ciliation initiatives resonate and/or concur with lower levels of reconciliation: the
social/community and individual levels. As pointed out by Hamber, it has become
critical that more attention is given to mental health in post-conflict political pro-
cesses27 and, as we will see in the upcoming section, in the field of transitional
justice.
This argument is reflected in the literature on reconciliation in the social
psychology field. Nadler and Schnabel distinguish between instrumental and socio-
emotional reconciliation. Socio-emotional reconciliation involves a deeper and more
complex transformative aspect than instrumental reconciliation. Thereby, each is
said to fit best with different contexts. Instrumental reconciliation is better suited
to a context of international or interstate conflict where ‘‘separated’’ coexistence is
possible. Socio-emotional reconciliation is better adapted to an intranational context
or intra-social conflicts28 where coexistence seems inescapable (for whatever reason)
and where one peaceful single social/national unit seems the key objective of
reconciliation. Instrumental reconciliation is oriented toward the present, whereas
socio-emotional reconciliation is oriented toward the past and the future. To be
more specific, instrumental reconciliation focuses on ongoing repetitive cooperative
projects, while socio-emotional reconciliation first focuses on the confrontation of
the conflicted past, where both recognition of past wrongdoings and pleading for
forgiveness (however defined) will lay a foundation for building future ‘‘relationships
of interdependence in a single unit.’’
Instrumental reconciliation has the ‘‘advantage’’ of being based upon ‘‘objective’’
indicators and factors like economic and political institutions. Moreover, the ‘‘objec-
tive’’ characteristics of instrumental reconciliation work well with and serve the
retributive understanding of justice underpinning contemporary peacebuilding and
transitional justice processes well. Socio-emotional reconciliation, grounded in sub-
jective interrelationships, is less amenable and useful to ‘‘concrete’’ national and
international peacebuilding practices and policies. However, not only the ‘‘subjective’’
characteristics of socio-emotional reconciliation concur with one’s own healing; they
lay the groundwork for one’s psychological orientation toward the other. The restorative
form of justice suits best the subjective and intersubjective needs of a deeply divided
society for socio-emotional reconciliation.
Nevertheless, it is not enough to examine and to emphasize the psychological
dimension of reconciliation. If this dimension is to be taken seriously, it must come
with an appreciation of the relationship between reconciliation and the form of jus-
tice that is promoted or sought. Building on an examination of the case of Rwanda,
the rest of this article explores the consequences of the retributive form of justice
upon reconciliation and how a restorative form of justice coupled with an emphasis
on the psychological dimension can better foster peace and reconciliation.
Reconciliation and the Retributive Form of Justice
There is little agreement about what transitional justice involves. This is under-
standable because of each country’s unique features (social, legal, economical, and
political dynamics) and the complexity of (re)building post-conflict societies.29 In
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addition, there is a wide range of possibilities and intertwined approaches to recon-
ciliation, justice, and reconstruction.
Justice can be interpreted in numerous ways.30 Yet, as used in the peacebuilding
literature, justice as transitional justice is a concept often minimally based upon
post-conflict survivors’ experiences and upon very little input from conflict survivors
and victims. Despite numerous attempts and claims to the objective status of justice,
justice can be a highly subjective and intersubjective notion that varies according to
context, group membership, and/or personal experiences. Justice is not universal.31
And yet, in practice, trials have been increasingly favored in transitional societies:
‘‘Practioners in the field argue that there is no peace and no reconciliation without
punitive justice.’’32 Moreover, the Western ‘‘universal’’ focus on retributive justice is
often imposed as a post-conflict solution in war-torn societies.33 In practice, however,
the majority of individuals who have committed mass atrocities have not been held
accountable or punished. In the scholarship on transitional justice, it is also assumed
or explicitly claimed that retributive justice should be prioritized in societies divided
by mass violence. Some will go as far as conceiving justice as obviously retributive
and they will assume the relationship between retributive justice and reconciliation
as natural and/or logical:
When justice is done, and seen to be done, it provides a catharsis for those physically
or psychologically scarred by violations of international humanitarian law. Deep-
seated resentments—key obstacles to reconciliation—are removed and people on
different sides of the divide can feel that a clean slate has been provided for.34
This understanding of justice necessarily implies acts of ‘‘ injustice’’ or ‘‘wrongs’’
that must be addressed and rectified through a prism of justice. However, retribution
is not necessary to initiate a transition process toward stability and peace.35 Re-
tributive justice’s primary aim is to punish the offender. At best, a victim gets to be
considered as an ‘‘official victim’’ and is given an opportunity to testify in a trial,
while the administrators, legislators, prosecutors, and judges are the ones who retain
the ultimate power to impose (or not) a punishment. In short, retributive justice
essentially constitutes ‘‘a transaction between the state and the offender.’’36 Claims
and assumptions about how retributive justice satisfies the needs and interests of
victims seem to ignore the bitter realities of a trial process and victims’ experiences
of that process. Indeed, these claims and assumptions about retributive justice are
challenged and recognized as erroneous in the fields of law and criminology.37
Here, I am not particularly concerned about how (transitional) justice can be
understood and conceived in different cultural contexts, but how a retributive form
of justice can affect reconciliation, notably in terms of the individual psychology of
victims of war.
Rwanda
Three levels of transitional justice can be been identified in Rwanda: the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the formal criminal trials at the
national level, and the gacaca courts at the local level.38 After the genocide, the
government of Rwanda and the international community put much emphasis on
holding perpetrators accountable. Fighting impunity was at the core of the Rwandan
government’s policies, in conjunction with other measures to promote national
reconciliation.
In the context of a post-conflict divided society, within the retributive form of
justice framework, the concepts of victim and perpetrator tend to be conceived in
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dichotomous terms: creating two distinct, mutually exclusive, and homogeneous
social groups. Victims are conceived as the passive objects of direct violence that
become visible only when perpetrators use that violence against them. In some cases,
the dichotomy has crucial political effects by generating two social groups that are
diametrically opposed, thus simplifying the process of identification of who is the
victim and who is the aggressor/perpetrator. This oversimplification is disconnected
from the reality of many post-conflict situations, does not reflect the complexity of
victimization during conflict, and often defines individual identities as solely that
of victim or perpetrator.39 Following the harmful act, the victim not only faces
numerous consequences and needs, but he/she can ultimately lose control of his/her
life. Retributive justice processes depend on the perpetrator to proceed: no perpe-
trator means no criminal justice process. Moreover, in the event where a monetary
compensation for the victim might be considered, the insolvability of the perpetra-
tor leaves the victim with little to no monetary aid to cope with his/her post-
victimization consequences and needs. Hence, the victim’s loss of control over his/
her life is perpetuated through the retributive justice system’s dependency on the
perpetrator.40 Retributive justice processes are adversarial, and both victims and
perpetrators are victimized through them. The victim and perpetrator categories are
established, reinforced, and polarized via an increased victimhood of both sides
brought about by the system’s adversarial procedures.
In the case of Rwanda, there is growing acknowledgment that reconciliation re-
quires more than the prosecutions of the key ge´nocidaires by international and national
courts. The international community put great faith into gacaca—encouraging con-
fessions, denunciations, and plea bargaining—for encouraging individual and social
reconciliation at least.41 However, in Rwanda, gacaca was ‘‘adapted’’ and it seems
to have become essentially a retributive tool to punish Hutu.42 Waldof even suggests
that gacaca might represent a social control tool for the government. The author
explains that gacaca, by facilitating mass accusations of Hutu men, not only pro-
motes a collective Hutu guilt, but it can also be used to disenfranchise a significant
number of Hutu voters.43 As such, this ‘‘tool’’ does not seem to meet the victims’
expectations, making them hesitant about any form of reconciliation.44 The following
testimonies are common:
I have gotten to know many (men) without my consent. . . . I discovered I am HIV
positive. I live in very bad conditions because I didn’t go to school (because of the
genocide). I have no job and am too weak now to dig the fields. I get food from an
organization that helps me to survive. . . . I don’t think I can forgive the FAR soldiers
or the Interahamwe. I don’t want to hear about reconciliation. I accused them in the
gacaca courts, including the one who raped me, those who participated in the killings
in the church and those I saw at the roadblock, but now they are being released.
Gacaca courts do not bring justice . . .
I don’t go to the gacaca courts anymore, because the people we are accusing are being
released. I don’t see the point in taking the risk of sharing my testimony there if it
doesn’t make any difference . . .
I feel the Interahamwe militia and FAR soldiers killed what I would have become.
I am HIV positive. I am not able to work, because I am very weak and constantly
ill. I suffer from headaches, chest aches, backaches, and pains in my vagina, and I
have sinus problems as a result of the men who raped me in the nose . . . Some of
the Interahamwe militiamen who raped me were imprisoned, but they are now being
released. This is not justice. Gacaca courts were supposed to bring justice and recon-
ciliation, but they are bringing more tears than smiles.45
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While in Rwanda silence remains on the alleged RPF war crimes, the number of
Hutu suspected of being ge´nocidaires keeps on increasing.46 Gacaca played an impor-
tant role in the staggering increased number of accused ge´nocidaires.47 It appears to
encourage an ‘‘exclusive’’ form of justice rather than an ‘‘inclusive’’ form where all
parties recognize their deeds and the others’ sufferings, even if they are of different
nature and degree. In fact, increasing literature indicates that the gacaca courts
seem to be skewed against Hutu. For instance, the Rwandan ambassador to Belgium
indicated that the number of suspected ge´nocidaires was close to two million, which
approximated the number of Hutu male in that period.48 As Mamdani wrote,
Every time I visited post-genocide Rwanda, I would ask responsible state officials . . .
how many ordinary civilians they thought had participated in the genocide. Every
time the answer was in the millions. Even more troubling, the estimate grew with
each visit.49
Participation at gacaca courts is mandatory. Despite the much projected image of
unanimous Rwandan consensus and support for gacaca initiatives—which might
have been genuine in the beginning—many Tutsi have become afraid to participate
and to testify with reason: a number of Tutsi have been intimidated, physically
assaulted, and even killed before or after their participation at gacaca courts. Tutsi
are more insecure since they are often harassed by the families of the individual who
killed their relatives. This trend has clearly augmented since 2003, when the first
waves of perpetrators/ge´nocidaires were released. Hutu are also afraid of the gacaca
courts since they fear being wrongly accused and/or imprisoned.50
Furthermore, while the number of guilty has been growing, an increasing
number of Rwandans find it more difficult to be recognized as victims since the
genocide. The Hutu who resisted during the genocide, who tried to save or saved
Tutsi relatives, friends, or neighbors, are not recognized as victims or survivors,
while the government tends to naturally label them as ge´nocidaires or accomplices.
Many Hutu were also hunted and killed following the genocide by RPF and the
Rwandan Patriotic Army. Others died in overcrowded refugee camps in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC).51 The ‘‘mixed’’ Rwandans also do not appear to
meet the criteria of victim. For instance, having one Tutsi parent and one Hutu
parent seems to encourage feelings of suspicion about one’s involvement in the
genocide, whether as a passive accomplice or as an active killer agent.52 Tutsi and
Hutu live in fear and most are too afraid to talk about the current situation, their
experience related to the circumstances that led to their victimization, or to their
participation in violence. The official ‘‘unity’’ policy appears to exacerbate the rift
between Tutsi and Hutu.
Since the 2003 constitution, the use of the words Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa is illegal
in public discourse and is punishable by law. However, despite the fact that the
identities are officially silenced, the stigmatization and marginalization associated
with them remain and are flourishing. This is largely explained by the fact that the
ethnic identities Tutsi and Hutu have become associated with the identities of victim
and perpetrator/ge´nocidaire, respectively:
In Rwanda, a Hutu is a perpetrator and a Tutsi is a victim. Because I am Hutu, I am
unable to go back to Rwanda to find out who killed my family and why. I cannot see
the house, nothing. Without any answer, it is impossible for me to get closure. I suffer
great pain.53
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Vidal suggests that the ban on public references to ethnic identity facilitates the link
between Hutu and ge´nocidaire since it leads all to forget that Hutu are not all guilty
and that some were in fact courageous and/or victimized.54 Also, it has been much
more difficult to remember and recognize that many Hutu suffered and are suffering
since the word Hutu is publicly banned. Hintjens explains that the ‘‘victims’’ in
Rwanda—whether they were in exile or in Rwanda—are connected by ‘‘a common
persecution and their victimizers, as a whole, are to blame’’ for it.55 The dichotomy
Tutsi/Hutu is very palpable and perpetuating. The Tutsi constitute an ‘‘us’’; the
Hutu represent the ‘‘other.’’ Twa remain invisible/non-existent. Dichotomous iden-
tities are implicitly intertwined with the victim/perpetrator dualism, making both
dichotomies mutually reinforcing. Both dichotomies have been enforced by Rwandan
political programs and initiatives such as the imposition of an official one-sided and
exclusive memory.
The question of historical memory, both individual and collective, is crucial to
the victim’s psychological rehabilitation, and thus to the reconciliation process. And
yet each commemoration does not recognize explicitly the massacred Hutu, thus
reinforcing the Hutu’s collective guilt. Buckley-Zistel contends that each commemo-
ration appears to further create negative emotions and negative cognitive percep-
tions for both Tutsi and Hutu.56 For Tutsi, being reminded of the genocide through
commemoration on a daily basis can only feed his/her trauma symptoms, fears, and
negative feelings and perceptions toward the ‘‘other.’’ Moreover, the impoverished
conditions of many Tutsi survivors make matters worse as they claim that the
government largely ignores their call for compensation, increasing further their
post-conflict difficulties. A number of studies indicate that these material conditions
encourage the use of violence in order to remedy the miserable survival conditions.57
For Hutu, being identified as accomplices or suspected ge´nocidaires, receiving no
acknowledgment for their sufferings and/or good deeds, and being marginalized
and stigmatized (often worsening their material conditions) in addition to their
post-conflict and post-genocide trauma symptoms (even if they are different than
the Tutsi’s) produces increasing resentment toward Tutsi. In these conditions where
psychological dispositions toward thinking in dualisms are reinforced, the potential
to resort to violence against the ‘‘other’’ appears to be increasingly likely.
Burkley-Zistel sustains that there is a ‘‘pretended’’ peace in Rwanda that is
supported by fear and pragmatism. In terms of pragmatism, the author explains
that living in an environment where ‘‘all depend on all,’’ means that ‘‘survival and
prosperity require collaboration.’’58 The gap between ‘‘us victims’’ and ‘‘them perpe-
trators’’ seems to have been continually and silently widened. Hence, this imposed
top-down ‘‘ethnic identity unity’’ and ‘‘consensus’’ do little to promote constructive
relationships between Tutsi and Hutu. These national initiatives conflict with any
form of psychological healing of individuals and communities. As each Rwandan
has to suppress his/her own suffering while trying to survive, openness toward the
‘‘other’’ has become unlikely.
This is basic psychology. Survey studies conducted in Northern Ireland indicate
that feelings of victimization of one’s party and competitive victimhood with the
adversary are negatively related to reconciliation.59 On the other hand, empathy
and perceptions of common identity with the antagonist was positively related to
reconciliation: ‘‘a full understanding of intergroup conflict requires changing the
relationships between the adversaries (e.g., to greater trust and constructive
cooperation) and attending to their psychological needs and feelings (e.g., needs for
justice and equality, feelings of victimization or guilt).’’60
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The ‘‘retributive spirit’’ (against Hutu) of Rwandan reconciliation processes
limits contact and open communication between parties, thus not contributing
positively to any form of reconciliation and, in fact, moving away from it. The depen-
dence on finding a perpetrator means that justice becomes offender-oriented rather
than victim- and/or community-oriented; more retributive than restorative. As the
reconciliation initiatives remain focused on the perpetrator, the victim—conceived
as a passive agent—is essentially left aside from the reconciliation process and
deprived further from much-needed restoration. Victims and even perpetrators see
themselves as ‘‘victim,’’ and are unable to heal their post-conflict wounds when
the separation between them is reinforced and/or imposed. In this context, the
ground cannot be laid for one’s psychological re-orientation toward the ‘‘other’’:
‘‘Unaddressed hurts and injustices will fester and grow, and ultimately undermine
the best political or economic reform.’’61
A Restorative Justice Approach to Reconciliation
While impunity or amnesty for perpetrators is rejected among victims of large-scale
violent conflicts, victims of various conflicts do not appear to be focused on the perpe-
trators’ punishment.62 It has been observed that victims tend to prioritize diverse
measures to address the consequences of large-scale violence.63 Among those measures
we find: the acknowledgment of their injury, the reparation of harms (material and
non-material), and the emergence of the truth about what happened.
Pratto and Glasford argue that restorative justice will promote reconciliation
better than retributive justice.64 In criminology, restorative justice proponents argue
that it is better suited to victims’ needs since, ‘‘as the individual harmed,’’ the victim
is a key stakeholder in the ‘‘ justice process.’’ Being considered as a central stake-
holder, the victim has validation for his/her worth as a member of the community—
something that is often taken away from him/her by the violent act and is rarely
(only symbolically, if ever) restored by retributive justice.65
A restorative process is necessarily social and psychological. It allows the victim to
share his/her experience of victimization and its aftermath and to get an understand-
ing of what happened from the perpetrator’s perspective. The victim decides whether
to accept offers for reparations or apologies, for instance. Via a restorative approach,
in addition to having a better understanding of what happened (psychological dimen-
sion), the victim can benefit from practical and material assistance usually direly
needed in post-conflict contexts. The victim might be worse off if the perpetrator
gets the ‘‘justly deserved’’ punishment. The victim will often feel more depressed,
overwhelmed, and/or disempowered because his/her needs have been disregarded,
in addition to seeing his/her wishes and expectations being denied. Indeed, as
trauma affects the victim in every spheres of his/her life, punishing the perpetrator
brings little to no improvement to his/her survival condition.
In addition to a restoration of the victim’s sufferings, restorative justice seeks
to restore the humanity of the perpetrator and his/her relationship with the victim.
As ‘‘an agent of the common good,’’ the perpetrator is asked to take responsibility for
his/her actions.66 By asking ‘‘why,’’ the victim gives an opportunity to the perpe-
trator to become more human, an opening that retributive justice fails to provide.
Both parties can come to agree on the victim’s restoration. The perpetrator can
acknowledge his/her actions and the following consequences to victims and the
community; he/she is encouraged to accept responsibility for his/her deeds, face his/
her loved ones and his/her victim(s). When the perpetrators make amends, the end
product does not follow the principle of proportionality of retributive justice. The
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objective is aimed toward the victims’ needs and interests because restorative
justice prioritizes the victim’s restoration rather than the perpetrator’s punishment.
Without leaving the harmful and illegitimate deeds unpunished, restorative justice
restores, so to speak, the perpetrator’s humanity; he/she can become a functioning
and contributing member of the community again.
Focused on the harms done and their redress, restorative justice promotes the
separation between the perpetrator’s actions and identity. This approach lays the
ground for a different perception of the other’s behavior than inherent ‘‘evilness.’’ A
dialogue on the possibilities of change is more likely. In short, acknowledgment and
willingness to seek repairs can be a starting point for a broader reconsideration of
relationships among individuals, groups, communities, and societies.
It was argued previously that the distinction between victim and perpetrator are
muddied in the context of war,67 especially in the context of a genocide.68 Indeed,
genocide implies that whole communities are displaced or destroyed, neighbors turn
against neighbors via forced complicity or inbred distrust. The theoretical static
victim and perpetrator identities do not reflect the fluid and changing sets of identi-
ties of each individual. Of particular importance in this regard, the ethnic group
often determines who is constructed as a victim or as a perpetrator, as seen above
in the case of Rwanda. A restorative approach to justice allows more fluidity and
flexibility in the victim/perpetrator identification since its responses to harmful or
criminal behavior seeks, first, to repair the harm done (to individual, community,
society), and, second, to address the reactions and the needs of the parties involved,
and then to reintegrate the ‘‘author of the harmful or criminal deeds’’ and the
‘‘victim’’ into the community and society. In short, restorative justice emphasizes
the intersubjective relationships and their complexity, especially in post-conflict
settings. While restorative justice is not as easily implemented as the retributive
form, it seems necessary to facilitate the (re)humanization of both parties. It
promotes much needed intergroup contacts in order to (re)build wider social relation-
ships within a deeply divided society.
Conclusion: Psychology, Reconciliation, Justice
This article challenged the improper separation between the ‘‘objective’’ and the
‘‘subjective’’ implicit in peacebuilding and transitional justice measures brought
about by the dichotomy victim/perpetrator found in the retributive form of justice.
Furthermore, it questioned the long-term effects of policies built upon such separa-
tion and polarization.
Transitional justice initiatives can become a tool that further reinforces the di-
chotomy victim/perpetrator rather than promote Rwandan reconciliation. In Rwanda,
gacaca courts are essentially retributive, thus reinforcing the victim/perpetrator
dichotomy. The knock-on effect is to further reinforce the exclusiveness of the perpe-
trator and the divide between the Tutsi and Hutu.
Retributive justice designates who is the victim and who is the perpetrator and
largely ignores, in post-conflict situations, the complexity of determining ‘‘who did
what to whom.’’ Inappropriately and unsubtly labeled and characterized, Tutsi and
Hutu have to face added hardships in silence—as each ‘‘objective category’’ is linked
to ‘‘privileges’’ (whatever they may be), to stigmatization, and/or marginalization—in
addition to their own post-conflict wounds. Further victimized as their sufferings are
increasing, it has become more difficult for one to acknowledge the sufferings of the
‘‘other,’’ and less likely for one’s psychological re-orientation toward the ‘‘other’’ to
Reconciliation and Justice after Genocide
287
occur. Officially and overtly identified as victim or perpetrator, each antagonist sees
their view of the ‘‘other’’ confirmed or strengthened.
There may be no more official Tutsi and Hutu identities, but the victim/
perpetrator-ge´nocidaires identities could be more powerful than the former in per-
petuating the violence. The intensified negative emotions and cognitions, fear, dire
survival conditions, and so on, all constitute potential contributors to violence and
even genocide. The psychological and intersubjective dimensions of the traumatized
are clearly ignored in the reconciliation process, thus jeopardizing its prospects. Unless
all levels of reconciliation are considered in an inclusive and holistic way, fear, silence,
suppressed anger, hate, denial, among other things, will continue to prevail and to
work against reconciliation efforts at all levels. Projects and policies of reconciliation
and justice will bring durable peace only if they acknowledge and deal with the
intersubjective and psychological complexity of post-conflict environments.
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Intrastate wars and genocides result in devastating losses and leave deep and
lasting scars on those who survive. Making space for civilians to share their
experiences of violence and to have them publicly acknowledged—especially by
their own governments—can be important parts of (re)knitting the social fabric.
This article focuses on the experiences of ordinary Rwandans during and after
their country’s civil war and genocide. It is centered on excerpts from a series of
field interviews and highlights Rwandans’ memories in their own words. This
article contrasts this cross-section of civilian narratives with the official memories
of violence that the national government disseminates through memorials and
schools. The central argument is that, in order to legitimate its rule, the Rwandan
government selectively highlights some memories of violence, and represses others,
and that this is likely to hinder sustainable peace.
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Intrastate wars and genocides result in devastating losses and leave deep and
lasting scars on those who survive. Moreover, in the aftermath, survivors must often
live alongside former enemies and continue to reside where they experienced state-
perpetrated violence. As a consequence, making space for civilians to share their
experiences of violence and to have those experiences publicly acknowledged—
especially by their own governments—can be important parts of (re)knitting the
social fabric. Unacknowledged wounds can present an obstacle to peacebuilding in
both present and future generations.
Some key locations for state acknowledgment of experiences of violence include
memorials, museums, and narratives in textbooks. Yet these locations are inadequately
scrutinized and often considered to be part of the ‘‘soft cultural sphere’’ on the outskirts
of power and politics. In contrast, I argue that selecting which civilian memories of
violence to include and which to exclude in these sites is a political process that
has important implications for ‘‘hard’’ politics—for the success of peacebuilding and
future security.
This article focuses on the experiences of ordinary Rwandans during and after
their country’s civil war and genocide. It includes excerpts from field interviews and
highlights Rwandans’ memories in their own words. This article contrasts this cross-
section of civilian narratives with the official memories of violence that the national
government disseminates through memorials and schools. There are two central
arguments. First, in order to legitimate its rule, the Rwandan government selectively
highlights some civilian memories of violence, and represses others. Second, failing
to acknowledge important memories hinders meaningful peacebuilding.
Elisabeth King, ‘‘Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Implications for Peace-
building,’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 5, 3 (December 2010): 293–309. 6 2010 Genocide
Studies and Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.5.3.293
The first part of this article briefly reviews the concept of acknowledgment and
examines its importance from the perspectives of academic literature, international
organizations, and survivors. The second part turns to Rwanda, first elaborating on
research methods, then exploring five types of civilian memories of violence, explain-
ing how and why some are acknowledged, while others are left out. The third part
elaborates on the implications for reconciliation, justice, and democracy.
Acknowledging Civilian Memories of Violence
Acknowledgment—meaning recognizing, admitting, or owning something and accept-
ing the authority of the claims of others—is a key concept in the study and practice
of post-conflict peacebuilding and conflict prevention.1 Acknowledgment in the
aftermath of violent conflict includes civilians’ experiences, as well as perpetrators’
accountability for crimes. This article focuses primarily on the former, but the two
overlap. It also focuses on official, national acknowledgment, but unofficial local and
interpersonal processes of acknowledgment, as well as international acknowledg-
ment, are also important.
Acknowledgment is widely considered a necessary part of post-violence societal
recovery. In the peacebuilding literature, acknowledgment is argued to be important
for reconciliation and the restoration of relationships, for transitional justice, and for
building open, inclusive, and legitimate political institutions.2 In cases of genocide
in particular, acknowledgment is also crucial to counteract the denial that often
follows.3
The importance of acknowledgment is also commonly recognized by international
organizations. United Nations’ standards ‘‘call attention to the duty to remember.’’
The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the General Assembly, include
‘‘commemorations and tributes to the victims’’ among the reparation duties of states,
as well as a ‘‘public apology including acknowledgment of the facts and acceptance
of responsibility.’’4 This duty to remember was embraced in both the South African
and Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, wherein recommendations
included not only individual reparations, but community and symbolic measures
such as the establishment of memorials and commemoration ceremonies.5
Most importantly, acknowledgment is often important to victims. A survey of
survivors of violence in eleven countries as different as Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Kosovo, and Sudan found that acknowledging experiences through memorialization
was considered a key form of state reparation for violence.6 A central part of
acknowledgment is that victims be satisfied with the response they receive.7
Nonetheless, a desire for acknowledgment may vary from case to case, across
time, and from individual to individual. Hayner writes that ‘‘in Mozambique the
accepted, though largely unstated, belief was ‘the less we dwell on the past, the
more likely reconciliation will be.’ ’’8 Hayner recalls ‘‘a palpable sense in Mozambique
that if you talked about the war, it might come back.’’9 Shaw argues that reconcilia-
tion in Sierra Leone may also be served by silence. She writes that in northern
Sierra Leone in particular, where social forgetting stands at the heart of established
processes of reintegration and healing for child and adult ex-combatants, ‘‘speak-
ing of the war in public often undermines these processes, and many believe it
encourages violence.’’10 There is no cookie-cutter model for post-conflict peacebuild-
ing, and moreover, no standard way to best acknowledge civilian memories of
violence. What may be appropriate in one case may not fit another.
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Yet, if one accepts the recurrent importance of acknowledging civilians’ memories
of violence, an important question arises: Whose stories to tell? While ours has
been called ‘‘the era of testimony,’’11 governments make unequal space for different
memories of violence. Some memorials, for example, have been criticized for includ-
ing too much; many Peruvians protested the ‘‘Eye that Cries’’ memorial for including
the names of forty-one Shining Path guerillas massacred in a prison in 1994.12
Not enough inclusion can also be problematic; Robben Island, the prime site of
remembrance in post-apartheid South Africa, is criticized for its exclusion of the
memories of victims and activists not associated with the current government,
the African National Congress.13 The same types of controversies arise in regards
to textbooks. In post-war Bosnia, textbooks are now published in Croat, Serb, and
Bosniak versions, and include and exclude vastly different narratives.14 Minow
suggests that the challenge for peacebuilding is ‘‘to seek a route between too much
memory and too much forgetting.’’15 In exploring this route, this article challenges
collective memory as a singular concept.
Research Methods in Rwanda
This article draws on fieldwork conducted in Rwanda in 2006 to investigate the com-
plex relationship between formal schooling on one hand, and violent conflict and
peacebuilding on the other. The core fieldwork consisted of approximately seventy,
one-on-one open-ended interviews with Rwandans. While not directly the topic of
research, many Rwandans wanted to share their memories of violence. These
included narratives that would be publicly acceptable, and many that would not.
Below, this article recounts relatively long excerpts of several stories in an effort to
both learn from, and to humbly acknowledge, these important memories.16
Those who experience violence are often considered ‘‘the most authentic bearers
of truth about the past.’’17 At the same time, interviewees have a number of reasons
to only selectively tell their stories, and testimonies are filtered through historical
memory.18 As Kalyvas notes, ‘‘there is compelling evidence that eyewitnesses of
criminal (and other) events are systematically wrong about substantial parts of
the events they are called to describe.’’19 The stories recounted below derive from
unverified individual testimony, but the validity of all of these types of narratives
has been substantiated by other research and evidence.
This article contrasts various civilian memories of violence with the narratives
portrayed at the Kigali Memorial Centre (Gisozi),20 Rwanda’s main genocide memorial,
and in the only existing primary school civics and social studies textbooks.21 Museums
are particularly dense sites of memory where acknowledgment and the lack thereof
come head to head. They are ‘‘a major area, in which politics, sensibilities, and folk-
lore mingle.’’22 The Kigali Memorial Centre is particularly important in Rwanda,
serving as the main national memorial and the sole memorial with explicit narra-
tion.23 The Memorial Centre plans to add a traveling component with the aim that
90% of the Rwandan population is exposed to its messages.24 The Gisozi memorial
has been subject to at least two recent grenade attacks, illustrating this site as
one of symbolic significance and contention.25 School textbooks are also particularly
important as they portray the ‘‘commonplaces of historical thinking of a certain place
and time.’’26 In Rwanda, there has been a moratorium on teaching history since the
genocide. The civics and social studies texts thus represent the state of teaching at
this time and foreshadow how further curriculum is likely to develop.
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Civilian Memories of Violence versus National
Acknowledgment in Rwanda
Rwanda descended into civil war in 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF),
a group of mostly Tutsi exiles who had fled Rwanda to Uganda in 1959, began an
armed invasion against the Hutu government of Rwanda. While a peace and power-
sharing agreement was reached in Arusha in 1993, the accord did not hold. In April
of 1994, genocide began, ending only three months later with approximately 800,000
Rwandans dead, including at least 500,000 Tutsi.27 The targets were civilians, as
were more than 90% of casualties.28 A 1996 report of the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Rwanda estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandan women
and girls had been raped.29 Countless others, Tutsi and Hutu, male and female,
young and old, were tortured or maimed before being left for dead by their fellow,
particularly Hutu, Rwandans. Indeed, a significant proportion of the population
participated in the killing. The military victory of the RPF brought the genocide to
an end and the RPF remains the government of Rwanda today.
While this article refers to Hutu and Tutsi throughout, public ethnic identifi-
cation is outlawed in post-genocide Rwanda, except in certain contexts. Ethnicity
remains, nonetheless, a salient category for many Rwandans. At the same time,
social differentiation is much more complex than it often appears and this article
aims to highlight the variety of experiences within and across Hutu and Tutsi groups
during and after violence in Rwanda.
The narratives below are thus categorized by ethnic group and level of national
recognition, but this is an oversimplification. Other markers, such as class and
region of provenance, are also important to one’s position in Rwandan society. More-
over, the categories are neither static, nor black and white. During the genocide, for
example, the same Rwandans often played different roles concomitantly; some Hutu,
for instance, participated in killing, yet saved the lives of Tutsi close to them.30
Therefore, while five main genres of civilian memories of violence are discussed
below—recognized Tutsi memories, somewhat recognized Hutu memories, unrecog-
nized Hutu memories, unrecognized Tutsi memories, unrecognized memories of
ethnically mixed Rwandans—these categories are neither watertight nor exhaustive.
Recognized Tutsi Memories
The first type of narrative that emerged during interviews involves memories from
Tutsi survivors of genocide. When asked about his family’s experience with genocide,
one Tutsi youth recounted:
So, it happened [the genocide] when my mother, my little brother, and my little
sister—who was still in my mother’s stomach, she wasn’t born yet—were there [his
father was in Burundi]. So, in the end, my mother and I were here in Rwanda and
we tried to escape to [hide in] the wells. The first time, someone tried to intervene
but was told to do his job [elsewhere], to machete some, and so he turned away. And
the second time too, it was by God, they were going to throw water in and someone
came, and told them that they had a job to do, and they left again. So, we left that
area where we lived, my mother and I. She carried my little brother on her back,
and me, she took my hand, and we left for [name removed]. So there was a place
that people were being taken, but instead of staying there where we were supposed
to stay, there where they were massacring a lot, a multitude of people, we continued.
We arrived in a place, in another region, and it is there that we were able to escape.
In fact, you know diapers, that you put on a child to leave his waste? We hid two
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potatoes in there, sweet potatoes, so that we could survive. Me, my mother, and my
little brother, we ate for a week. And then, we had a brother, my uncle, who was a
soldier of the saviors. So, since we had a brother who was a soldier for the RPF, and
he saw that we were there, he took us and put us in a little security. We spent one
month, two months, then when the war was over we returned [home].
But, in the meantime, while we weren’t there, my mother’s family, just about every-
one was kccchhh [makes the sound and actions of getting chopped in the neck with a
machete]. In the end, my mother’s family . . . no one was left. Just the co-wife. Yup,
the co-wife was left, and that’s our family. And that’s our experience of the genocide.
I guess I was traumatized, yes, seeing someone machete in front of you. I was a little
traumatized. Once, someone was shot right in front of me when I was there. They
killed him. I was there. They [the killer] had to walk in front of me and I felt some-
thing rise inside me. My mother wasn’t near me; I don’t know where she was hiding.
So I said to myself, ‘‘Is it true that someone can lose their head like that?’’ I was
shocked.31
At the Kigali Memorial Centre one encounters similar stories. There are panels,
stills, and clips dedicated to survivors’ narratives. The memorial Web site also
includes ten survivors’ testimonies with the intention to expand to a larger database.
Each person’s story is heart-wrenching and defies description. The memories, how-
ever, share some commonalities. Each tells of horrific specifics of violence, such as
Anne-Marie Bucyana, whose husband and child were killed while she was raped, or
Emmanuel Mugenzira, who was shot in the head and left for dead like the rest of
his family. They talk of fleeing to churches, United Nations camps, and into the
mountains. They also share the emotional trauma of life in post-genocide Rwanda.
For example, as Dancilla Nyirabazungu recounts, ‘‘I clean, I garden, I separate the
clothes from the bones left on the church floor.’’32 Half of the narratives refer to the
causes of genocide being grounded in dehumanization and discrimination against
Tutsi by the previous regime. All of the testimonies explicitly or implicitly suggest a
Tutsi voice.33
The type of narrative recounted by the teenage boy above fits in with the his-
torical panels at Kigali Memorial Centre, with primary school textbooks, and with
the RPF’s version of history. The panels at Gisozi, for example, present precolonial
Rwanda as a golden age: ‘‘This has been our home for centuries. We are one people.
We speak one language. We have one history.’’34 It blames divisions between Rwandans
on the colonial powers: ‘‘We have lived in peace for many centuries, but now the
divide between us had begun.’’ The panels explain that when Rwanda gained
independence it ‘‘became a highly centralized, repressive state with a single party
system’’ wherein ‘‘the regime was characterized by the persecution and ethnic
cleansing of Tutsi.’’ The Gisozi narrative explains that the ‘‘Path to a ‘Final Solution’ ’’
began long before the 1994 genocide when ‘‘over 700,000 Tutsis were exiled from our
country between 1959 [and] 1973’’ and explains that ‘‘genocide was rehearsed.’’ The
panels note that ‘‘Rwandan Tutsis had been fleeing for more than a generation.’’
They report that when President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, ‘‘genocide
was instant,’’ ‘‘ it was genocide from the first day,’’ and that ‘‘no Tutsi was exempt’’
since ‘‘the death lists had been pre-prepared in advance.’’ It explains that ‘‘any Tutsi
who tried to pass [a roadblock] was humiliated, beaten, mutilated, murdered, raped
and dumped by the roadside.’’ With panels that explain the specifics of torture,
the Kigali Memorial Centre notes that ‘‘Rwanda had turned into a nation of
brutal, sadistic merciless killers and of innocent victims, overnight.’’ While decrying
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the failure of an international response, the panels note that the RPF moved forward
‘‘in an attempt to gain control and to stop the genocide.’’ The narrative presented in
the civics and social studies textbooks is very similar.35
Narratives of Tutsi genocide survivors that support the RPF’s policies and views
of history are the most prominent genre of narrative in post-genocide Rwanda.
It is crucially important that these stories are told. Having a record of survivors’
testimonies helps avoid potential negation of the genocide.36 Victims and survivors
deserve respect and acknowledgment. There are also significant potential benefits of
giving and hearing testimonies of violence. The process of telling one’s story, and
it being acknowledged through listening and empathy, can contribute to healing.37
Indeed, as argued above, recognizing and commemorating victims and crimes can be
crucial steps in reconciliation and part of a transitional justice process. Learning
about the experiences, as well as the causes and consequences of genocide, may also
be important for its future prevention.38
At the same time, many survivors remain unsatisfied with the space that they
are granted for their memories and the political uses to which they are being put.
As Doughty reports, ‘‘many survivors feel that repatriated refugees [including much
of the government] came in late, know nothing of genocide, and are reaping more
benefits of Rwanda’s post-genocide reconstruction’’ than they are.39 The RPF is
instrumentalizing these memories of violence and using the genocide as a political
tool.40 It bases its legitimacy at home and abroad on having stopped the genocide
and thus having the moral high ground over the international community, as well
as other Rwandans. Moreover, by emphasizing the long-term persecution of Tutsi
dating to 1959, the government consolidates Tutsi that were in and outside of
Rwanda at the time of the genocide into a single ‘‘survivor’’ group. Therefore, in
addition to the importance of these narratives for acknowledgment and peace-
building, promulgating Tutsi survivors’ memories is central to the government’s
maintenance of power.
Somewhat Recognized Hutu Memories
Second, there is also a public place for the narratives of Rwandans who helped hide
those trying to escape genocide. One former Rwandan army soldier, a Hutu, shared
his story:
During the war, as I was a soldier, I hid many people, Tutsis that were threatened.
As a soldier, I was strong, I commanded, I hid many people. Instead of killing them,
or stealing their money, I kept their money and I hid them in my home . . . After the
fall of Kigali, I left Kigali and I went outside of the country. I came back here in 2002.
When I arrived, it was them that welcomed me and gave me everything. Now I am
brother and sister with them. So it is for this reason that I wanted to tell you this
story. Now, I can tell my children, or my brothers, that killing isn’t good, that using
an opportunity to do bad is not good. If we write stories that during the war, instead
of killing people, people also hid others like this, and that after the war, one is proud
to be with the Tutsis that he hid, if we teach this history that shows reality and the
truth, the path created for our children will produce something [better.]41
At the Kigali Genocide Centre, there are panels dedicated to this genre of
civilian memories under the heading of ‘‘Resistance to Genocide.’’ The panels note
that ‘‘resistance took many forms. The RPF led the political and armed resistance
to genocide. Members of moderate wings of different political parties made passionate
calls for resistance. Some of the victims organized resistance to the killings. A
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number of Hutus and others hid targeted victims sometimes at the risk of their
own lives.’’42 After some short excerpts on resistance by Tutsi survivors in specific
locations, the panels turn to feature six named rescuers, including short testimonies,
mostly from survivors rather than rescuers themselves. The ethnicity of the rescuers
is never explicit, although the Tutsi identity of the victims is often mentioned. Four
of the ten survivor stories presented on the Gisozi memorial Web site, and discussed
above, refer to people that helped them hide and escape. Nonetheless, the museum
also features a videotaped testimonial where a survivor suggests that only 5% of
the Hutu population was innocent.43
Primary civic education textbooks mention rescuers, this time specifying Hutu,
but only briefly: ‘‘A Hutu deemed a traitor—for having hidden one or several
Tutsi—was forced by the killers to kill them himself. When he did not do so, he was
killed along with the members of his family.’’44 Students recounted that they also
learn about Agathe Uwiligiyimana, the former moderate Hutu prime minister, who
is celebrated on National Heroes Day. Uwiligiyimana, who would likely have issued
a radio call for calm the morning after Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, was
among the first killed during the genocide.45
While there is space in Rwanda for stories that recognize the positive role of
some Rwandans, and particularly Hutu rescuers, during the genocide, this already
narrow space is further narrowing. For example, there has been great controversy
surrounding the actions and statements of Paul Rusesabagina, the Hutu temporary
manager of the Hotel des Mille Collines, credited with saving up to thousands of lives
during the genocide (and best known as the basis for the main character of the movie
Hotel Rwanda). The Rwandan government and newspapers have charged him with
having ‘‘a self-promotion agenda while distorting Rwanda’s history and spread-
ing negative propaganda against the current government’’ and with advancing
‘‘outrageous assertions and dirty campaigns.’’46 The government has also accused
Rusesabagina of denying genocide. Acts of Hutu ‘‘heroism’’ are also frequently
received with suspicion at local gacaca courts.47
The former soldier cited above felt that more stories like his needed to be
shared, a sentiment echoed by other interviewees. He emphasized that the roles
of different groups in Rwanda’s genocide are more nuanced than the government
usually makes them appear. Indeed, the dominant narrative often polarizes Tutsi–
Hutu as survivor–perpetrator; the panel at Gisozi, mentioned above, notes ‘‘Rwanda
had turned into a nation of brutal, sadistic merciless killers and of innocent victims,
overnight’’ providing only two role options.
Unrecognized Hutu Memories
Third, while there is space, however limited, for Hutu rescuers of the genocide, and
mention of ‘‘Hutu moderates’’ killed during the genocide (by insinuation by other
Hutu), there is no public space in Rwanda for Hutu memories of violence perpetrated
by the RPF. Indeed, saying that there are ‘‘unpunished RPF crimes’’ is equated
with negation of genocide and may classify as the punishable offense of ‘‘genocide
ideology.’’48
Yet reports indicate that the RPF committed widespread killings during the civil
war (1990–1993) and during the genocide. Since 1994, the RPF has engaged in
killing and other violations of human rights in two wars in the Congo (1996–1997,
1998–2003), as well as in ongoing operations, and in massacres in Rwanda, such as
at the Kibeho camp for the internally displaced in April 1995.49
Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda
299
In response to a question about her family’s losses to violence, a female Hutu
youth replied:
Me? My father, my family. Except my grandmother and my older sister that were not
killed in the war. This was when the RPF came by here. Yes. Now we have no means
to continue without my father. We are no longer valued.50
Witness also this representative statement from an elderly Hutu woman from
Northern Rwanda:
The other history that we have to teach [besides the government version disseminated
at memorials, ingando re-education camps, and schools]. For example, I lost three-
quarters of my family during the war. There’s my mother who died during the war.
There is my daughter, her child that died. I say in my house there was my father
who died, there was my little sister, my brother-in-law, my grandchildren. My
brother-in-law and his wife were killed. But we don’t have the right to say we lost
people. There are orphans of the genocide, widows of the genocide, everything of the
genocide. That’s it. That creates a lot of conflicts. But we keep quiet. Us [Hutu], we
can’t say anything. I can’t say anything because if I say it they will put me in prison,
or punish me in another way, but they also have to give the ability to people to speak
and to say what they think.51
The civics textbook notes that during the genocide of 1994, ‘‘more than one
million Tutsi and moderate Hutu’’ were killed, but it is silent to other violence expe-
rienced by Hutu.52 The social studies textbook is similar, acknowledging the killing
of ‘‘Hutu moderates who did not follow the government’s extreme policies.’’53 As a
Hutu youth said, in response to a question about what schools teach about the war
from 1990–1993 and genocide,
On the subject of the war and the genocide, they tell us how it developed. For the
most part, they taught about genocide. They don’t say [anything] about the war.
They teach us about the genocide only.54
Similarly, at the Kigali Memorial Centre, the panels note that ‘‘Hutus who did
not comply [help kill Tutsi] were threatened with death. A number of Hutus who
did not subscribe to the genocidal ideology, as well as those who tried to protect
Tutsis were persecuted and killed.’’55 Yet, as in the civics textbook, ‘‘of the reprisal
massacres of Hutus by the Tutsi rebels there is not a word. Not surprising, perhaps,
since the rebels now run the country.’’ A representative of the Aegis Trust, who
helped design the museum, claims that this was his decision, not the government’s:
‘‘ in this society at this time it’s akin to Britain in 1945 talking about the bombing of
Dresden as a war crime.’’56
The reality is more complicated. The British and American air forces that carried
out the bombing of Dresden and were key players in ending World War II did
not have to govern post-war Germany, nor live alongside German survivors of the
bombing or German perpetrators of war. In Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front
ended the genocide through military victory and still leads the country today.
The Rwandan government has made important progress on a number of fronts
and is often praised for its role in Rwanda’s political stability and economic growth.
Indeed, the image of stability and progress of President Paul Kagame’s government
dominates international reporting and much of academia as well.57 Yet Rwanda
today is much closer to authoritarianism and dictatorship than to democracy, and
there is increasing concentration of power around a small group of former Tutsi
exiles from Uganda. Many Rwandans experience censorship and self-censorship, and
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fear being charged with the vague offenses of ‘‘divisionism’’ and ‘‘genocide ideology,’’
which increasingly seems to mean simply disagreeing with the government.58
Several Hutu interviewees felt left out of mourning and lamented that they are
not allowed space for their stories and memories of violence. They consider them-
selves to be victims, but their victimhood remains unacknowledged by the state.
Vidal makes a similar argument in reference to commemorations, arguing that
Hutu survivors have had their right to publicly suffer and mourn ‘‘confiscated.’’59
Burnet notes that while Hutu and Tutsi received joint recognition as victims of the
genocide at the first annual commemoration, subsequent commemorations have illus-
trated that Tutsi hold a ‘‘monopoly on suffering’’ in Rwanda.60 From early references
to the ‘‘Rwandan genocide,’’ the government has moved since about 2008 to calling
the events of 1994 the ‘‘Tutsi genocide.’’61
Furthermore, public space for the first two types of narratives—those of Tutsi
survivors and Hutu rescuers–paired with the exclusion of Hutu memories of violence
and mention only of the death of Hutu moderates, implies that those that do not
fall into these first two categories are ge´nocidaires. The middle ground between
survivor–perpetrator categories is eclipsed and the RPF often hides outlawed ethnic
distinctions behind these new categories.
Unrecognized Tutsi Memories
Fourth, there are also Tutsi memories of war and genocide that do not make it into
the public sphere. One female Tutsi youth shared her story:
So, when the war started, we were there, at home. That night we heard life falling
and we panicked. Our father counseled us to stay in the hallways, because of the
bars [reinforcements] so that we didn’t have any accidents. We spent two weeks like
that in the house, and our neighbors, those with means, were leaving. They were
leaving even if we had really been friends with them before. And after a time, it was
military guys that came and took us to Byumba because it was there, beside Uganda
where there was no war. Well before, they [the military men, RPF] lived in Uganda,
it’s from there that they came in [to Rwanda], it’s there that there are borders.
So we left for Byumba on foot! From Kigali to Byumba on foot. Me, I was three years,
four years old. I had a little brother who was a baby during the war. Well, finding
food was a problem. So, he was sick during the war. So we left, we went to Byumba.
We were in a school. Well there, the situation, I don’t know how [to describe it]. There
was no food. There was cholera and sickness everywhere. I remember when we
arrived, there was a swimming pool dripping with blood. It was completely red. We
were thirsty. So we drank it. Well, it was terrible.
My little brother was still sick. So, we looked for all methods to go to Uganda. They
could not accept that my father go with us [he was a medical doctor]. So we left with
my mother, my brothers, and my sister. He had to stay. And also, there were the
soldiers. There were things that they did. They wanted us to go get all of the boys so
that they could go fight. It was the RPF that came asking for boys. So my [older]
brother had to hide, so that they wouldn’t find him.62
The last part of this girl’s memory—that the RPF was clandestinely recruiting boys
and was feared by some—is contrary to the way the RPF would like to be perceived.
Nonetheless, research shows that many Tutsi feared RPF soldiers.63 In contrast,
the RPF sees itself as the savior of Rwandans and as the representative of genocide
victims. The type of civilian memory presented above is thus not part of the
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memories of violence that are acknowledged by the RPF government, nor noted at
the Kigali Memorial Centre, nor in textbooks.
There have been public denunciations by Ibuka, the largest survivor organiza-
tion, that the government sometimes ill-represents survivor interests and even
exploits their suffering for its own ends.64 As Tutsi genocide survivor Innocent
Rwililiza recounted to journalist Jean Hatzfeld,
Basically, it’s the Tutsis from abroad, those of the former diaspora, who are running
the show. These Tutsis suffered in exile and returned after the killings to reclaim
houses, buy the most cows, start up new businesses. . . . They govern the country.
And the survivors, they wind up frustrated, under a crippling inhibition, and they
murmur. . . . Being powerless to voice one’s anger, sadness, and longing for what is
lost, and unable to tell one’s whole story for fear of offending a Hutu or annoying the
authorities—this inability to reveal one’s heart is sheer torture. I say this sincerely:
Survivors have no opportunity to express their true private feelings in public and to
ask for a comforting little compensation.65
Other survivors told Hatzfeld that they feel they cannot speak publicly about their
memories to anyone but other survivors, except when they are called upon during
ceremonies, gacaca, and mourning week.66 In short, Tutsi with memories inconsis-
tent with the way the RPF wishes to be perceived are excluded from public space,
and some Tutsi survivors feel that their ability to speak out and to be acknowledged
is constrained more broadly.
Unrecognized Memories of Ethnically Mixed Rwandans
Finally, Rwandans of mixed ethnic background are also often restricted in terms of
public acknowledgment of their memories. As one teenage boy with a Hutu mother
and Tutsi father replied, when asked if he had lost anyone in genocide,
During the genocide, it’s hard to say, because, ummm, those that belonged to the
family of my father were affected. But they were Tutsis and they were exiled [before
the genocide]. Unfortunately, it is my maternal grandmother and grandfather that
died. They told us that it was the RPF army that shot them. . . .67
When asked whether she felt acknowledged by the government, a Tutsi teenager
with parents of two different ethnicities said,
I am a child alone in the world. No father, no mother, no brothers, no sisters. I
am alone. I am not able to be helped by the FARG [a government program to help
genocide survivors pay for health care and school fees] because it is for children with
Tutsi fathers and Tutsi mothers. But me, my mother was Tutsi, my father no.68
While the school textbooks say nothing of Rwandans with mixed ethnic heritage,
the Gisozi memorial mentions only that ‘‘Hutu women in mixed marriages were
raped as punishment’’ and that ‘‘Hutu and Tutsi women were forced to kill their
own Tutsi children.’’69
Rwandans with mixed ethnic background are often in a particularly difficult
position given the post-genocide government’s bipolar association of survivor–
perpetrator status with ethnicity. Burnet recounts the story of Se´raphine, a Hutu,
married to a Tutsi husband, who was repeatedly raped. ‘‘Despite Se´raphine’s emo-
tional and physical suffering, she was not perceived as a survivor for two reasons—
because she was Hutu and because her husband did not die. Furthermore, with
the polarizing discourse in post-genocide Rwanda, because she was not a ‘survivor,’
Se´raphine became classified, by default, as a perpetrator.’’70
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Other
There are many other genres of civilian narratives of violence that have not been
discussed here. These include memories of violence of Twa Rwandans, narratives
of repatrie´s who were not in the country in 1994 but who are sometimes falsely
subsumed into the first category of Tutsi genocide survivors, and, of course, those
that were killed and thus unable to share their stories.
In sum, in post-genocide Rwanda, civilians hold a multitude of different and
nuanced memories of violence. Yet only some civilian memories of violence are
acknowledged while others are repressed. The former are predominantly from Tutsi,
and include some narratives from Hutu that helped rescue other Rwandans; the
latter are from Hutu who have memories of violence perpetrated by the RPF, and
also include Tutsi and ethnically mixed Rwandans whose memories contradict the
narrative with which the RPF legitimates its position.
Implications for Peacebuilding
The selection and distortion of social memory for political interests, while under-
studied by scholars of conflict and peacebuilding, is frequent. It has long been
recognized that the victors write history. Paradoxically, in Rwanda, the strong state
structures that facilitated genocide remain and determine the representation of
violence. However, the exclusion of certain memories of violence is unlikely to lead
to meaningful peacebuilding in Rwanda. Many Rwandans’ memories are inconsis-
tent with public ones and there is friction between state discourses and personal
narratives.
In terms of reconciliation, several Hutu Rwandans explained that by failing to
recognize their pain and to acknowledge their mourning, it is difficult for them to
relate to and to embrace the suffering of Tutsi Rwandans. As one Hutu participant
at the first National Unity and Reconciliation Summit voiced, ‘‘we do not say it loud
enough, but the question of Hutu memory is a prerequisite so that people can sit
together and sincerely discuss the real problems of this country.’’71 As one elderly
Hutu man told me, ‘‘perhaps if there is reconciliation, things will be okay. But a
real reconciliation, where people talk.’’72 A lack of acknowledgment is particularly
pressing in Rwanda where Hutu and Tutsi in post-genocide Rwanda remain inter-
mingled on the same hills.
Rwanda’s Senate report on Genocide Ideology condemns as revisionist attempts
to ‘‘vaguely acknowledg[e] genocide but, in the same breath, [try] to justify it through
counter accusations in order to cleanse the real culprits of any responsibility.’’73 In
contrast, as Godobo-Madikizela suggests as she reflects on South Africa, ‘‘ in societies
trying to break the cycle of hatred and revenge, it is important to first acknowledge
[emphasis added] as did the TRC, that human rights abuses were committed on both
sides, and then to find an effective way of moving society forward.’’74 Acknowledging
a wider range of civilian memories need not invoke questions of moral equivalence or
absolve responsibility for genocide.
By acknowledging only a select category of memories of violence, the government
is failing to address and challenge the social cleavages and exclusion that charac-
terized Rwanda’s past and may be, moreover, fostering exclusion and social cleavages
in the present. This is as true for Tutsi with memories inconsistent with the public
narrative as it is for Hutu. This sense of exclusion could help lay the foundations
for future intergroup conflict. Devine-Wright explains that memories of victimiza-
tion harden boundaries between ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them,’’ and foster in-group cohesion and
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out-group derogation. Grievances surrounding unacknowledged, or unsettled, his-
torical memories are likely to increase in intensity with time. Unacknowledged
emotional (or physical) wounds could be powerful motivations for vengeance, includ-
ing violence.75 In Rwanda, lack of acknowledgment of memories of members of the
Hutu majority may be especially problematic.
In terms of justice, many Rwandans feel that by failing to acknowledge their
memories of violence, the RPF is reigning with impunity.76 This could also hinder a
sustainable peace. Falconer argues that reconciliation of memories, an important
part of peacebuilding, includes both accepting responsibility for the past actions
of one’s group and acknowledging the history of the other group to learn from its
experiences.77 As Cole argues, while schools and the narratives that they teach
have been largely neglected by the transitional justice literature, they ‘‘should have
a place at the table.’’78 In relation to justice in Rwanda more broadly, Longman
argues that the post-genocide justice system highlights certain human rights viola-
tions, contributing to the erasure of others. He contends that trials disseminate the
RPF narrative and ignore parts of the past that do not fit.79 Acknowledging only
some memories of violence and selectively applying accountability negates the rule
of law. The government’s monopoly on memory may be considered victors’ justice.
The Rwandan government espouses the importance of some tenets of democracy
by holding elections, but at the same time engages in antidemocratic practices. For
instance, the quality of democracy depends on the participation of its citizens; but
the acknowledgment of only some civilian memories involves great exclusion and
coercion. Many Rwandans do not feel free to share their opinions or memories in
public. The Rwandan character today, explained one female Hutu youth, ‘‘ it’s hiding
things. We don’t forget, but we hide. Yes, it’s difficult, but we try. It is in our
character. We don’t show you that we hate you. It’s difficult. Even if you come to
my house, I show you that there is no problem between you and I. But the problem
is in my heart. We do not have the habit of opening ourselves, of showing on the
exterior what we are thinking on the interior.’’80 Others were more explicit about
the repression and censorship that they experience. One elderly Hutu woman said
that ‘‘Rwandans have become liars. We can’t say anything because they’ll imprison
us or kill us.’’81 Freedom House International ranks Rwanda as ‘‘not free.’’82 In the
end, neglecting or more actively repressing, certain memories can be both a symptom
of, and catalyst for, other forms of repression.83
Conclusion
Scholars, international organizations, and victims alike consider acknowledgment
of memories of violence an important element of (re)building the social fabric. Since
each post-conflict and post-genocide context differs enormously, there is no recipe for
acknowledgment in sites like memorials or textbooks. Yet, selecting which memories
to include and which to exclude is a common challenge with important consequences.
This article suggests that memorials and textbooks are not on the margins of power,
as some suggest; there is significant power and important implications vested in the
ability to choose how to represent past violence.
In Rwanda, the Kigali Memorial Centre and primary school textbooks, key sites
of the official historical record, prioritize only some memories. They exclude the
memories of violence of numerous segments of the population and interviews reveal
a number of stories that contradict official accounts. Hutu who have memories of
violence perpetrated by the RPF, as well as Tutsi, and ethnically mixed Rwandans
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whose memories contradict the narrative upon which the RPF legitimates its
position, are silenced. This exclusion of many Rwandans’ memories is likely to
hinder reconciliation, justice, and democracy and undermine durable peace.
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Dilemmas of Teaching the ‘‘Greatest
Silence’’: Rape-as-Genocide in Rwanda,
Darfur, and Congo
Kimberley A. Ducey
University of Winnipeg
The author describes the dilemmas of teaching about rape-as-genocide, focusing
on Rwanda, Darfur, and Congo. While theoretically and methodologically sophis-
ticated academic writings are a crucial part of the pedagogical approach described
here, the author’s focus is on the dilemmas associated with using testimonials
and memoirs, documentaries, and commentaries. It is argued that such discourse
helps make the subject matter more accessible to undergraduates. One of the key
issues that arises from this discussion is students’ preference for first-hand
accounts. Excerpts from the students’ writing dispersed throughout the article
provide an essential and frank assessment of the importance of the approach
described. The method of instruction encompasses pedagogical issues that cut
across disciplines and will appeal to instructors in a broad range of fields. The
author systematically analyzes students’ written work for evidence of learning.
Key words: genocidal rape, Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, genocide, sexual violence,
pedagogy
Introduction
The 1994 Rwanda Genocide is commonly referred to as the ‘‘machete genocide’’
because perpetrators systematically hacked their victims to death with machetes.
Such descriptors are understandable and may encourage awareness of genocide;
arguably, however, the number of dead becomes ‘‘the definitive measure of tragedy
even though it may distance us from the human consequences of genocidal actions.’’1
When my students hear the word ‘‘genocide,’’ they usually do not think of mass
rape methodically planned to wipe out an ethnic group—in whole or in part. They
do not generally think of women deliberately infected with HIV in an orchestrated
attempt to ensure that future sexual partners, and children of survivors, will be
infected as well and ultimately killed by the disease. These matters get to the heart
of the current article—the dilemmas of teaching about rape-as-genocide.
The approach described here is an effective tool for a pedagogical examination of
traditional attitudes toward women that tacitly condone violence against women. It
serves as a catalyst for discussions regarding the lingering effects of rape-as-genocide
(e.g., survivors suffer severe stigma and discrimination, especially if they are also
living with HIV; they frequently endure the denial of their rights to employment,
property, and inheritance). Furthermore, this approach serves as a vehicle for dis-
cussions concerning social, political, and cultural climates in which women find it
extremely difficult to speak openly about sexual violence or give testimony in court.
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In Rwanda, for example, some survivors choose not to participate in the traditional
gacaca courts because many rapists receive short sentences and are released back
into the community in exchange for their confessions.2
While theoretically and methodologically sophisticated pedagogic discourse is a
crucial part of my approach to teaching about rape-as-genocide, the current focus is
on testimonials and memoirs, documentaries, and commentaries, which help make
the subject matter more accessible to undergraduates. One of the key issues that
arises from this discussion is students’ preference for first-hand accounts. Excerpts
from students’ writing (including take-home exams, anonymous course evaluations,
and personal correspondence via e-mail) dispersed throughout this article provide
an essential and frank assessment of the importance of the approach described here.
From the outset, two caveats are in order. One, teaching about rape as a weapon
of genocide is not viewed as a zero-sum game in which every word about male
victimization automatically leads to one less word on female victimization or vice
versa. Although sexual violence and rape are perpetrated against girls and boys,
women and men, discussion in this article is largely limited to the experiences of
girls and women. Two, it should be acknowledged that there are particular issues
when dealing with victims of rape (in any context) regarding protection, the difficulty
of giving evidence, and the need to avoid re-traumatization.3
General Overview of the Course
I include a unit on rape-as-genocide in an advanced sociology course on comparative
genocide. An examination of several cases provides the foundation for comparative
analysis, including Rwanda, Darfur, and Congo.
In addition to a unit on rape, topics include micro- and macro-level theories; the
development of human rights in international law; the relationship between human
rights and genocide; the history of the criminalization of genocide; and prevention
and prosecution strategies (i.e., early warning systems, punishment as deterrence,
the UN, the International Criminal Court, and the role of NGOs).
Topics are arranged in specific chronological order. Classic social psychological
studies—including Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments and Philip Zimbardo’s
Stanford prison experiment—are introduced near the beginning of the course, help-
ing students grasp how ordinary (wo)men become bystanders and even perpetrators
of genocide.4
Ervin Staub’s work is also studied early in the course as we contemplate not only
how those in authority bring about compliance, but also how the motivation of the
entire group evolves. Students are asked to grapple with Staub’s (1989) conclusion
that ‘‘Milgram’s dramatic demonstration of the power of authority, although of great
importance, may have slowed the development of a psychology of genocide, as others
came to view obedience as the main source of human destructiveness.’’5
Students then familiarize themselves with the Goldhagen controversy,6 and in
the process become acquainted with decades of research on the Holocaust conducted
by such prominent scholars as Hannah Arendt, Omer Bartov, Martin Broszat,
Christopher Browning, Saul Friedla¨nder, Raul Hilberg, Herbert C. Kelman, Robert
Jay Lifton, and Hans Mommsen. The course ends with theoretical insights on
obstacles to reconciliation and discussions on how to prevent genocide.
Unit on Rape-as-Genocide
I recognize the necessity and value of theoretically sophisticated scholarly works,
including the work of feminist legal scholars.7 Such discourse plays a pivotal role in
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my teaching.8 The stress on the theoretical ensures that the academic material
students are supposed to learn is not sacrificed despite the prominence in my course
of testimonials and memoirs, documentaries, and commentaries.
In this vein, Allison Reid-Cunningham’s (2008) ‘‘Rape as a Weapon of Genocide’’
offers an invaluable introduction, including a brief history of sexual violence and
rape in armed conflict and genocide; an overview of the scope of the current problem;
the contextualization of sexual violence and rape in terms of social and cultural
realities; the effects of rape, including infection, illness, injuries, pregnancy, psycho-
social problems, and post-traumatic stress; and consequences for communities,
including stigma, deterioration of family, and societal structures. An educator seeking
an article to include in a lesson or unit on rape would almost certainly find this piece
an ideal introduction for university and college students.9
For a focus on Sudan, Kelly Askin’s (2006) ‘‘Holding Leaders Accountable in the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for Gender Crimes Committed in Darfur’’ proves
effective in focusing students’ attention on how rape and other forms of sexual vio-
lence have been prominent features of the ongoing attacks committed by government
of Sudan (GS) troops and the Janjaweed (Arab militia). Following a discussion of
specific cases of rape and other sexual crimes committed in Darfur, Askin discusses
how such crimes can be, and have been, prosecuted as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. Other topics discussed include concepts of individual and
superior responsibility, and the need to hold leaders liable for sex crimes.10
Human Rights and International Law
Students are introduced to human rights legislation and supranational criminal law
and procedure in the next part of the unit on rape-as-genocide. Anne-Marie de
Brouwer’s (2005) ‘‘Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC
and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR,’’11 selections from Alexandra Stiglmayer’s
(1994) Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina12 and Adam
Jones’ (2004) Gendercide and Genocide13 prove especially effective in providing a
history of rape as a weapon of war and genocide. Moreover, de Brouwer, Stiglmayer,
and Jones successfully raise the question of whether supranational criminal law and
procedure are satisfactory from the perspective of victims of sexual violence. Con-
sequently for students, a paramount question becomes whether sexual crimes
against girls and women in Rwanda, Darfur, and Congo will fade from public and
historical consciousness or survive as exceptional cases. After all, even where rape
and forced prostitution is mass or systematic historically, as occurred in both arenas
of World War II, or when cases have shaken the global conscious, such as in the
‘‘rape of Nanking,’’ survivors do not characteristically obtain redress. Though
the ‘‘rape of Nanking’’ was discussed in the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) (1946–1948), also known as the Tokyo Trials
or the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, rape was not separately charged against the
Japanese commander as a crime. It was not until 1992, in the face of widespread
rapes of women in the former Yugoslav Republic, that the issue of sexual violence
in conflict finally came to the attention of the United Nations Security Council.14
The first international judicial body to recognize rape and sexual violence as
genocide was the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The ICTR
was established by the United Nations Security Council in November 1994 with a
mandate of judging those responsible for the genocide and other grave violations of
international law. The inauguration of the ICTR was followed by the establishment
of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) that came into effect on 1 July
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2002. In June 2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted UN Resolution
1820, aimed at ending sexual violence in conflict.
Testimonials and Memoirs: The Men Who Killed Me and
Tears of the Desert
The ability of first-hand accounts to bring another dimension to students’ under-
standing of rape-as-genocide is unmistakable. In the absence of survivors as guest
speakers, these narratives play a prominent role in my students’ education. To this
effect, in the case of Rwanda, I have found no better source than de Brouwer and
Sandra Chu’s (2009) The Men Who Killed Me.15
The testimonials of seventeen genocidal rape victims—sixteen women and one
man16—as detailed in de Brouwer and Chu’s work enhances students’ understanding
of rape-as-genocide. For example, students are stunned to learn that some Rwandan
survivors still live within walking distance of those who committed violence against
them. A student addresses this issue in her exam:
[In] the traditional gacaca courts Rwanda had prior to 2008, [they had] jurisdiction to
deal with all crimes related to the genocide, except for crimes known as ‘‘category one
crimes’’ (i.e., crimes committed by the planners and supervisors of the genocide, as
well as rape and sexual torture). Category one crimes were intended to be prosecuted
before national courts. However, the undertaking was so colossal that approximately
6,808 individuals accused of category one crimes were transferred to the gacaca courts
under the amended genocide law in 2008.17 And this is why as one survivor puts
it, ‘‘when I look out my window in the morning, I see the men who raped me,
freely walking on their way to work.’’18 And this is almost certainly why, while each
survivor’s testimonial [contained in The Men Who Killed Me] is incomparable, one
similarity is that they believe justice is not served. Of course I understand from other
readings that judicially the gacaca courts have in some ways ensured justice is served,
despite the consistently unenthusiastic views articulated by survivors in [The Men
Who Killed Me]. But now the words of survivors like Hyacintha Nirere haunt me.
‘‘I go to the gacaca courts, but I am more and more frightened to give my testimony
when I see what happens to other survivors when they do so. They are intimidated,
or, even worse, killed. I wonder why I should give my testimony, because the Intera-
hamwe are being released. It seems that our testimonies in gacaca courts are more
formalities than truly helpful.’’19
The Men Who Killed Me unquestionably highlights the authority of survivors as
shown in the previous student’s comments, as well as in the following anonymous
evaluation for the course:
I may forget a theory or who said what, but I will never ever forget the woman [from
The Men Who Killed Me] who had been chained to a bed for three months and
raped continuously by a dozen of her captors. Her words are seared into my psyche.
Whether she’s in the fields, or at home, or at market, she will never get the smell of
semen out of her nostrils.
Many of the testimonies in The Men Who Killed Me are arguably even more unsettling
and shocking. They give witness to the vituperative misogyny that contaminates so
much of the modern world.
De Brouwer and Chu’s work provides a candid and multifaceted discussion of
sexual violence during the 1994 genocide, including its ruthlessness and methodical
orchestration; the culture of pre-existing gender inequality that helped create an
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environment that maliciously targeted women; and the systematic propaganda,
which contributed appreciably to encouraging sexual violence against Tutsi women,
the public nature of the rapes, and the level of brutality. Moreover, the publication
sheds light on the stigma rape victims face today.20
Regarding organized propaganda, The Men Who Killed Me documents how the
Hutu ‘‘Ten Commandments,’’ published in December 1990, focused—in part—on
the sexuality of Tutsi women. For example, the first ‘‘commandment’’ describes Tutsi
women as tools of their ethnic community, used to weaken and destroy Hutu men.
Furthermore, students learn that newspapers, such as the publication responsible
for originally circulating the ‘‘Ten Commandments,’’ commonly featured cartoons
that portrayed Tutsi women, and even the moderate Hutu Prime Minister Agathe
Uwillingiyimana who was later assassinated, as sexual objects.21
Furthermore, the book details how men, primarily of Tutsi ethnicity, were
sexually assaulted, often by the mutilation of their genitals, which were sometimes
displayed in public; and that in some cases Tutsi boys and men were forced to rape
Tutsi women or were forced by Hutu women to have sex with them.22
The Men Who Killed Me helps students who might otherwise object to the
female-centered nature of the discussion of rape by not only including a testimonial
from a man and giving voice to the sexual assaults men endured, but also because
the women’s testimonials are replete with examples of the horrors their loved ones
suffered, including sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers.
As Franc¸oise Mukeshimana describes how her brother was ordered to dig his own
grave just prior to her being gang raped, one is left with the indelible impression that
there is in all probability no completely female-centered discussion of genocide-as-rape:
[T]he Interahamwe hit my brother with a huge club and told him to look at his sister
for the last time. As he looked at me, he begged them to kill me first, because he
feared that I would die of pain. Instead, they continued to bash him, until he died
looking into my eyes. The Interahamwe then proceeded to discuss how they would
kill me. One of them argued that it would be a great mistake if they killed me without
humiliating me first. He said that they should strip me naked and do to me all that
they wanted.23
The Men Who Killed Me also documents legislative changes in post-genocide
Rwanda (e.g., laws that guarantee girls and women the same rights as boys and
men to inherit property), and responses by non-governmental organizations, the
international community, and the ICTR. It contains a discussion of the UN Security
Council Resolution 1820.24
Finally, the publication provides an overview of the roots of violence in Rwanda,
including the complex and bloody history between Tutsi and Hutu starting with
the Belgian colonialists’ arrival in 1916; the growing resentment among the Hutu
about the special treatment of Tutsi over the years; and the effects of Rwandan
independence from Belgium in 1962, including the forced exile of more than 700,000
Rwandan Tutsi to neighboring countries between 1959 and 1973. It brings to light
the growing denial of what happened during the 100-day genocide and remarks on
the resurgence of contemporary genocidal ideology in Rwanda and other countries.
Halima Bashir’s Tears of the Desert: A Memoir of Survival in Darfur (2008)25 also
proves beneficial in making the subject more accessible to students and is an effec-
tive way to highlight the authority of survivors. Bashir was born in Darfur, and was
raised in a loving family that was part of the black African Zaghawa tribe. In an
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unusual opportunity for a girl of her village, she attended junior and secondary
school. Bashir even went on to study medicine, becoming her tribe’s first trained
doctor. By the time she had started to practice medicine, the Janjaweed had begun
attacking black Africans in Darfur with the support of the local Sudanese
government. Her willingness to treat those rebelling against the government and
the Janjaweed got her dangerously noticed.
In January 2004, the militia attacked a remote school and gang-raped forty-two
schoolgirls. Bashir was the only source of help in the neighboring one-room medical
clinic. When she bravely spoke out regarding the atrocities, she was arrested by the
secret police, interrogated, tortured, and raped. She escaped to her home village, but
the violence followed her there, and her father and other relatives were killed in
reprisal. Bashir was forced to flee Sudan in 2005 to seek a tenuous asylum in
Britain.
Students are fond of referring to Bashir’s story. They report that her memoir
helps them understand how sexual violence begins and how, when unchecked, it
can become rape-as-genocide. Students also value the historical background Bashir
provides that assists in their understanding of the violence that overwhelms Darfur.
They especially appreciate the epilogue regarding the history and causes of the
current situation in Darfur.
An excerpt from a student’s exam illustrates the first point, how sexual violence
becomes rape-as-genocide:
Rape as a weapon of genocide is destructive to their person, their ethnic bonds, and to
their physical health. I recognize that mass rape can destroy a substantial part of
a group and therefore constitutes genocide. Prosecuting the rapes in Darfur, for
example, as crimes against humanity would get at the crime’s gravity. However,
when all’s said and done, genocide is a whole other order of destruction. And it is
clear that thousands of women and girls are attacked by rapists as a means of
destroying their ethnic group.
As it relates to the usefulness of the historical background provided by Bashir, a
student—via e-mail—remarks,
I’m confessing my ignorance here but one thing I hadn’t really realized [prior to read-
ing Tears of the Desert] was the involvement of the British. It reminds me of the
Belgians in Rwanda. By installing the Arabs to govern Sudan they helped create the
very atmosphere in which this conflict would sooner or later ignite. Bashir states: ‘‘My
father glanced at me, his eyes glinting. ‘But you know the worst thing the British did?
The very worst? When they left they gave all the power to the Arab tribes. They
handed power to the Arabs. Now that’s the sort of things you should be learning at
school.’ ’’26
Sensitizing, Not Traumatizing
It should be noted that students report that The Men Who Killed Me and Tears of the
Desert are particularly graphic. As a guiding principle and in pursuit of what Donald
Schwartz (1990) calls ‘‘sensitizing not traumatizing,’’27 I offer from the outset alter-
native ways of meeting the course requirements. Correspondingly, the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum’s guidelines for teaching read as follows: ‘‘Students are
essentially a ‘captive audience’ . . . a basic trust [is] the obligation of the teacher to
provide a ‘safe’ learning environment. . . . Try to select images and texts that do not
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exploit the students’ emotional vulnerability or that might be construed as dis-
respectful of the victims themselves.’’28
Despite the option of replacing The Men Who Killed Me and/or Tears of the Desert
with other comparable (less graphic) readings, no student has yet made such a
request. Instead, a typical response to unsettling accounts goes something like this:
‘‘If you feel uncomfortable when you read this material, that’s good.’’ Or as another
student put it,
Sometimes I deliberately stay away from books like [Tears of the Desert] because I
know they will be difficult to read, but at the same time I think it’s crucial for us to
read these accounts so we can be more informed regarding the appalling things that
are sadly still happening in the world today. I have friends who think genocide
started and ended with the Holocaust. Besides, it’s too easy to be complacent while
watching the news about countries on the other side of the world, thinking that
it doesn’t involve us. But then the news, if it even reports on sexual violence as
genocide, usually spotlights statistics. Reading Tears of the Desert, and getting to
know Halima [Bashir] and her family through the pages of the book, genuinely put a
human face on the tragedy occurring in Darfur.
The same considerations regarding ‘‘sensitizing not traumatizing’’ students arise
regarding documentaries. However, as with The Men Who Killed Me and Tears of the
Desert no student has yet requested a less graphic substitution when it comes to
films. In fact, when students are absent from class, and consequently miss a viewing,
they appear to go out of their way to locate the documentary (e.g., request my copy,
inquire into where they might locate it on online, or rent it).
Documentaries: G-d Sleeps in Rwanda, Mothers Courage, Thriving
Survivors, and The Greatest Silence: Rape in the Congo
Films are a good way ‘‘to highlight the validity of life outside . . . textbooks.’’29 Like
The Men Who Killed Me and Tears of the Desert, the documentaries G-d Sleeps in
Rwanda (2005),30 Mothers Courage, Thriving Survivors (2005),31 and The Greatest
Silence: Rape in the Congo (2007)32 redirect students’ attention to the tens of
thousands of girls and women who are victims of genocide.
In G-d Sleeps in Rwanda, the filmmakers chronicle the genocide’s impact on five
women. Each lost many, if not all family members, during the genocide. Similarly,
Mothers Courage, Thriving Survivors offers testimonies from women survivors of
the 1994 genocide. As is the case in G-d Sleeps in Rwanda, it chronicles women
struggling to rebuild their lives and their country.33
Writing via e-mail, a student reflects on G-d Sleeps in Rwanda, illustrating its
value as an educational tool:
[H]ow incredibly inspiring I found G-d Sleeps in Rwanda. Based on the subject
matter, I assumed it would be terribly hard to watch, and some parts certainly were.
But I was so incredibly moved by the strength and ability of the women to persevere
in the face of so much violence and repeated devastating attacks. I kept thinking to
myself, ‘‘Don’t ever, ever underestimate women.’’ I felt incredibly proud to be a part
of such an extraordinary gender. It is a staggering statistic that 70% of the Rwandan
population is now female, but also incredible that so many women have risen to the
occasion to become political leaders, heads of households (some at such a young age),
and are able to accomplish such labor-intensive jobs (not that I ever doubted women
could do such things!!!).
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The student continues:
In some of the readings, the sexual violence perpetrated against these women seems
to be understood to be the equivalent of killing them through psychological damage,
physical torture, or damage to their reproductive system, and through the damage
it creates in their families and communities. And though all of these disgusting
intended consequences are true, the point is many of these women are still not dead.
And are astoundingly able to create solidarity and to rebuild their communities and
families. It is TRULY remarkable and inspirational to see some positive things come
from such horrible events. It is really important to focus on such things. . . . I think
[G-d Sleeps in Rwanda] has given me yet another perspective in a horrific, yet direly
important topic.
‘‘The idea that sexual violence in Rwanda was not merely the product of a
few misogynist Hutu extremists, but a thorough-going policy of the state and its
agents leaves me speechless,’’ another student writes in reaction to Mothers Courage,
Thriving Survivors. ‘‘That stories like Athanasie Mukarwego’s, who was raped
while her four children were sequestered in the next room, would not attract enough
interest or compassion to make powerful people and nations take immediate action,
makes me both distressed and furious.’’
As a final example of the pedagogical power of film, The Greatest Silence: Rape in
the Congo presents evidence that rape and sexual torture of girls and women in the
Congo is meticulously carried out to create and prolong an atmosphere of political
and economic insecurity in a country where valuable natural resources are exploited
by profiteers.
Corresponding via e-mail, a number of students describe their reactions to the
film: ‘‘After watching [The Greatest Silence: Rape in the Congo] I decided to protest
China’s aid to the repressive regime in Darfur, part of what is destabilizing all of
central Africa. It makes me feel better to know that I’m doing something.’’ A second
student remarks, ‘‘It is utterly incomprehensible that there is so little media
coverage on this. . . . Every day we are suffocated by endless entertainment ‘news,’
and then zero about the Congo.’’ A third student writes:
All this in a world where slogans like ‘‘women’s rights’’ appear frequently in news
accounts and are echoed in the best lecture halls universities have to offer. Shame
that more people can’t see this [film], isn’t it? Meanwhile some brainless horror flick,
which glorifies rape, or uses rape to shock and sell tickets, sells out three weeks in a
row [at the local theater].
Commentary by Eve Ensler
Two commentaries, written by Eve Ensler and published in 2007 by The Washington
Post and Glamour magazine, are frequently mentioned by students during dis-
cussions of rape-as-genocide. While one can appreciate that giving commentaries to
students for discussion makes sense, commentary alone is not sufficiently academic.
It does, however, make the subject matter more accessible.
Ensler’s work, in combination with a scholarly piece like Reva N. Adler, Cyanne
E. Loyle, and Judith Globerman (2007),34 helps students make links between the
social position of women in Congo, the life of women prior to the 100-day Rwanda
genocide, and the ultimate devaluation of girls and women during and after geno-
cide. An excerpt from an exam illustrates the success of this approach:
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According to Adler, Loyle, and Globerman (2007), under Rwandan law, prior to 1994,
women were banned from inheriting property, entering into any legal agreement, or
even opening a bank account without the permission of their husbands; very few
held positions of power inside government.35 In Congo, Ensler (2007) found that for
at least one man it was more important to protect gorillas than women. . . .36 Social
constructions of masculinity and systematic sexism are indispensable to under-
standing violence against women—sexual and otherwise. In times of peace, it is no
different.
A second example of the efficacy of Ensler’s commentary is in its ability to
encourage students to think analytically about the UN Convention on Genocide.
‘‘Ensler (2007) unmistakably links rape in the Congo to at least four of the five
elements of genocide outlined in the UN Convention,’’ argues one student. Similarly,
a student referring to Samantha Power (2002) and then Ensler (2007) remarks,
According to the UN Convention, genocide includes killing members of the group,
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,
and forcibly transferring children of one group to another group.37 Rape clearly fits
into each of the requirements for genocide. Mass rape results in the death of many
women, including as a result of HIV/AIDS. It causes both mental and physical harm
to the survivors, including vesicovaginal and rectovaginal fistula. It renders survivors
unable to bear children, which stifles the next generation. It results in diluting the
ethnicity of the victim’s children, which serves to damage her community. ‘‘Clearly
these rapes are not done to satisfy any sexual desire but to destroy the soul. The
whole family and community are broken.’’38
A third advantage of Ensler’s commentary lies in its capacity to encourage
students to think critically, even about seemingly positive steps to combat sexual
violence. For example, a year after the adoption of Resolution 1820, the UN dubbed
Congo the worst place on earth to be female; and while sources like The Men Who
Killed Me offer an overview of Resolution 1820, Ensler (2009) offers a more critical
appraisal:
Resolution 1820 must be enforced with seriousness by the Security Council and the
secretary general. Arrests need to be made immediately of known rapists and war
criminals at the highest levels. The United Nations must stop supporting military
actions, because they are doomed in Congo. And the root economic causes of the war
need to be addressed with the leaders of countries in Africa’s Great Lakes region who
commit violence to reap benefits from Congo’s minerals, as well as their Western
corporate partners. They, too, are liable for these atrocities. . . . The women of eastern
Congo are enduring their 12th year of sexual terrorism. The girl children born of rape
are now being raped. What will it take for the United Nations to finally do something
meaningful to stop the violence? The women are waiting.39
Though an arguably cursory summary of the situation in Congo, Ensler’s piece
cited above, used in combination with scholarly materials, effectively encourages
critical thinking and leads to theoretically sophisticated analysis.
Last, a recurring theme in students’ comments relates to Ensler’s description of
women lined up at her door before breakfast wanting to talk.40 ‘‘There were actual
lineups of women wanting to be heard!’’ wrote one student in typical fashion.
Students consistently conclude, as does Ensler, that the deepest wounds for survi-
vors is the sense that they have been forgotten, that they are invisible, and that
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their pain has no meaning. The simple act of listening to survivors has a profound
impact on students and their education.
Conclusions
Despite the sophisticated and theoretically informed reflections typically provided by
students, understanding the unrelenting brutality that is genocide lies outside their
experience for the majority of them. Furthermore, statistics like ‘‘500,000 raped’’
are impossible to grasp. First-hand accounts promote solidarity with victims and
a deeper understanding of rape-as-genocide, including its lingering effects in post-
genocide societies.
How effective might the approach described here be in other contexts, in other
institutions, and with other students? Committed to multi-disciplinary social justice
research, the public institutions in Canada where I have taught are richly diverse
communities. A large number of undergraduates are immigrants or first-generation
students. At least a half-dozen of my students are survivors of genocide and war.
My students also tend to be a little older than traditional college age, which may
mean they are more likely to possess the sensibilities required to address these
sensitive issues. Finally, the course is offered to senior undergraduates. These
factors may help explain the incredibly articulate and well-written responses I
typically receive.
The implications here go beyond any one course however. Ignoring sexual
violence, either by excluding it from the curriculum or by mentioning it merely in
passing, has significance. In such cases, educators inadvertently send the message
that rape-as-genocide is not worthy of our attention. Thus, we contribute to ‘‘the
greatest silence.’’ Furthermore, neglect of rape-as-genocide adds to the normalization
of rape (in any context).
In the end, the choice of pedagogical approach is unavoidably accompanied by a
‘‘taking of sides.’’ I prefer to include first-hand accounts because no one person can
give genuine voice to victims and survivors of rape-as-genocide.
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The Armenian Genocide of 1915 from a
Neutral Small State’s Perspective: Sweden1
Vahagn Avedian
Chief Editor, Armenica.org
This study depicts how the Armenian massacres in the Ottoman Empire during
World War I were perceived by a neutral small state, namely, Sweden. The
Swedish knowledge should be of special interest since, as a neutral state during
the entire conflict, Sweden had no immediate involvement or interest in the
ongoing conflict; thus, any reporting about the events would have been untainted
compared to that of the Entente or Turkey’s allies. The information at hand is
also essential to an understanding of the subsequent Swedish reaction. However,
surveying the full amount of information needed for comprehensively understand-
ing and analyzing the response to the massacres is beyond the scope of this article
and requires a larger study. This article, therefore, addresses the first part,
namely charting the information at hand, while the analysis of the response,
especially a neutral small state’s during an ongoing global conflict, will be left to
future studies. The surveyed information in this study shows that information
about the Armenian massacres in the Ottoman Empire was abundant.
Key words: Armenian Genocide, Sweden, neutral small state
‘‘And look what it says here. The first who were called wogs [svartskallar] were
Armenian beggars. They were thrown out from Sweden since it was forbidden to
beg.’’2 The beggars in question were Armenian survivors from the massacres in the
Ottoman Empire.
Today, the Republic of Turkey dismisses almost every historic document pre-
sented by the Entente powers of World War I as war propaganda, which they see as
serving the sole purpose of defaming Turkey. Turkish documents on the subject, on
the other hand, are dismissed by genocide scholars as unreliable, since they are the
Turkish government’s falsification and a cover-up.3 Having said that, it should
be mentioned that research on German and Austrian documents, allies of Turkey
during the Great War, confirms the Entente’s version, rather than that of Turkey.4
A neutral nation’s observations of the event, however, should be free of any allega-
tions of bias from either side in the conflict. One such nation was the USA, which
remained neutral in the conflict until April 1917. The reports and observations
made by the US Embassy and American missionaries and relief workers throughout
Turkey constitute an important part of the data about the Armenian massacres,
since the Americans were the only major power (except Germany and Austria) left
inside Turkey after the outbreak of the war. Their presence in Turkey, as well as
their neutrality, ended in April 1917 when USA entered the war on the Entente’s
side. Sweden, on the other hand, remained neutral during the entire conflict and
its reports and subsequent actions cannot be ascribed to Swedish involvement in
a specific war camp. The full scope of such a study would be to find out how much
Sweden knew about the massacres, what alternative actions could have been taken,
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what alternatives Sweden chose, and why. However, in order to conduct this study
within the given limitations, this article will concentrate on the contents of the
reports and the information and the analysis that reached Sweden in regard to
the Armenian massacres and the fate of Armenia, leaving the three subsequent
questions to future studies.
The Swedish Press, Christian Missions, Military Missions,
and Embassy Reports
During World War I, the Swedish press dedicated much space to the war efforts,
as did the press in other countries. Among others, a special bureau was created to
provide the Swedish countryside papers with articles from the German press. ‘‘About
fifty papers were among the receivers, mostly conservative publications organs, but
also a number of liberal papers.’’5 The fact that such a large number of newspapers
were under German influence should have affected the reporting of events on
Turkey. In order to further influence Swedish opinion, Germany secretly purchased
the majority of the shares in the newspapers Aftonbladet and Dagen. With a total
circulation of 92,000, these newspapers equaled the circulation of the Entente-
friendly Dagens Nyheter and Social-Demokraten.6 This could explain why the news
of the massacres in Armenia was a relatively small event in the reports from the
front. The resources of the Swedish newspapers were not adequate to employ foreign
correspondents of their own. This meant that much of the news concerning foreign
affairs was acquired from foreign news agencies, often coloring the perspective
of the reports. However, until Hitler’s seizure of power in Germany, the leading
Swedish publications’ foreign policy aimed less at influencing public opinion and
more toward debating and providing orientation concerning prevailing international
affairs.7
While the information published by the newspapers was ‘‘second-hand intelli-
gence’’ acquired from foreign news agencies, there were more reliable information
sources documented by individuals present in Turkey. These documents were the
reports and dispatches by Swedish missionaries in Turkey and the Caucasus, the
Swedish Ambassador to Turkey, and the Swedish Military Attache´ in Constan-
tinople. These documents are mainly found in the National Archives, but some are
published as memoirs as well.
The material belonging to the Swedish missionaries has been collected from
several sources: pamphlets, brochures, and books published during the period of
1915–1923; as well as memoirs published later, which contain eyewitness accounts
and stories of the studied period; letters and reports from the missionaries in the
field that were sent to the Swedish Church reporting about the status of the
missions, as well as depicting the situation in their parish. These documents were
found in the Missionary Archive administered partly by the Church of Sweden and
partly by the Swedish National Archives.
The reports and the warnings issued by the Swedish missionaries in Turkey and
the Caucasus date to the end of the nineteenth century and to the massacres of
1894–1896.8 Searching through the missionary correspondence for the period 1914–
1917 did not, however, reveal any special information. An examination of the letters
showed that the volume, especially from Turkey, decreased dramatically, with the
engagement in the Great War. Stationed in Mush, Western Armenia, beginning in
1910, Alma Johansson, for example, wrote about two to three letters a month to
Sweden. During the entire period of 1914–1917, however, there were only four
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letters from her in the archives.9 The archivist at Svenska Missionskyrkan (the
Mission Covenant Church of Sweden), Katarina Thurell, explained that the lack of
information from missionaries all over Europe during World War I was a common
phenomenon. The reasons were many: the war forced many missionaries to leave
their field missions, and at the same time resulted in communication difficulties;
scarce information was also due to wartime censorship and control of the information
flow. Letters from missionaries had to pass through military channels. This cen-
sorship resulted in letters arriving several months, or longer, after they had been
written. Some may never have reached their destination. While it is true that
German and Austrian missionaries remained in the area until the end of the war,
the censorship by the German and Austrian governments, in regard to the ongoing
war effort in general and the reputation of the Turkish ally in particular, strictly
prohibited any publication of the information and observations the missionaries
relayed back home.
Two larger publications in the form of booklets were Blod och ta˚rar: Armeniernas
lidanden i Turkiet (‘‘Blood and Tears: The Sufferings of Armenians in Turkey’’) and
Vad en tysk lektor i asiatiska Turkiet upplevde i 1915 (‘‘What a German Senior
Lecturer in Asian Turkey Experienced during 1915’’). The first is a collection of
testimonies, letters, and articles from different medical personnel, missionaries,
soldiers, and Armenian survivors about the massacres in the Ottoman Empire, and
not all the sources provide first-hand information. The second booklet depicts the
experiences of Dr. Martin Niepage, an upper-grade teacher in the German Technical
School at Aleppo. His article concentrates mainly on information that should be
regarded as more reliable, as it excludes much information attained by hearsay.
Both booklets’ contents give an interesting insight into the events, both as first-
hand testimonies as well as analysis of how the massacres were perceived. In addi-
tion, there are some other non-Swedish witness accounts, translated and published
in Sweden, that are included in the present study.
The Swedish missionary reports, letters, and pamphlets were yet another means
of affecting public opinion, mainly by initiating and persuading the civilian Swedes
to contribute to humanitarian aid and collections for the benefit of the victims and
survivors of the Armenian massacres. However, they could also indicate the Swedish
Church’s knowledge of events and its choice of action regarding the massacres, as
well as the actions of the missionaries in Western Armenia.
Moving further up the ‘‘reliability scale’’ of the reports and their impact on the
Swedish state’s knowledge of and basis for decision making are the Swedish military
personnel’s reports. The most frequently cited Swedish military testimony, used by
deniers of the Armenian genocide, is that of Major Gustav Hjalmar Pravitz. He was
actually stationed in Persia, not in the Ottoman Empire. Pravitz was a member
of the Swedish military mission invited to improve Persia’s gendarmerie and police
operations.10 In 1918, Pravitz published his memoirs, Fra˚n Persien i stiltje och storm
(‘‘From Persia in Calm and Storm’’); however, he published one passage of the book
a year earlier in Nya Dagligt Allehanda (NDA),11 where he made an interesting
assertion: ‘‘I guess generally, one can say that a continuous, even if somewhat
milder, persecution is less bearable to endure than a bloody but quick act of
despotism, as in assaults of the kind that from time to time put Europe’s attention
on the Armenian question.’’12 During his journey through Turkey to reach Persia,
Pravitz admitted that he had seen dead bodies and dying people begging for a piece
of bread, but, with the exception of one case, he did not see the alleged violence used
against the Armenian ‘‘emigrants.’’13 He also mentions meeting an Armenian in a
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concentration camp (‘‘koncentrationsla¨ger’’), itself an interesting choice of word in
the context of this study.14 In order to be able to put Pravitz’s observations and
interpretation of the Armenian situation in perspective, it is necessary to also reflect
upon his personal view about the Armenian people. In his book, Pravitz renders his
views regarding Persia, Persians, and the minorities living in the country. A large
portion of the first part of chapter ten, entitled ‘‘My Second Journey to Persia,’’ in
which he describes the ‘‘Armenian question,’’ has more or less the same content
as his article in Nya Dagligt Allehanda. Moreover, his description of the Armenian
element is not flattering. Jews and Armenians are described as ‘‘lying merchants’’
and Armenians as ‘‘highly untrustworthy.’’15 In general, he writes that the ‘‘bloody’’
measures of the Turkish government toward the ‘‘disloyal’’ Armenians were quite
justified, even though innocent people had suffered too.16 The parallels to the argu-
mentation about the Holocaust are too striking to be ignored.
Notwithstanding, the study of the Swedish War Archive reveals another, quite
opposite, perspective, expressed by someone much closer to the events, namely, that
of Captain Einar af Wirse´n (later Major), the official Swedish Military Attache´ in
Constantinople, 1915–1920.17 In his memoirs, Minnen fra˚n fred och krig (‘‘Memories
from Peace and War’’), published in 1942, referring to Talaat’s somewhat gruesome
humor, he mentions the following answer Talaat gave him in regard to the Armenian
massacres: ‘‘I see in the Times that we would have executed, or in other ways killed
none less than 800,000 Armenians. I assure you that this is untrue, it was only
600,000.’’18 Djemal Pasha, however, was more moderate and ‘‘disliked the massacres
of the Armenians.’’19 The book is based upon Wirse´n’s experiences and memoirs
during his service as military attache´ in the Balkans and Turkey. Here he demon-
strated in more detail his knowledge of the Armenian genocide. Although published
in 1942, the book gives insight into how the events were understood by the official
Swedish Military Attache´ in Turkey when they happened. In the chapter Mordet pa˚
en nation (‘‘The Murder of a Nation’’), Wirse´n gives a brief review of the background
to the Armenian question, before describing the atrocities committed by the Turkish
government during the war.20 He found the accusations of Armenian collaboration
with the Russians questionable.21 The subsequent deportations were nothing but
a cover for the extermination: ‘‘Officially, these had the goal of moving the entire
Armenian population to the steppe regions of Northern Mesopotamia and Syria,
but in reality they aimed to exterminate [utrota] the Armenians, whereby the pure
Turkish element in Asia Minor would achieve a dominating position.’’22 Wirse´n
points out that the orders were given with utter cunning. The communications were
generally given verbally and in extreme secrecy in order to give the government a
free hand in the implementation of the massacres.23 Describing the methods used
for massacring the Armenians and depriving the survivors of basic needs so they
would perish by hunger and disease, Wirse´n notes that the ‘‘annihilation of the
Armenian nation in Asia Minor must revolt all human feelings . . . The way the
Armenian problem was solved was hair-raising. I can still see in front of me Talaat’s
cynical expression, when he emphasized that the Armenian question was solved.’’24
The military reports are of great importance, since the Swedish Military Attache´,
as a representative of a neutral state, was allowed to visit the fronts and gather
information about the ongoing campaigns and actions in the Ottoman Empire. He
received military intelligence reports, dispatched not only by the Turks but also by
the Germans and Austrians serving in the Ottoman Army. The reports show that
Wirse´n took the liberty to make recommendations about certain actions toward both
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Turkey and Germany, which suggests that his analytic reports were of importance to
Swedish foreign policy making.
On 30 April 1915, Sweden’s Ambassador to Constantinople, Per Gustaf August
Cosswa Anckarsva¨rd, wrote a five-page dispatch on the subject of the armeniska
fra˚gan (Armenian question) and the Armenian revolutionary movement. Noting
that the ‘‘ghost of the so-called Armenian question’’ had re-appeared in the interior
parts of the country, Anckarsva¨rd gave a rather detailed chronological description of
the issue.25 Anckarsva¨rd mentions that the Sublime Porte,26 based upon intelligence
information about revolutionary plans, made a mass arrest of about 400 Armenians
in Constantinople and numerous others had been taken into custody in other cities
as well. ‘‘Among the arrested are many Armenian journalists, doctors, and lawyers
especially. They had been sent to Angora [Ankara], awaiting trial in a court
martial.’’27 Anckarsva¨rd was referring to the arrest of the Armenian intellectuals
throughout the Empire, especially in Constantinople.
On 26 May 1915, Svenska Morgonbladet (SvM) published the following telegram
from Paris: ‘‘Since about a month ago, the Kurdish and Turkish populations in
Armenia, in accord with each other and with help from the Turkish Government,
have committed mass murder on Armenians. These have occurred from mid-April
[new style], in Erzurum, Dertsjun [Ter-Djan], Egin, Bitlis, Mush, Sasun, and
others.’’28 On 6 July 1915 Anckarsva¨rd dispatched a two-page report entitled ‘‘The
Armenian Persecutions,’’ a wording used in the title of six other reports during
1915. The dispatch reads as follows:
The persecutions of the Armenians have reached hair-raising proportions and it all
points to the fact that the Young Turks want to seize the opportunity, since there is
no effective external pressure to be feared for various reasons, to once and for all put
an end to the Armenian question. The means for this are quite simple and consist of
the extermination [utrotandet] of the Armenian nation . . . It does not seem to be the
Turkish population that acts on its own accord, but the entire movement originates in
the government institutions and the Young Turks’ Committee, which stands behind
the government and now displays the kinds of ideas they harbor . . . The German
Ambassador has in writing appealed to the Porte, but what can Germany or any other
of the Major Powers do as long as the war continues? That the Central Powers would
threaten Turkey is for the time being unthinkable, and Turkey is already at war with
the majority of the remaining Major Powers.29
Here, for the first time, Anckarsva¨rd pinpoints two important observations: (1) the
mass killings were state orchestrated, with the Committee of Union and Progress30
behind the scene, and (2) their aim was to ‘‘exterminate the Armenian nation.’’ The
atrocities would justify yet another European intervention, but only once the war
was over. The Swedish Ambassador’s analysis of the hopelessness of the situation
also emphasizes Turkey’s knowledge of the window of opportunity, caused partly by
the passivity of its allies and the inability of the world (neutral and hostile nations),
which provided them with an opportunity to implement their ‘‘final solution.’’
Anckarsva¨rd’s report described the basic need of a humanitarian intervention, but
neither the friendly state (Germany) nor other major powers capable of implement-
ing such an intervention were in a position to interfere to stop the genocide.
Soon after, on 15 July 1915, Anckarsva¨rd informed Stockholm of the warning
delivered to the Porte by the German Ambassador about the Armenian massacres.
‘‘Turkey risked, especially among the neutral nations and foremost in America,
evoking an extremely disadvantageous opinion. Furthermore, the unlawfulness and
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excesses of the Turkish government agencies opened the door for Europe’s inter-
vention and its interference in Turkey’s internal affairs as soon as the war ceased.’’31
The issue of a humanitarian intervention was made clear, but it also established the
fact that such an action would, due to the prevailing circumstances, almost certainly
come too late to save the Armenians.
Anckarsva¨rd’s 15 July 1915 report stated that the ‘‘Armenian Patriarch has
asked the Justice and Culture Minister, whether his intention is to annihilate the
entire Armenian nation, in which case he was ready to start a movement to organize
a mass emigration to, among other places, countries in South America. In this way,
the Turks would get rid of the Armenians and the Armenians would suffer somewhat
less than now.’’32 This suggestion was quite similar to the Nazi’s Madagascar plan.33
On 22 July 1915, Anckarsva¨rd informed his foreign ministry that it was not only
the Armenians who were subject to persecutions, but also the Greeks who faced the
same fate. The Greek charge´ d’affaires in Constantinople, Mr. Tsamados, explained
that: ‘‘ it [the deportations] cannot be any other issue other than an annihilation
war against the Greek nation in Turkey, and the measures therefore being taken
are that the Turks have been implementing forced conversions to Islam; the obvious
aim being that, if at the end of the war there would again be a question of European
intervention for the protection of the Christians, there would be as few of them left
as possible.’’34
On 18 August 1915, the Swedish Ambassador notified Stockholm about a new
German protest against the ongoing massacres. The German Ambassador’s note con-
tained a ‘‘much more serious tone,’’ pointing out that Germany could not passively
witness ‘‘how Turkey, through the Armenian persecutions, was going downhill,
morally and economically. Furthermore, they [the Germans] protested against the
Porte’s course of actions, based on which her [i.e., Turkey’s] ally Germany becomes
suspected of approving these actions and, finally, Germany renounces any responsi-
bility for the consequences.’’35 On 2 September 1915, Anckarsva¨rd dispatched a new
report stating that it ‘‘ is obvious that the Turks are taking the opportunity to, now
during the war, annihilate [utpla˚na] the Armenian nation so that when peace comes,
the Armenian question no longer exists . . . It is noteworthy that the persecutions
of Armenians have been done at the instigation of the Turkish government and
are primarily not a spontaneous eruption of Turkish fanaticism, even though this
fanaticism is used and plays a role. The tendency to ensure that Turkey is inhabited
only by Turks could, in due time, appear in a horrifying manner toward the Greeks
and other Christians also.’’36 Anckarsva¨rd made it quite clear that the massacres
were neither an act of vengeance, nor a matter of civil or domestic war, but a
systematic killing planned and implemented by the state, that is, a genocide. Thus,
Turkey was behaving as a failed state, in which the structure and the norms for
safeguarding the human rights of its citizens were suspended or ignored.37
The dispatch of 4 September 1915 presented the estimation of the Armenian
losses given by the Armenian Patriarch. Anckarsva¨rd confirmed the Patriarch’s
estimation that approximately half the Armenian population had been erased, but
doubted that the Armenian population was as numerous as 2 million, which the
Patriarch asserted. Anckarsva¨rd also noted the negative economic impact these
persecutions had in Turkey, since almost 80% of the trade was in Armenian hands.38
On 4 October 1915, SvM claimed that the US ambassador in Constantinople,
Henry Morgenthau, had been ordered by his government to deliver a warning to the
Turkish foreign minister, stating that ‘‘ if the Armenian massacres do not cease, the
friendly relations with the US will be jeopardized.’’39 However, a similar directive
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was never issued by Stockholm. Instead of exhorted protests, the Swedish press now
started to question the credibility of the news, citing the Turkish government’s
explanation that the measures were necessary because of the Armenian’s liaisons
with the Russians, British, and the French.40 Nevertheless, 1915 was replete with
notes and reports about the state-implemented annihilation and extermination of
the Armenian nation. The ambassador alone dispatched over ten reports about the
persecution of the Armenians and their fate.
On 15 January 1916, Anckarsva¨rd dispatched a report written by the Swedish
Military Attache´ Wirse´n, in which the situation of the military operations in Turkey
was described. Commenting on the shortage of food, the report pointed out that
this was partly as a result of bad harvests in Anatolia. The bad harvests were due
to lack of labor since ‘‘so many men had been enlisted and in large areas, the
most able-bodied population, i.e. the Armenians, have been subjected to the saddest
fate . . .’’41 On 13 March 1916, Wirse´n noted the tension surrounding the German
officers, which was affecting their relations with the Turks. He assumed that some-
thing was about to happen at the Caucasian front, but the outcome was uncertain.
He concluded the paragraph with the following sentence: ‘‘One can observe that the
persecution of the Armenians has now begun in Thrace and even in Constantinople
itself, when the Armenians living in the eastern parts of the city have begun being
transported away to Asia.’’42 Commenting on the general situation in May, Wirse´n
points out the main source for the epidemics spreading in the eastern front: ‘‘The
health situation in Iraq is horrifying. Typhus fever claims numerous victims. The
Armenian persecutions have to a large degree contributed to the spreading of the
disease, since the expelled [Armenians] in hundreds of thousands have died from
hunger and deprivation along the roads.’’43
In his dispatch, dated 20 May 1916, Ambassador Anckarsva¨rd reported on the
ongoing negotiations between Turkey and Germany, commenting on the situation in
Turkey and the rumors of a possible surrender. Talking about the possible assaults
on foreigners in Turkey and the subsequent foreign intervention, Anckarsva¨rd
asserts that a foreign intervention would only weaken the Turkish Empire, but his
analysis leaves no other option:
It is only due to the war that an ultra terrorist regime such as the present can be
upheld. The true nature of this regime has come to the surface in such a significant
manner through the Armenian persecutions. That the same violent methods are still
implemented is evident through the recent intelligence reports regarding measures
for subjugating agitation among Arabs . . . In Aleppo there are rumors regarding an
imminent deportation of the Arabs in hundreds of thousands. Such is the Young
Turk administration, so incompetent is it in solving the difficult problems posed
by the heterogeneous elements that the population is composed of. The military
successes, thanks to German aid, should not create the illusion that Turkey will
be re-born thanks to the war. The stub is so corroded that a real regeneration is
inconceivable.44
Thus, Anckarsva¨rd predicted that, even though an intervention might not be the
perfect answer, it might be the only alternative since no change would come from
within to improve the situation of the minorities. However, the war gave the perfect
opportunity to act as a failed state without fearing external interference.
On 7 June 1916, Dagens Nyheter reported that in Trabizond, for every 10,000
Armenian inhabitants, only 92 were still alive. ‘‘The extermination of the Armenians
has been done systematically.’’45 The Swedish passivity in response to the reported
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atrocities was criticized by editor G.H. von Kock, who not only criticized the
government but also the church: ‘‘It is with sorrow one notes that, since the initial
notification of the issue, nothing or at least very little has been done to assist the
Christian Armenians and Syrians who in Asia Minor have been murdered in
the hundreds of thousands by Turks and Kurds . . . Sometimes it feels that we,
here in Sweden, have been paralyzed in the face of all misery that now prevails and
increases constantly in the world.’’46
Almost a month later, Anckarsva¨rd dispatched a report notifying Stockholm of
the possibility of a Greek declaration of war against Turkey, which could result in
the repetition of the Armenian fate, this time engulfing the Greeks in Turkey. The
report is significant due to the expected request for protection of Greek interests in
Turkey: ‘‘[T]he Dutch Ambassador here has notified his government, that in case of
a possible request from Greece regarding entrusting the protection of its interests
in Turkey to the Dutch legation, it must be denied. The Foreign Ministry in [The]
Hague has replied that it completely approves the Ambassador’s view. On my own
behalf, I would like respectfully make the same proposal to Your Excellency as
it concerns this embassy, in case the government in Athens would turn to H[is]
M[ajesty]’s government.’’47 This is the only instance where Anckarsva¨rd recom-
mended a certain policy to Stockholm regarding the events in Turkey. It also
illustrates how the fear of endangering one’s own country’s interests could directly
prevent that country from intervening in case of a humanitarian urgency. This policy
would become much more obvious once the new Swedish ambassador arrived in
1920.
In his dispatch on 5 January 1917, Anckarsva¨rd made an important observation
of the German influence in Turkey in regard to the impending risk of Turkish
surrender: ‘‘The situation would have been different if Turkey had followed the
advice of the Central Powers in letting them organise the question of provisioning
etc. . . . Even worse than this is, however, the extermination [utrotandet] of Armenians,
which, perhaps, could have been prevented if German advisers had in time received
authority over the civilian administration as the German officers actually practise
over army and navy . . . The above-mentioned statements, as mentioned, come from
a diplomatic official allied with Turkey. Your Excellency can then consider what the
neutral diplomats think of the situation here.’’48
On 14 January 1917, Anckarsva¨rd sent a dispatch regarding the decision to
deport the Ottoman Greeks. He noted that the US ambassador had been trying to
stop the deportation by stressing to the Porte the kind of impression ‘‘a repetition
of the Armenian persecutions, but this time against the Greeks, would give in the
entire civilised world.’’ He ended the report by asserting the following: ‘‘What above
all appears as an unnecessary cruelty is that the deportation is not limited to the
men alone, but is extended likewise to women and children. This is supposedly done
in order to much more easily confiscate the property of the deported.’’49
The Armenian question was revived in 1917 in Sweden. Then, even writers and
politicians joined the debate. The Turkish embassy in Stockholm got engaged in the
debate, refuting the allegations presented in the Swedish press. On March 24,
Dagens Nyheter published the parliamentary interpellation, written by Stockholm’s
Mayor Carl Lindhagen to Foreign Minister Johannes Hellner, stating, ‘‘Earlier
cruelties in Armenia fade in the face of the actual extermination [utrotandet] of
the Armenians, which recently has been going on.’’ He continued, asking whether
‘‘the government, alone or in cooperation with other neutral governments, who could
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have any influence in the matter, wish to help the right of the Armenian population
to protect their lives, their property and their nationality?’’50
As an answer to Mayor Lindhagen’s interpellation to the Swedish foreign
minister, Chairman of the Conservative Parliamentary Group Arvid Lindman
rejected any claim for intervention, referring to the fact that Sweden will not inter-
fere in other state’s internal affairs.51 The leader of the opposition, Chairman of the
Social Democratic Party Hjalmar Branting, mentioned that Sweden should protest
against the Armenian massacres in the same way Sweden protested against the
‘‘catastrophe in Belgium.’’52 However, no protest was ever issued. On March 26, a
protest meeting was arranged in support of the Armenians. In a packed auditorium
in Stockholm, the meeting was presided over by Mayor Lindhagen, and Hjalmar
Branting gave the introductory speech. The keynote speech was delivered by the
author Marika Stjernstedt. The French, Russian, Belgian, and Italian ambassadors
also attended the meeting and funds were raised.53 Talking about the Armenian
massacres during the last decades of nineteenth century, Branting rebuked the
conservative newspapers for having practically silenced the information on the
massacres, stating that the world had ‘‘witnessed that in Armenia, a fully organized
genocide [ folkmord] has been carried out and the events down there are unparalleled
with all that which has happened during the war.’’54 Branting might very well have
been the first public figure who, decades before Raphael Lemkin, used the term
folkmord, that is genocide, in regard to the annihilation of a nation. Branting also
informed the audience that he, back in 1916, had contacted the then foreign minister
Knut Wallenberg to make him intervene and put a stop to the massacres. The
courting had been fruitless.55 It should be borne in mind that at this point in time,
Branting was the opposition leader, chastising the government for its Germanophile
attitudes and indifference in the face of an obvious humanitarian disaster. He would
have the chance to address the issue when he became prime minister, which I will
touch upon later. The meeting infuriated the Turkish mission in Stockholm, which
published an article in SvM explaining that the Turkish government, at the
beginning of the war, had cautioned all that there would be ‘‘severe punishment for
attempts of rebellion. Armenians continued with their old policy, and a bloodbath
and attacks on Turks began—in other words, all symptoms for a total insur-
rection.’’56 Nine days later, Stjernstedt published a passionate article about the
Armenian massacres, citing new testimonies verifying the accusations against the
Turks.57
In a 20 August 1917 report about the impact of the war on Turkey, the territorial
losses, as well as the impact on the society, the Swedish Envoy Ahlgren identifies the
following causes for increased living costs: ‘‘obstacles for domestic trade, the almost
total paralyzing of the foreign trade, and finally the strong decreasing of labor power,
caused partly by the mobilization but also by the extermination of the Armenian race
[utrotandet af den armeniska rasen].’’58 Thus, Ahlgren concurred with Anckarsva¨rd’s
view when describing the true goal of the massacres and the nature of the Armenian
fate. The analysis of the situation was elaborated in more detail soon after in the
report about the new masters of Turkey, the ‘‘Young Turks.’’ In a dispatch on 10
September 1917, Ahlgren gives a detailed description of the Union and Progress
Party. The Turkish policy prior to the war was that of ‘‘Ottomanism,’’ aiming to
homogenize the disintegrating heterogenic empire that until then was kept together
by autocracy. However, the new leaders realized that Ottomanism threatened the
Turkish element, since other subdued people ‘‘demanded equal rights for themselves
as the Turks: security for life and property, access to the civil and the military
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offices, yes, even to government.’’59 In order to prevent this, Talaat and Enver,
through the coup d’e´tat in 1913, eliminated the liberal government, and started
implementing changes in the constitution for improving the rights of the Turkish
element. Referring to the new Turkish leader’s policy of homogenizing Turkey,
Ahlgren asserts that this was being planned by ‘‘assimilating other nationalities
and, when it failed, soon enough through political persecutions and extermination.
It is in the light of these facts that one should regard the measures taken against
the Armenians and maybe future similar [actions] against the Greeks.’’60 All opposi-
tion had been brutally removed, all major positions within the administration were
appointed to loyal people, and a new police force was created to act as a secure tool
in the government’s hand. The same applied to the army.61 The government was in
full control over the country.
In 1918, after a conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Nessimy Bey,
Anckarsva¨rd sent a letter to Stockholm, dated 22 April, reporting on the information
he had received from the minister. Nessimy Bey had refuted the recent news about
renewed Armenian massacres, calling them British propaganda and had pointed out
that their previous sufferings were due to the Armenians’ own rebellious posture
and the subsequent evacuation. ‘‘But,’’ Anckarsva¨rd added, ‘‘to just recently [and]
unnecessary subject the Armenians to new sufferings could not be comprehended
by any reasonable person in Turkey, since this would further nourish the already
prevailing indignation toward Turkey.’’62 In other words, Anckarsva¨rd hinted at
existing foreign resentment towards Turkey and its treatment of the Armenian
subjects, even though a strong condemnation of the actions was conspicuous by
its absence. On 25 August, Ahlgren reported on the ongoing peace negotiations in
Caucasus between Turkey and the newly created Caucasian republics of Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Mentioning the Turkish push eastward, into Caucasus
towards Baku and beyond, he notes that the territorial demands of the Georgian
and Azerbaijani republics were mostly met by Turkey, while the original Armenian
claims to a territory of 45,000 square kilometers were limited to only 11,000 square
kilometers, largely encompassing the Erivan province. ‘‘Thus, Armenia was heavily
circumscribed, but this is less surprising than that the Turks have, at all, decided
to recognize an independent Armenian state, which conspicuously contradicts their
implemented policy since 1915, which strove to solve the Armenian question by the
extermination of the Armenian race [den armeniska rasens utrotande].’’63 However,
Ahlgren noted that the Turkish recognition was not voluntary, but due to German
persuasion. Nevertheless, the Turkish offensive towards Baku was halted by the
signing of the armistice at Mudros, by which Turkey surrendered on 30 October
1918.64 The Turkish reconciliation measures would continue in 1919.
It is noteworthy to mention a dispatch that Anckarsva¨rd sent to Stockholm on 8
October 1918. The dispatch contained a debriefing on Anckarsva¨rd’s audience at
Crown Prince Abdul Medjid’s court. The prince had dismissed the Talaat cabinet
due to its misrule of the country and especially lost confidence, internally as well as
externally, due to ‘‘two unforgivable errors, which in the eyes of Turkey and abroad,
made them unsuitable for running the country, namely partly the Armenian persecu-
tions, and partly the exaggerated cruelties committed in Syria against the conspiracy-
entangled Arab sheiks.’’65 There are two important notes in this dispatch: (1) the
Turkish rule indicated a failed state, misgoverning the country in general and not
only in regard to the minorities; (2) the Turkish reaction, here by the Crown Prince,
admitted to the knowledge of the atrocities long before the Entente powers exerted
pressure on defeated Turkey and subsequent trials.
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On 10 January 1919, Anckarsva¨rd reported on the future prospects of Turkey. A
major issue mentioned in the report was the future of Cilicia (and also Diarbekir),
whether the important and rich province would be included in the planned indepen-
dent Armenia, or left to Turkey. This report was one of the first of many from
Constantinople to Stockholm, indicating the impact of the creation of Armenia and
the affected Turkish finances. The main issue was how to salvage Turkey from an
impending financial catastrophe, and more importantly, how to save foreign capital
invested in Turkey. Anckarsva¨rd notes that a French adviser, commenting on the
financial situation in Turkey, advises that ‘‘Turkey must be saved from bankruptcy
and at the same time save the considerable French and English capital here in
Turkey. ‘The Entente’ should, in its own interest, not ruin Turkey, which they hope,
in the future, to fully be able to control and exploit freely.’’66 Anckarsva¨rd concludes:
‘‘The cliche´ states that one does not ruin one’s debtor, and the question is, whether
one should best draw conclusions from this thesis.’’ Future reports, mentioned later,
will further illuminate the implementation of this thesis by the foreign powers in
regard to Armenia and Turkey.
Until this point, the embassy dispatches clearly stated that there were large-
scale massacres with the aim of annihilating the Armenian nation. There had been
some Armenian revolutionary activities, partly due to the Turkish atrocities com-
mitted in the past, but the scale of these and other actions were hardly reason to
exterminate the entire Armenian nation. Furthermore, the dispatches pointed out,
on more than one occasion, that the Armenian massacres were not a result of
spontaneous public actions, but government orchestrated implementation of erasing
a nation. Thus, it is safe to say that the Swedish government’s policies, irrespective
of the additional information provided by domestic newspapers and missionaries,
were, based solely on dispatches from its foreign and military missions, well
informed of the ongoing eradication of the Armenian nation.
However in 1920, with the arrival of a new Swedish envoy to Constantinople,
the tone of the reports and analysis changed dramatically, at least in regard to
Armenians and the Armenian question. The new envoy was Gustaf Oskar Wallenberg,
former Swedish envoy to Japan, and half-brother to K.A. Wallenberg, the former
Swedish foreign minister. He represented a completely new breed of diplomats in
the Swedish Foreign Office. He differed from the traditional Swedish diplomats
in several ways: He was no career diplomat, but rather a businessman, a fact
that can definitely be ascribed to his family background. He belonged to the wealthy
Wallenberg clan, by far Sweden’s family of financial leaders. However, despite his
plutocratic background, he was not from an aristocratic family, which was the case
for Swedish diplomats normally.67 Furthermore, he was an energetic advocate for
Swedish trade interests, both in existing markets, and especially in new emerging
ones.68 The latter aspect is quite evident in the studied material as well. While
Wallenberg’s predecessor, Anckarsva¨rd, primarily reported on the military and diplo-
matic issues, Wallenberg’s reports are replete with comments on trade possibilities,
strategies for expansion of Swedish export to the region, etc.
On 26 January 1920, the Swedish Foreign Ministry sent a letter marked
‘‘Strictly Confidential’’ [Stra¨ngt Fo¨rtroligt] to its ambassadors in Oslo, Helsinki,
Berlin, Vienna, The Hague, Bern, Rome, and London, as well as to Lieutenant
Colonel Francke at the General Staff ’s headquarters. The attachment to the letter
is an anonymous report from ‘‘a Swede, who has been staying in Constantinople
for a long time.’’69 The report in question completely refutes the massacres: ‘‘The
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talk about massacres of the ‘Christians’ and so on is undoubtedly absolutely untrust-
worthy; it is characteristic that there are no offered verifiable details, ‘the national
forces’ are presented only in general as massacrers, but does anyone ask for
proof ?’’70 The dispatch statement asserts that the news is due to the ‘‘irresponsible
agitation against Turkey, which, since the truce, has been allowed to be carried out
by more or less loathsome Levantine elements . . .’’71 There is no clarification
in regard to these ‘‘Levantine elements,’’ even though one could assume the
nationalities—Armenian and Greek—that the author has in mind.
On 12 April 1920, the Swedish Embassy sent a dispatch entitled ‘‘regarding the
future position of Armenia,’’ asking Stockholm about the League Council’s decision to
find a ‘‘civilized state that wished to accept the responsibility of mandate [power]
over Armenia under the supervision of the League of Nations.’’72 During a con-
versation, M.J. Gout, Chief of French Affairs in the League of Nations, had told the
Swedish envoy that ‘‘ it would be extremely desirable if one or several states, who
might be inclined to accept this significantly important and humanitarian task . . .’’
The embassy concluded the message by offering further information if Stockholm
was to be inclined to accept the offer.73 On 24 April, a telegram was received
in Stockholm, referring to newspapers claiming that either Holland, Sweden, or
Norway intended to take the mandate role. In any case, the USA would assume the
responsibility for the economic aid. According to additional information, the final
decision was postponed, awaiting the statement of the International Commission.74
On 26 April 1920, however, G.O. Wallenberg dispatched a three-page recommen-
dation to Foreign Minister Erik Palmstierna, in which he pointed out the importance
of dropping any support for the Armenian cause for the sake of Swedish interests in
Turkey and the region. He went quite far in justifying his point of view by, among
other things, asserting that the ‘‘Armenian national character is highly unreliable,
something which, by the way, is nothing to be surprised about a people, whose policy
for centuries has been restricted to the fields of intrigue . . . The representatives of
the mandate power there will risk being used for aims that they will not like; and if
there be any scandals, the Armenians will always let them bear the responsibility.’’75
The content of the report can only be seen as a clear attempt to downplay the
need for Swedish involvement based on moral and humanitarian issues. Wallenberg
approached the problem from a purely realistic perspective, safekeeping Swedish
economic and political interests. Armenia, unlike its neighbors, had nothing to offer
Sweden. Wallenberg made this utterly clear and would continue this rhetoric in
order to diminish the Armenian position in the equation. It is especially worth
noting that his analysis and observations strongly contradict both his predecessor’s
views and those of Wirse´n. Wallenberg was a businessman, interested in profits, not
in humanitarian responsibilities. During the subsequent years, Wallenberg con-
tinued his negative attitude toward the Armenians and the Armenian question. He
dismissed the claims that there were any Armenians in Turkey whatsoever, but
there were ‘‘Turks of Christian faith.’’ To verify that there was no Armenian com-
munity in Turkey, Wallenberg cites an Armenian lawyer who said: ‘‘We are Turks
and wish to remain that way.’’76 Later Wallenberg asserts that the Armenians do
not have a future anyway. In Turkey, practically all ‘‘so-called Armenians speak
Turkish,’’ and ‘‘in the Soviet Union, they will surely be Russified.’’77 Furthermore,
he claimed that the effort to create an independent Armenia was entirely a desire
of diasporic Armenians, who were ‘‘rootless nationalists,’’ and had no anchorage
whatsoever among Armenians in Armenia. In this regard he compared the Armenian
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exile organizations with the Zionist movement, comparing the Turkish Armenians to
the Palestinian Jews, criticizing their co-nationalists in the diaspora.78
On 22 October 1920, news was received about Armenia’s request for Entente
assistance due to an ultimatum from Soviet Russia. Citing Inde´pendance Belge,
Dagens Nyheter reported that ‘‘the League of Nations, in regard to Armenia, has
proposed that the Supreme Council should appoint a mandate power for Armenia.’’79
The issue of a Swedish mandate over Armenia was brought up during the autumn
session of the League of Nations. On 20 November 1921, the League had its first
General Assembly, with Hjalmar Branting as the leader of the Swedish delegation.
The meeting had received numerous telegrams from Armenian organizations in
France, Turkey, Romania, USA, and Egypt, among other places, appealing to the
members of the League to save Armenia.80 In terms of the Grotian definition, these
appeals were the calls from the suppressed subjects asking for foreign intervention
as a refined form of ‘‘just war.’’81 Referring to the telegrams and the appeal of
the Armenians, the Yugoslavian delegate asked the major powers to intervene. The
humanitarian intervention was not only a rescue mission, but also a peacekeeping
one. Thereafter, Branting took the podium, seconding the previous speakers,
demanding that the major powers intervene in the matter.82 Thus, one could
conclude that, in Branting’s view, the intervention was not only a moral duty for
protecting the human rights and the security of the Armenian subjects in Turkey,
but also that the whole situation posed a threat to international security and
the newly established League of Nations. Both France and England declined the
mandate, referring to the fact that they already had accepted mandate missions.
Upon receiving the news, Swedish Prime Minister Louis De Geer the Younger
immediately telegrammed back to the League, declining the mandate over Armenia,
due to ‘‘the distance between the countries, and the complex and grave nature of
the Armenian problem.’’83 Norway’s telegram was, literally, a carbon copy of the
Swedish reply, while the Danish answer was also the same in its content.84
On November 23, Nya Dagligt Allehanda published an article posing the follow-
ing question: ‘‘Shall the Armenian question lead to the creation of an international
police force?’’85 This also might be the very first occasion when the need of an inter-
national peacekeeping force had arisen. That the League was unwilling or unable
to make any commitment in regard to the Armenian question in the hour of need
was exposed by the Social-Demokraten correspondent in Geneva, who wrote, ‘‘The
civilized nations looked at each other, a bit ashamed indeed and each and everyone
whispered their answer to the Council: ‘Surely Armenia must be aided. It is a
responsibility toward all humanity to aid Armenia. It must not happen that Armenia
is not aided. But why should I do it? Why should I? Why should I?’ was sounded
from every direction. ‘Why exactly should I expose myself for the risk and the incon-
venience of putting my nose in this robber’s den?’ And so all the civilized nations
there stood on the shore, around the drowning people, each and everyone with
its lifeline in hand. But no one wanted or dared to throw it, fearing they would
themselves be drawn into the water.’’86 The world community obviously saw the
problem and expressed its sympathy, but that was all. Armenia was simply not
worth the risk. Whoever engaged in accepting mandate power over Armenia would
risk both being burdened with expenses and getting involved in conflict with the
economically and politically more adept neighbors such as Turkey, Azerbaijan,
and Russia. The responses from almost all countries declining participation, who
acknowledged the need for humanitarian intervention, illustrates that while there
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is sufficient will to intervene, there is insufficient will to devote resources to the
cause.
On 19 October 1921, Wallenberg wrote yet another letter in regard to the possi-
ble request by the League of Nations for Sweden to act as guarantor for a temporary
Armenian government in Cilicia. The prospects for such a request looked quite slim,
but nonetheless, Wallenberg’s recommendation, based on the same reasons he had
provided about the suggestion concerning the mandate power, was to decline such
a request.87 Commenting on the issue of non-interference in a sovereign state’s
internal affairs, he notes that ‘‘to seek to make an international issue of this would,
at its core, be the same as choosing to raise the principle that states would no longer
legally have the right to take measures against plots regarding their security.’’88 On
15 November 1921, the economic worth of a close relation with Constantinople was
made more clear when Wallenberg dispatched a four-page report analyzing the
development in the Black Sea region, in which he repeatedly emphasized the
renewed importance of Constantinople, pointing out (mentioned twice and under-
lined on pages 1 and 4) that ‘‘the road to the new Russian market does not pass
over the Baltic Sea any more, but over Constantinople and the Black Sea ports.’’89
Swedish trade and economic interests in Turkey were far more important than any
humanitarian-related problem.
Conclusion
Taking the data at hand into consideration, it is clear that the information regarding
the massacres in the Ottoman Empire and their genocidal nature was abundant in
Swedish newspapers as well as in the reports submitted to the Church of Sweden,
the Swedish Defense Ministry, and the Swedish foreign ministry and government.
It is safe to assert that the Swedish government had a clear view of what transpired
in Western Armenia during the Great War. Even if one were to disregard the
information presented by the missionaries and the press, the Swedish Government,
especially through its embassy in Constantinople, as well as through its military
attache´ in Turkey, was well informed about the ongoing annihilation. In his dis-
patches to Stockholm, Ambassador Anckarsva¨rd stressed the fact that what took
place in the Ottoman Empire was neither an act of mutual killing, nor measures
taken against Armenian insurrection, but a well-planned systematic annihilation
of the Armenian nation, initiated and implemented by the Turkish government.
Indeed, the reports tell of Armenian collaboration with the Russian Army and armed
resistance in some places, and they also make clear that 1) the acts of vengeance
occurred long after the bulk of the 1915–1916 massacres and deportations, thus
the government’s actions can not be justified as measures against insurgency and
treason; 2) the cooperation with the enemy was to a very limited extent and could
not justify the implemented annihilation of the entire Armenian nation. This view
was further verified by the information and testimonies published by the Swedish,
as well as Danish, Norwegian, German, and American missionaries and relief
workers who had returned home during the last years of the war. The reports also
indicate that the Turkish government relied on the fact that, as long as the war
was going on, the world would be unable to intervene. By the time the war ended,
the genocide had taken its toll, emptying Western Armenia of its Armenians. This,
in part, legitimated claims that it was impossible to create an Armenia based on
national self-determination, simply because there were no Armenians left to make
this decision. The date of the first classified diplomatic intelligence indicates that
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Stockholm received an early warning and was notified of the ongoing humanitarian
catastrophe during the first steps of the large-scale massacres and deportations.
Later reports further indicated that Turkey’s actions illustrated a state violating
the rights and safekeeping of its citizens. That is to say, Turkey was a failed state,
which in turn could justify a humanitarian intervention.
A limited number of politicians, such as Hjalmar Branting, appealed to the
Swedish public to influence Swedish decision making, but there are no indications
in the data studied that suggest any effect in this matter. It seems that only the
missionaries took action and, where and when possible, did everything in their
power to give shelter to the victims, actively worked to provide assistance and food
for the deportees, and saved as many as possible from executions, etc. Ambassador
Anckarsva¨rd, despite his clear knowledge of the situation, refrained from making
any official recommendations to his government in regard to this issue, or to ask
Stockholm about any possible directives. Having said that, one must be reminded
that Anckarsva¨rd remarked on the moral aspects of the annihilation policy and that
the Turkish government made itself guilty of committing crimes against humanity,
but his diplomatic position and obedience to the neutrality policy did not allow him
to act. Unlike Anckarsva¨rd, Wallenberg played an active role in Stockholm’s decision
making, or at least influencing the basis for it, by openly advocating a specific policy
in regard to the Armenian question. Wirse´n, too, had a comprehensive knowledge
about the annihilation, but as a military envoy might not have had the authority to
make political comments. Only later, when commenting on his experience from the
mission, does Wirse´n describe the massacres and the deportation of the Armenian
nation and try to interpret their true nature and the aims of the Turkish leaders.
As far as the Swedish government is concerned, there will need to be an extended
study of the events in order to comment on the Swedish official action, or the lack
thereof. There are no data indicating that Sweden would have put forward any
protests or pressure for a humanitarian intervention. Nonetheless, the absence of
relevant information does not allow a full interpretation of the official stand. Yet,
later, when the question of a mandate power was brought up, Sweden acted like
other nations, unwilling to be involved in the country so far away. Thus, the wording
of the Swedish correspondent asking ‘‘Why should I?’’ depicts quite well the senti-
ment that prevailed in Sweden in regard to far-away Armenia.
Expanding the horizons of this study, and trying to find out how the Swedish
officials debated the news received about the Armenian massacres, would enable
one to investigate a new perspective on the data presented in this study. How does
a small state respond when confronted with the news about an ongoing humani-
tarian crisis and the option of intervening? What alternatives did Stockholm have,
how did the decision makers debate, and what did they decide? Do massive humani-
tarian crises, such as genocide, challenge the fundamental doctrine of small-state
policies or that of an international organization, such as the UN? How can an
effective humanitarian intervention be implemented in a time of a major regional
or global conflict when the perpetrating side is already at war with the potential
interveners? Is an intervention by foreign states always impossible when genocide
is committed during the course of a global war? Are there any alternative solutions
for a military intervention? In order to address these questions, additional factors
must be added to the equation, such as the dynamics of Sweden’s foreign policy of
abandoning its strict neutrality by engaging in the League of Nations, but also the
perceived imminent threat from the new Bolshevik Russia.
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